French v. French

4 Citing cases

  1. Hamilton v. Hamilton

    154 Tex. 511 (Tex. 1955)   Cited 69 times
    Reiterating that a partition deed does not transfer or convey title but divides the property so as to give each owner the share which he already owned by virtue of a prior deed or conveyance

    This petitioner insists that the covenants of warranty in a deed convey a fee simple title and that an after-acquired title inures and immediately passes to the benefit of the grantee, citing Scates v. Fohn, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W. 837, also Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3; Jackson v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 644; Gottwald v. Warlick, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 1060 and Bedford v. Rayner Cattle Co., 13 Tex. 618, 35 S.W. 931. These general propositions are correct but not decisive of our case. It seems to be the law generally that a partition deed does not operate as a conveyance or transfer of title, the effect being to divide the property and to give to each the share which he already owned by virtue of some prior deed or other conveyance. French v. French, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 586, er. ref.; Jones v. State, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 973, the reason being that the parties already owned their respective interests and a partition deed from one to another is not the conveyance of title but merely the division of the property so that each may have exclusive use and occupancy and the right to dispose of as he sees fit his own land, to make it in a form certain instead of an undivided interest in the whole. Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472.

  2. In re Allen

    658 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Tex.Estates Code Ann. § 102.003.See generallyWassmer v. Hopper , 463 S.W.3d 513, 526 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.) (recognizing that the homestead exemption passes to the surviving spouse through the Probate Code and the Texas Constitution, and that the surviving spouse's interest in the homestead was not subject to estate administration); French v. French , 188 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.), (the homestead right is not inherited by the surviving spouse but is acquired through the Texas Constitution and statutes), citingRoots v. Robertson , 93 Tex. 365, 371, 55 S.W. 308, 309 (1900) (recognizing that the "homestead exemption does not descend to heirs, but they take the property, under the statute and the constitution ..."). We need not, however, decide whether Lisa fits within section 22.010 ’s general definition of "distributee," because Lisa is a "distributee" under the more specific definition of that term found in section 404.005(d) of the Code.

  3. Donahoe v. Allen

    608 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    Neither can such rights be inherited, nor transferred by will. Roots v. Robertson, 93 Tex. 365, 55 S.W. 308, 310 (1900); see also French v. French, 188 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1945, writ ref'd w. o. m.); George v. Taylor, 296 S.W.2d 620, 623-624 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Further, a conveyance of property protected by homestead rights, though inoperative during the tenure of the homestead, becomes operative on the death of the protected party.

  4. Odstrcil v. Odstrcil

    384 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 4 times
    Stating that the law generally does not recognize a partition as operating as a conveyance or transfer of title

    'It seems to be the law generally that a partition deed does not operate as a conveyance or transfer of title, the effect being to divide the property and to give to each the share which he already owned by virtue of some prior deed or other conveyance. French v. French, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 586, er. ref.; Jones v. State, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 973, the reason being that the parties already owned their respective interests and a partition deed from one to another is not the conveyance of title but merely the division of the property so that each may have exclusive use and occupancy and the right to dispose of as he sees fit his own land, to make it in a form certain instead of an undivided interest in the whole. Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472.