Opinion
F079121
10-08-2019
In re D.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SELENA L., Defendant and Appellant.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Kevin A. Stimmel, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17CEJ300286-1)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Leanne LeMon, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Kevin A. Stimmel, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Selena L., mother of the minor D.E., appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition and in finding the "beneficial parent-child relationship exception" to adoption did not apply. Mother also contends reversal is required because the juvenile court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We reject all of mother's contentions and affirm.
References to code sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Because mother is the appealing party, we focus on those facts relevant to her and the issues she has raised. The minor was born in 2016. Mother and father engaged in a physical altercation in the presence of the child in January 2017. Father was arrested. Complaints were made to the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) on behalf of the minor on April 11, 2017, and September 12, 2017. Both complaints were "evaluated out."
Thereafter, on September 18, 2017, mother was a passenger in a vehicle being pursued by law enforcement. When the car sped away from law enforcement, there was a collision. The minor was in the back seat of the car but not properly secured in a car seat. At the time of the collision, used bindles of methamphetamine, a torch, and marijuana were found in the minor's diaper bag. In another bag carried by mother there was a second torch, a tin containing methamphetamine, and a methamphetamine pipe. The day after the collision, mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
A section 300 petition was filed on behalf of the minor on September 19, 2017. It was alleged that father also abused methamphetamine and was in a Salvation Army rehabilitation center at the time of the filing of the petition. Mother did not have stable housing.
The minor was detained on September 20, 2017. The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation for the parents. The department was ordered to provide parenting classes, substance abuse assessment and treatment, random drug testing, domestic violence assessment and treatment, and mental health evaluation and treatment.
Mother denied Indian ancestry and filed a form ICWA-020 so stating on September 20, 2017.
On November 13, 2017, both parents appeared in juvenile court and were represented by counsel; father's appearance was telephonic. Mother had not yet engaged in services, although they had been offered, and the referrals had to be renewed because they had lapsed. Mother submitted on the petition. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent of the juvenile court and authorized placement in foster care or with an approved relative. Reunification services were ordered for mother along with supervised visitation.
Also, at the November 13, 2017 hearing, the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply to the minor. The record of this hearing does not reflect an inquiry was made of father during the hearing regarding possible Indian ancestry.
A court-appointed special advocate (CASA) was assigned to the minor on December 5, 2017.
On April 30, 2018, the social worker reported the minor remained in a licensed foster home. Mother had completed a parenting class and attended a domestic violence evaluation. She had not participated in a substance abuse assessment, mental health assessment, or drug testing. Mother did maintain visitation.
On May 25, 2018, mother finally participated in a substance abuse evaluation, reported daily methamphetamine use, and was referred to a residential treatment program. Mother entered the program three days later. At the residential program, mother engaged in substance abuse treatment, domestic violence prevention, and anger management classes. Father entered a residential treatment program on June 4, 2018.
On July 16, 2018, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and advised the parents of the right to file an extraordinary writ. The juvenile court also reduced visitation to two supervised visits per month.
Mother filed a section 388 petition on October 10, 2018, seeking reinstatement of reunification services. The CASA supported mother's request.
The minor was placed with a relative on December 14, 2018. A decision was made to seek adoption as the permanent placement plan for the minor.
On January 28, 2019, the department requested the section 388 petition be denied. The department maintained that mother had failed to maintain a safe and sober lifestyle for any appreciable time period. The social worker reported that mother expressed she was not ready to care for the minor for another one to two years. The current relative placement was with the prospective adoptive parents and the minor seemed happy and well-adjusted in the home. The social worker was of the opinion the minor had formed a parent-child relationship with the prospective adoptive parents that was stronger than any relationship the minor had formed with either parent. The social worker described mother's visits with the minor as "play dates."
A contested section 366.26 hearing in combination with a hearing on the section 388 petition was held on April 10, 2019. Mother testified, stating she had a lot more work to do toward achieving long-term sobriety. Mother was seeking a stable home in a sober living environment and was not seeking custody of the minor. Mother also praised the current relative placement for the minor.
The social worker noted 18 months had passed since the filing of the section 300 petition and mother still was not able to accept custody of the minor, even with family maintenance services.
The juvenile court denied the section 388 petition, terminated parental rights, and ordered adoption as the permanent placement plan.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on April 12, 2019.
DISCUSSION
Mother raises three issues in this appeal: (1) the juvenile court failed to comply with ICWA; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition; and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply to mother.
I. ICWA
Mother contends reversal is required because the juvenile court failed to directly inquire of father whether he had Indian ancestry and did not order him to complete form ICWA-020.
Father appeared through counsel on September 20, 2017. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on November 13, 2017, father's counsel was present in person and father participated by telephone. At this hearing, the juvenile court made a finding that ICWA did not apply to the minor.
In the report dated October 29, 2018, prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker stated that a new ICWA inquiry was conducted with father on October 12, 2018, and father reported having no Indian ancestry.
Standard of Review
Where, as here, the juvenile court has made a finding the ICWA is inapplicable, the finding is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 178-179.) Thus, we must uphold the court's orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we must indulge all legitimate inferences in favor of affirmance. (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) A juvenile court's ICWA finding is also subject to harmless error analysis. (In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 16.)
ICWA Notice Requirements
A parent can raise the issue of ICWA compliance at any stage of the proceedings, including in an appeal after termination of parental rights. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14.) Consequently, although both mother and father failed to raise any challenge to the ICWA notice in the juvenile court, mother has not forfeited her right to challenge the ICWA compliance.
Congress enacted the ICWA to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes that will reflect the unique values of Indian culture. (In re C.Y. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 34, 39; In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195.) An " 'Indian child' is defined as a child who is either (1) 'a member of an Indian tribe' or (2) 'eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and ... the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe ....' (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)" (In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 338.) The ICWA applies only to federally recognized tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(8); In re Jonathon S., supra, at p. 338; In re B.R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 773, 783; In re Wanomi P. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 156, 166-168.)
"The ICWA establishes minimum federal standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children from their families." (In re H.A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1210.) "Among the procedural safeguards included in the ICWA is a provision for notice, which states in part: 'In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.' (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)" (In re D.T. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1454.) Notice serves the dual purpose of (1) enabling the tribe to investigate and determine whether a child is an Indian child, and (2) advising the tribe of the pending proceeding and its right to intervene. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 470.)
Because the ICWA was enacted by Congress with the intent to "protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families" (25 U.S.C. § 1902), the juvenile court and the department had an affirmative and continuing duty at the outset of the proceedings to inquire whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child. (In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-839; see § 224.3, subd. (a); see also California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)
References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
A social worker who "knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is ... involved ... must make further inquiry" regarding the possible Indian status of the child, "as soon as practicable, by: [¶] (A) [i]nterviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and 'extended family members'... to gather the information listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2[, subdivision(a)(5)]." (Rule 5.481(a)(4); In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165. (Gabriel G.).) "[I]f the court [or] social worker ... subsequently receive[] any information required under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.2 that was not previously available or included in the notice issued under Section 224.2, the social worker ... shall provide the additional information to any tribes entitled to notice under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.2 and the Bureau of Indian Affairs." (Former § 224.3, subd. (f), as amended Stats. 2018, ch. 833 § 7.)
Duty to Inquire
In every dependency proceeding, the department and the juvenile court have an " 'affirmative and continuing duty' ... to 'inquire whether a child ... is or may be an Indian child ....' " (§ 224.3, subd. (a); see rule 5.481(a); In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 53 (W.B.); Gabriel G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) Once the court or department " 'knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the social worker ... is required to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and to do so as soon as practicable ....' " (Rule 5.481(a)(4); § 224.3, subd. (c); Gabriel G., supra, at p. 1165.)
Section 224.3 and rule 5.481(a) impose upon both the juvenile court and the department "an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire" whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian child. (See W.B., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 53.) The social worker must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and the parents, if the child has Indian heritage. (Rule 5.481(a)(1).) Upon a parent's first appearance in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must order the parent to complete a form ICWA-020. (Rule 5.481(a)(2).) "If the parent, Indian custodian, or guardian does not appear at the first hearing, or is unavailable at the initiation of a proceeding, the court must order the person or entity that has the inquiry duty under this rule to use reasonable diligence to find and inform the parent, Indian custodian, or guardian that the court has ordered the parent, Indian custodian, or guardian to complete ... (form ICWA-020)." (Rule 5.481(a)(3).) Here, mother completed form ICWA-020, but the record contains no form ICWA-020 completed by father.
It is clear the department and the juvenile court have an " 'affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child ... is or may be an Indian child ...' " and the department satisfied that duty. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); rule 5.481(a); Gabriel G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; W.B., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 53.) The department satisfied that duty by making an inquiry of father on October 12, 2018. At that time, father indicated he had no Indian ancestry.
The department received no information from mother or father regarding potential Indian ancestry and, in fact, both parents denied having any Indian ancestry. The department is required to serve the ICWA notices only when it "knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved." (Rule 5.481(a)(4); § 224.3, subd. (c); Gabriel G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) In the absence of any information indicating the minor may have Indian ancestry, the department was under no duty to serve any ICWA notice.
Harmless Error
If the juvenile court erred in failing to have father complete the form ICWA-020, any error was harmless. Father was interviewed by the social worker, apparently more than once, and denied any Indian ancestry. Furthermore, mother has not asserted in this appeal that father has Indian ancestry or provided any information to dispute father's representation to the social worker that he had no Indian ancestry. (In re Alexis H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 16.)
II. Section 388 Petition
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition because granting the petition was in the best interests of the minor.
Mother's section 388 petition was filed on October 10, 2018, after reunification services had been terminated. Mother stated in the section 388 petition that reunification services were terminated as to her on July 13, 2018. She claimed to have now "demonstrated a commitment to sobriety and changed lifestyle." Mother wanted the section 366.26 hearing vacated and reunification services reinstated.
In support of the section 388 petition, mother attached a letter from Fresno First CalWORKS Residential Program, Mental Health Systems, stating mother had enrolled in a residential treatment program on May 28, 2018, as a referral from the department. Services through the department were terminated on July 16, 2018. Mother enrolled in a 90-day residential treatment program on July 17, 2018, and was scheduled to complete the program on October 14, 2018, but transferred to another residential program lasting six to nine months on October 1, 2018. Mother was attending group sessions two to three times per week and learning about "healthy boundaries and establishing healthy relationships."
In denying the section 388 petition, the juvenile court noted that mother's substance abuse problem had been long-standing; that mother continued to abuse methamphetamine after the section 300 petition was filed in September 2017; there were positive drug tests during the pendency of the case; and that mother refused to participate in services for at least six months after they were offered. The juvenile court also noted that the proceedings were initiated because mother was in a high-speed chase with law enforcement, while the minor was in the back seat and not properly secured. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in the minor's diaper bag.
The juvenile court acknowledged that mother appeared to be able to remain sober while she was in a residential program. Mother remained in a residential program at the time of the hearing. It also was noted that the bond between mother and the minor appeared "weak" and not a strong parental bond. Mother had indicated she would be able to assume custody of the minor in another one to two years.
The juvenile court found that granting mother's section 388 petition would not be in the best interests of the minor because mother was not currently in a position to have the minor returned to her on family maintenance, and that six months of additional services would not "be enough of a change to return the minor at that time."
Standard of Review
Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child's best interests. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919; see rule 5.570(e).) The standard of review for an order denying a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion. "The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.)
The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) Courts liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its sufficiency. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).) In assessing the petition, the court may consider the entire history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) Where there is conflicting evidence, we reverse only if the evidence compels a finding for the appellant as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527-1529.)
The best interests of the child are of paramount consideration when a section 388 petition is brought after reunification services have been terminated. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child at this juncture, the juvenile court's focus is on the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.)
Analysis
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] The parent bears the burden to show both a legitimate change of circumstances and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child." (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 611-612.) Section 388 serves as an " 'escape mechanism' when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights." (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528.)
"Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order. [Citation.] ... [T]he problem that initially brought the child within the dependency system must be removed or ameliorated. [Citations.] The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged order." (In re A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.)
"After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.' " (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) "A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child." (Ibid.) " 'A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent ... might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests.' " (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206.)
We agree with the juvenile court that mother did not carry her burden of showing that granting the section 388 petition would be in the best interests of the minor. Mother's sobriety had been relatively short-lived. She had been provided with 18 months of services; failed to participate in services for at least the first six months; had positive drug tests during the pendency of the case; and was currently unable to accept custody of the minor and did not feel she could do so for another one to two years. Mother was in the process of looking for a sober living facility in which she could reside while participating in services.
Essentially, mother was asking the juvenile court to delay permanency for the minor for another one to two years to see if mother would be able, at some future point, to have custody of and parent the minor. This does not promote stability for the minor or the minor's best interests. (In re Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.) "The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it." (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038.)
While mother had made progress after reunification services were terminated, she was not in a position to provide a permanent, stable home for the minor. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) "Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate." (Id. at p. 310.) The minor had been in dependency and placed in foster care since September 2017, when she was about 10 months old. By the time of the hearing on the section 388 petition on April 10, 2019, the minor had been in foster care for about 18 months. The minor, nearly two and one-half years old, needed permanency and stability that mother was unable to provide. (Id. at p. 309.)
III. Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it failed to find the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applicable. Mother asserts she maintained regular visitation with the minor during the dependency and that she and the minor "have a parent/child relationship warranting preservation." The department does not dispute that mother maintained regular visitation. However, the department contends that mother failed to establish that termination of her parental rights would cause detriment to the minor.
Standard of Review
The standard of review of a court's finding that a parent did not meet his or her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights applies is "whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law." (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528, italics added.) The evidence on the record before us does not compel a finding that the exception applies.
Analysis
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and order the child be placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions to the general preference of termination of parental rights is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides the court shall terminate parental rights unless "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to ... the following circumstance[]: [¶] The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It is the parent's burden to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor because of the exception to termination of parental rights and adoption. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573-574 (Autumn H.).)
"Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) "[B]enefit from continuing the relationship," as described by subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of section 366.26, however, has been interpreted to mean "the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) "[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." (Ibid.) The preference for adoption is overcome if severing the relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. (Ibid.)
"The balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables, including the age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.) Here, the minor was very young; she was approximately 28 months old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and had spent 18 of those months in foster care. The minor was placed in the home of relatives, who wanted to adopt the minor. The minor was in a stable placement, and the minor recognized the relatives as her primary caregivers.
Evidence of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a beneficial parental relationship. (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.) Even though mother's visits with the minor usually went well and the interactions were positive, that is insufficient to establish detriment from termination of parental rights. Mother's visits were twice weekly from November 13, 2017, to July 16, 2018. Visitation was reduced to twice per month from July 16, 2018, until parental rights were terminated on April 10, 2019. Mother had not served a parental role in the minor's life during the 18-month duration of the dependency proceedings.
The court is also permitted to consider the amount of time the child has spent in the parent's custody. (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) In the present case, the minor had spent 10 months in mother's custody and 18 months in foster care. Thus, the minor had spent more than half her young life out of mother's custody.
There was no evidence that the minor would suffer detriment if mother's parental rights were terminated. Mother did not present a bonding study that might have revealed the extent of their bond and whether the minor would be harmed if that bond were severed. (See, e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 533-534 [the mother failed to demonstrate harm would ensue from termination of parental rights where the record showed the child easily separated from the mother at the conclusion of visits and readily returned to the caretaker's home, and there was no bonding study or evidence to counter the social worker's conclusion that the child would not suffer any detriment].) "[I]f an adoptable child will not suffer great detriment by terminating parental rights, the court must select adoption as the permanen[t] plan." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229.)
An example of sufficient evidence of detriment is found in In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, where the appellate court concluded the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied when the nearly nine-year-old son had lived with his mother for the first six and one-half years of his life, he "seemed lonely, sad, and ... 'the odd child out' " in his placement, he wanted to live with his mother, he enjoyed unsupervised night visits in her home, and a psychologist opined the son and his mother "shared a 'strong and well[-]developed' parent-child relationship and a 'close attachment' approaching a primary bond." (Id. at pp. 1206-1207.) Similarly, in In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, the appellate court reversed termination of parental rights, finding the exception applied, where a psychologist, therapists, and the CASA all concluded a beneficial parental relationship clearly outweighed the benefit of adoption, the two older children had a strong primary bond with their mother, and the younger child was strongly attached to her. (Id. at pp. 690-691.)
After reunification services are terminated, the goal is no longer reunification, but permanency and stability for the children. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) Mother essentially ignores the strong statutory preference for adoption at the stage of a section 366.26 hearing. (See § 366.26, subd. (b).) The evidence does not compel a finding the beneficial parent-child exception applies. We do not find the juvenile court misapplied the law; the beneficial parent-child exception did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The section 366.26 order terminating parental rights and placing the minor for adoption is affirmed.