French v. the City of Wilmington

Full title: Jayme S. French v. The City of Wilmington, A Municipal Corporation of The…

Court: Superior Court of Delaware

Date published: Aug 26, 2005

C.A. No. 02C-07-063-JRJ (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2005)

Opinion

C.A. No. 02C-07-063-JRJ.

Date Submitted: July 25, 2005.

Date Decided: August 26, 2005.

Allen D. Bowers, II, Esquire, Law Office of Joseph J. Rhoades, Wilmington, DE.

Beth H. Christman, Esquire, Casarino, Christman Shalk, Wilmington, DE.

Alex J. Mili, Jr., Esquire, City of Wilmington Law Dept., Wilmington, DE.

JAN R. JURDEN, Judge.

Dear Counsel:

The Court has reviewed the post-hearing submissions relating to Defendant Godfrey's Motion for Summary Judgment. In his deposition, Firefighter Krystopolsky testified:

We were sitting there at the light, we were edging up so we could look up Shipley and I heard a couple of warbles and saw the lights in the side view mirror. And I told Ron to let up and let him [Brown] go because there was something going on.

Defendant Godfrey points out that elsewhere in Krystopolsky's deposition, he testified his firetruck was "five to ten feet before the intersection" when the accident happened. Based on Firefighter Krystopolsky's testimony alone, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Godfrey should have seen the emergency lights on the firetruck or heard the firetruck siren.

The defendant argues that his expert testimony establishes that the intersection where the accident occurred is a "blind" intersection, and because the defendant, City of Wilmington, has failed to rebut this testimony, Defendant Godfrey is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of his alleged negligence. According to Defendant Godfrey, in light of the defendant City's failure to rebut Godfrey's expert testimony that the configuration of the intersection makes it very difficult for motorists on Shipley Street approaching 4^th Street to see or hear what is happening on 4^th Street, the only way a jury could conclude that Defendant Godfrey was negligent was to speculate about what Godfrey could see or hear. The Court disagrees. There are ample facts from which a jury could determine what Defendant Godfrey should have seen or heard as he approached the intersection. There are questions of material fact as to where the firetruck was shortly before the collision, i.e., whether it was stopped at the intersection or moving up to the light before the collision, what, if any, of the firetruck and its emergency lights should have been visible to Defendant Godfrey as he approached the intersection, and whether Defendant Godfrey should have heard the firetruck siren. These are questions for the jury to decide. For these reasons, Defendant Godfrey's motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.