Opinion
No. 641 C.D. 2011 No. 642 C.D. 2011
07-05-2012
CASES ARE NOT CONSOLIDATED
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, JR., Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
In these two related appeals, Jonathan Freeman and Sean P. Gallagher (collectively, Petitioners), police officers employed by Trainer Borough, Delaware County, challenge the final orders of the Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission (Commission) revoking their police officers' certifications for violating the Commission's cheating policy. They argue that the Commission had no authority under Section 2164 of the Act, commonly referred to as the Municipal Police Education and Training Act, as amended, 53 Pa. C.S. § 2164, to revoke their certifications for cheating and that the Commission's decisions are arbitrary and capricious, constitute an abuse of discretion and violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
These two unconsolidated appeals are related to twelve appeals docketed at Nos. 599-610 C.D. 2011 and an appeal docketed at No. 612 C.D. 2011. This Court permitted the Commission to file a single brief for all of the related appeals. To the extent that Petitioners, represented by the same counsel, raise the same legal issues, the Court's discussion in Barbour v. Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 599-610 C.D. 2011, filed July 5, 2012), and Hannigan v. Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 612 C.D. 2011, filed July 5, 2012), a memorandum opinion, equally applies to these two appeals.
I.
The Commission is responsible for establishing a municipal police officers' education and training program, which is administered by the Pennsylvania State Police. Section 2161(a) of the Act, 53 Pa. C.S. § 2161(a). The Commission has, inter alia, the following powers and duties:
The Commission is composed of twenty members, including the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, the Secretary of Community and Economic Development, the Attorney General, and the appointees of the Governor, the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Section 2163(a) of the Act, as amended, 53 Pa. C.S. § 2163(a).
(1) To establish and administer the minimum courses of study for basic and in-service training for police officers and to revoke an officer's certification when an officer fails to comply with the basic and in-service training requirements or is convicted of a criminal offense or the commission determines that the officer is physically or mentally unfit to perform the duties of his office.
....Section 2164(1), (6) and (14) of the Act (emphasis and footnote added).
(6) To require every police officer to attend a minimum number of hours of in-service training as provided for by regulation ....
....
(14) To make such rules and regulations and to perform such other duties as may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to implement the education and training program for police officers.
The term "certification" is defined as "[t]he assignment of a certification number to a police officer after successful completion of a mandatory basic training course ... and successful completion of mandatory in-service training." Section 2162 of the Act, as amended, 53 Pa. C.S. § 2162. A certification is issued initially for two years and can be renewed every two years thereafter only to officers who have satisfied the mandatory in-service training requirements. Id.; 37 Pa. Code § 203.13(c). The 1988 amendment to the Act granted the Commission the authority to revoke a police officer's certification. Saccol v. Mun. Police Officers' Educ. & Training Comm'n, 613 A.2d 122 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
Under the Commission's regulations, municipal police officers are required to comply with (1) "[c]ontinuous" in-service requirements, consisting of annual qualifications on firearms and other weapons and maintenance of a first aid and CPR certification, and (2) "[a]cademic" in-service requirements, consisting of at least 12 hours of annual academic training requirements. 37 Pa. Code § 203.52(b)(1) and (2). Successful completion of academic in-service requirements is determined by examinations provided by the Commission and administered by certified course instructors at the end of each training course. 37 Pa. Code § 203.52(c)(6).
The Commission also adopted a policy on cheating in 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a), which provides:
The contents of all examinations are confidential. An individual may not cheat or tamper in any manner with an official examination either conducted or sponsored by the Commission by obtaining, furnishing, accepting, or attempting to obtain, furnish or accept
answers or questions to examinations, or portions thereof. Individuals may not copy, photograph or otherwise remove examination contents; nor may they use any misrepresentation or dishonest method while preparing, administering or participating in examinations. Unauthorized possession of a test, examination, quiz or a [sic] questions, answers or answer keys relating to a test, examination or quiz shall constitute cheating. An individual violating this section shall be barred from further participation in any Commission-required training and ineligible for certification. Individuals will receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard under Subchapter G (relating to notice and hearings). [Emphasis added.]The Commission "maintains the right to revoke certification after notice and an opportunity to be heard" for "[f]ailure to successfully complete annual mandatory in-service training" and "[c]heating." 37 Pa. Code § 203.14(a)(4) and (9).
II.
In separate letters dated June 30, 2009, the Commission's executive director, John M. Gallaher, informed Petitioners and 13 other police officers involved in the related appeals that he was proposing to revoke their police officers' certifications for cause and that they had a right to request a hearing within 15 days. Gallaher stated that he possessed facts which led him to believe that they (1) failed to successfully complete the 2009 academic in-service training requirements and (2) cheated during the academic training course examinations by possessing and/or furnishing answers to the examinations. A hearing officer appointed by the Commission held 15 separate hearings on the proposed revocations of certification in November and December 2009. After the hearings, the hearing officer granted the Commission's motion to adopt a master record, consisting of the testimony of the Commission's witnesses at the November 2, 2009 hearing held for Officer Michael K. Irey, the petitioner in No. 610 C.D. 2011, and its exhibits M-1 through M-31, which would be considered in all of the 15 related cases. The hearing officer also permitted the Commission to supplement the record to include copies of Gallaher's June 30, 2009 letters (Exhibits M-32 through M-46).
The evidence presented by the Commission revealed the following circumstances leading to the cheating allegations against the officers. In 2009, police officers were required to take four three-hour annual academic in-service training courses. The Commission prepares three versions of examinations for each academic in-service training course: (1) Test 1, also referred to and interchangeable with Test A, to be administered after each training course; (2) Test 2 or Test B, a retest for officers who fail Test 1; and (3) Test 3 or Test C, to be administered to officers who fail both Test 1 and Test 2 and must re-take the course. Before scheduled examinations, the Commission sends twenty-one police academies a compact disc containing three versions of tests and answer keys. The police academy directors then reproduce hard copies of the tests and answer keys from the compact disc. Each test consists of ten multiple-choice questions with a possible answer of A, B, C or D for each question. In late December 2008, the Commission shipped test materials for 2009 in-service training courses to the police academies by UPS.
On February 5, 2009 Officers Brian Dever and Joseph Devlin of the Borough of Oxford police department received an e-mail from Gallagher, who was a full-time police officer for the Borough of Oxford at that time, with the subject line, "FW: Answers for Act 180 if you need them." The e-mail then listed answers to all four 2009 academic training course examinations. Exhibits M-12 and M-13; Commission's Master Record (M.R.) at 156-57. Dever and Devlin forwarded Gallagher's e-mail to their police chief, who in turn reported the e-mail to the director of the police academy at the Delaware County Community College (Delaware County police academy), William Davis. Gallagher told the police chief that he received the e-mail from Freeman on February 5 and forwarded it to other police officers. Davis notified the Commission's administrative officer, Beverly Young, that the Test 1 answers had been disseminated via an e-mail. On February 12, 2009, Young and the Commission's director of training, Rudy M. Grubesky, instructed police officers' education training specialists, Timothy Ebersole and Kimberly L. Shaw, to investigate the cheating allegations.
On February 24, 2009, Grubesky sent the police academy directors an e-mail, notifying them that Test 1 for all four 2009 in-service training course examinations had been compromised and should not be used. The Test 1 materials were destroyed, and the Test 2 and Test 3 versions were used for the February 25 and 26 examinations at the Delaware County police academy. After reviewing the answers of the officers who failed to receive a passing grade of 70%, the course instructor learned that they seemed to have the same wrong answers and that most of them would have received 90% or 100% on the Test 1 version. The next day, he informed the Delaware County police academy director of his findings. Petitioners did not sit for the February 25 and 26, 2009 examinations.
On March 2, 2009, the investigators interviewed Gallagher. He was cooperative with the investigation and admitted that he received the e-mail from Freeman and forwarded it to other officers. He told the investigators that he thought Freeman's February 5 e-mail was a joke and deleted it after forwarding it to the other officers. The investigators determined that the answers in the e-mail matched 8 correct answers to the Off-Duty Decision Making test and to all correct answers to the three other courses. Gallagher testified that forwarding the e-mail without indicating that it was a joke was "stupid." November 12, 2009 Hearing, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 23. Officer Devlin testified that nothing in Gallagher's e-mail indicated that it was joke. Gallagher told Officer Dever that he thought the e-mail could not be traced because it was sent from his girlfriend's computer. Following an internal investigation, the Borough of Oxford terminated Gallagher's employment. Gallagher is currently a part-time police officer for Trainer Borough. The Trainer Borough police chief testified that Gallagher had an exceptional reputation for truth and integrity and that he would recommend that the Borough retain Gallagher as a part-time police officer.
Because Gallagher's reproduced record is not numbered, it cannot be cited.
Freeman is a former police officer for the Borough of Oxford and a current police officer for Trainer Borough. The investigators interviewed Freeman on March 3, 2009 because Gallagher told them that he received the e-mail containing the test answers from Freeman. Freeman told the investigators that he received the e-mail from Officer Richard Griffin of the Trainer Borough police department, who has since been decertified. Freeman forwarded the e-mail to other officers and deleted it one or two weeks later. Freeman provided the investigators with a copy of an e-mail that Officer David K. Cleary sent him on February 27, 2009 in response to his February 5 e-mail. Cleary's e-mail stated: "Hey don't use these answers. I was told that someone told [the Commission] that they were out there and they changed the test. Yesterday a bunch of guys used them at Malin Road and had to retest after 1530 hours[.] THERE IS ALWAYS A RAT SOMEWHERE. BE SAFE OUT THERE." Commission's Exhibit M-26; M.R. at 170 (emphasis in original). Freeman told the investigators that he thought Griffin's e-mail was a joke and that "the test answers had been floating around for years." November 12, 2009 Hearing, N.T. at 27; R.R. at 6AA. Officer Ian C. Cleghorn, the petitioner in 601 C.D. 2011, testified that he received the e-mail containing the test answers from Freeman and that he thought it might be a joke. The Trainer Borough police chief testified that his opinion of Freeman as being a good police officer had not changed despite the cheating allegations.
In separate proposed decisions and recommendations dated November 2, 2010, the hearing officer determined that the Commission failed to establish cause to revoke Petitioners' certifications for failure to successfully complete the 2009 in-service training requirements. The hearing officer rejected as not credible Petitioners' testimony that they thought the e-mail was a joke. She also rejected their contention that their actions did not constitute cheating because they did not intend to violate the cheating policy. Concluding that the Commission established that they cheated by possessing and forwarding the test answers, she recommended revocations of their certifications.
On November 4, 2010, the Commission notified Petitioners that exceptions to the hearing officer's proposed decisions and recommendations must be filed no later than December 8, 2010. In a timely filed brief on exceptions, Gallagher challenged certain findings of fact made by the hearing officer and argued, inter alia, that 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a), authorizing the Commission to revoke a police officer's certification for cheating, exceeded the Commission's authority under Section 2164(1) of the Act. Freeman also filed a brief on exceptions, contending that the hearing officer failed to give due weight to his testimony and the testimony of his witnesses, that his action did not constitute cheating because he did not have the knowledge that he was violating the cheating policy, and that not every officer who received the e-mail containing the test answers was recommended for decertification. Counsel for the Pennsylvania State Police filed the responses to the exceptions, urging the Commission to adopt the hearing officer's proposed decisions and recommendations. By a final order dated March 10, 2011, the Commission revoked Petitioners' certifications, adopting verbatim the hearing officer's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, including her conclusion that the evidence did not support the proposed revocations for failure to successfully complete the 2009 in-service training program. Petitioners' appeal to this Court followed.
Exceptions to a hearing officer's proposed decision must be filed "in a brief (designated 'brief on exceptions')" with the agency head within 30 days after the service of the proposed decision or such other time fixed by the agency head. 1 Pa. Code § 35.211. A brief opposing exceptions may be filed within 20 days after the time limit for filing a brief on exceptions or such other time as may be fixed by the agency head. Id. The hearing officer's proposed decision "will not be deemed a final order if a brief on exceptions is not filed." 37 Pa. Code § 203.103(e).
An administrative agency's decision must be affirmed, unless it violated a constitutional right or was not in accordance with law, or any necessary findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; D'Alessandro v. Pa. State Police, 594 Pa. 500, 937 A.2d 404 (2007).
III.
Petitioners first argue that the Commission exceeded its authority under Section 2164(1) of the Act in adopting the cheating policy in 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a) and in maintaining the right to revoke a certification for cheating in 37 Pa. Code § 203.14(a)(9). They assert that the Act authorizes a revocation of certification for failing to comply with the training requirements, not for violating the cheating policy.
The Act delegates to the Commission the broad authority to "make such rules and regulations ... as may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to implement the education and training program for police officers." Section 2164(14). Where, as here, the statute delegates to an agency authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary to administer a statute, regulations adopted pursuant to such authority "establish new law, rights or duties." Borough of Pottstown v. Pa. Mun. Ret. Bd., 551 Pa. 605, 609, 712 A.2d 741, 743 (1998). Such legislative regulations have the force of law and are binding on reviewing courts as part of a statute, as long as they are (1) within the granted power, (2) adopted in compliance with proper procedures and (3) reasonable. Tire Jockey Serv. Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 591 Pa. 73, 915 A.2d 1165 (2007). Petitioners do not dispute that the Commission's regulations were adopted in compliance with the procedural requirements.
The agency's legislative regulations must be distinguished from regulations adopted pursuant to its interpretative rulemaking powers. Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 958 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), aff'd, 607 Pa. 527, 8 A.3d 866 (2010). Unlike the former, the interpretative regulations merely construe a statute and do not expand upon its terms; they are deferred to by the court only if they are reasonable and genuinely track the meaning of the underlying statute. Id.
To establish that an agency has exceeded its legislative rulemaking powers, regulations must appear to be so entirely at odds with fundamental principles as to be the expression of a whim, rather than an exercise of judgment. Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 958 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), aff'd, 607 Pa. 527, 8 A.3d 866 (2010). Under the Act, the Commission is responsible for establishing and administering the municipal police officers' academic training program and setting a minimum hours for required in-service training. Sections 2161(a) and 2164(1) and (6). Pursuant to its broad legislative rulemaking powers granted by the Act, the Commission determined that "[o]nly examinations provided by the Commission shall be used to determine successful completion of academic requirements for [the training] courses." 37 Pa. Code § 203.52(c)(6). To implement the training course examinations, the Commission prohibits individuals from, inter alia, obtaining, furnishing or accepting answers to the examinations. 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a). To enforce this cheating policy, the Commission bars individuals cheating on the examinations from further participating in the required training, makes them ineligible for certification and subjects them to a possible revocation of certification. 37 Pa. Code §§ 203.54(a) and 203.14(a)(9). Contrary to Petitioners' argument, these provisions of the regulations are well within the Commission's broad legislative rulemaking powers to implement the education and training program.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the regulations, "appellate courts accord deference to agencies and reverse agency determinations only if they were made in bad faith or if they constituted a manifest or flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or functions." Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 556 Pa. 199, 208, 727 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1999). The regulations adopted pursuant to the legislative rulemaking powers enjoy a general presumption of reasonableness. Borough of Pottstown.
This Court has consistently held law enforcement officers to high standards of conduct. McFadden v. Pa. State Police, 540 A.2d 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). As this Court stated in Cerceo v. Borough of Darby, 281 A.2d 251, 255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971):
The police officer[ ] is expected to conduct himself lawfully and properly to bring honor and respect to the law which he is sworn and duty-bound to uphold. He who fails to so comport brings upon the law grave shadows of public distrust. We demand from our law enforcement officers, and properly so, adherence to demanding standards which are higher than those applied to many other professions. It is a standard which demands more than a forbearance from overt and
indictable illegal conduct. It demands that in both an officer's private and official lives he do nothing to bring dishonor upon his noble calling and in no way contribute to a weakening of the public confidence and trust of which he is a repository.
In adopting the cheating policy, the Commission determined that police officers who cheat on training course examinations commit a serious breach of such standards of conduct and should not remain certified. The Commission's determination is consistent with its objectives of maintaining the integrity of police forces and promoting the public confidence and trust. The Commission's cheating policy is not arbitrary and was not adopted in bad faith. The Court is disturbed by Petitioners' characterization of their violation of the cheating policy as "de minimis," ignoring the seriousness of their conduct. Freeman's Brief at 17; Gallagher's Brief at 15.
The fact that the regulations do not provide for a less severe punishment for cheating and do not consider mitigating circumstances does not render the regulations unreasonable. In reviewing the regulations, "[i]t is not our function to decide what we would have done under the circumstances if we had been" in the Commission's position. Appeal of Zimmett, 367 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (emphasis in original). A court "is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers." Rohrbaugh, 556 Pa. at 208, 727 A.2d at 1085. Hence, we may not interfere with the Commission's determination that an appropriate punishment for violating the cheating policy is a revocation of certification. See Miller v. City of York, 415 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (holding that the extent of punishments imposed upon a police officer who violated police regulations is for the city council to decide and may not be interfered with by the court, absent a flagrant abuse of discretion). See also McFadden (holding that the Pennsylvania State Police did not abuse its discretion in terminating a state police officer's employment for illegal drug use without considering mitigating circumstances).
IV.
Petitioners further argue that the Commission's decisions denied their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Petitioners seem to assert that the Commission treated them differently than the other officers who received the e-mail containing the test answers and used them during the examinations. Petitioners point out that they did not take the tests in February and did not use the test answers in the e-mail. According to Petitioners, the Commission granted other officers a right to be recertified, while denying the same right to them. They submit that the regulations violate an officer's right to equal protection by authorizing a revocation of certification for cheating, while allowing an officer who has been convicted of a misdemeanor of the third degree involving dishonesty, such as theft from a motor vehicle (Section 3934 of the Crimes Code, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S. § 3934), to remain certified.
While making this general allegation that others were treated differently, Petitioners do not clarify this allegation with any specific information, nor do they point to any evidence in the record supporting such a claim.
A police officer's certification may be revoked for conviction of "a disqualifying criminal offense," i.e., "[a] criminal offense for which more than 1 year in prison can be imposed as punishment." 37 Pa. Code §§ 203.14(a)(6) and 203.1. Under Section 1104(3) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 1104(3), a person convicted of a misdemeanor of the third degree may be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than one year.
Petitioners, however, failed to raise these arguments before the hearing officer or the Commission. To preserve an issue, a party must raise the issue at every stage of the proceeding. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tropello), 763 A.2d 555 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Where, as here, a party failed to raise an issue in an agency proceeding, even one of constitutional dimension, the issue has been waived and cannot be raised on appeal. Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a); K.J. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 767 A.2d 609 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). This includes a challenge to the validity of a regulation (as opposed to a challenge to the facial validity of a statute). Moran v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 973 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); DARLINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACTICE (2011-2012) § 1551:4.
Suffice it to note that "[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n of W. Pa., 453 Pa. 60, 76, 311 A.2d 634, 643 (1974). Whether the classification is the best means to achieve the desired result is a matter left to the legislature, not to the courts. Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam'rs, 577 Pa. 166, 842 A.2d 936 (2004). The punishment imposed by the regulations for cheating is directly related to the Commission's objectives of holding police officers to the high standards of conduct and maintaining the integrity of the police force. We also note that the Commission did not grant a recertification right to any officers involved in the related appeals. Noting that 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a) did not provide for any exception to a revocation based on mitigating circumstances, the hearing officer merely suggested that if the Commission may exercise discretion in determining an appropriate punishment and a possibility of recertification, mitigating circumstances of the officers in the related appeals might be considered. In its final orders, the Commission did not accept the hearing officer's suggestion. Finally, the fact that Petitioners did not take the February examinations and did not use the test answers in the e-mail is irrelevant. The regulations do not limit the application of the cheating policy to test-takers and prohibit any "individuals" from obtaining or forwarding test answers.
V.
Stating that the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines cheating as deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavoring to defraud another of his known right "by some willful deceit," Petitioners finally argue that the Commission failed to establish that their conduct constituted cheating. Gallager's Brief at 15 and Freeman's Brief at 16. They claim that they did not cheat because they believed the e-mail they received and forwarded to others was a joke, as they testified.
Black's Law Dictionary 252 (8th ed. 2004) defines cheating as "[t]he fraudulent obtaining of another's property by means of a false symbol or token, or by other illegal practices." --------
The Commission had the burden of establishing cause for revoking Petitioners' certifications for cheating by a preponderance of the evidence. Suber v. Pa. Comm'n on Crime & Delinquency, 885 A.2d 678 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). A preponderance of the evidence is such evidence as leads a fact-finder to find a contested fact to be more probable than its nonexistence. A.B. v. Slippery Rock Area Sch. Dist., 906 A.2d 674 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In the matter, the Commission adopted the hearing officer's credibility determinations. The hearing officer rejected as not credible Petitioners' testimony that they believed that the e-mail was a joke. The hearing officer noted that Freeman admitted that test answers had been floating around for years, that the subject line of the e-mail identified the e-mail as containing the test answers, and that nothing in the e-mail indicated that it was a joke. The hearing officer further noted that Gallagher told Officer Dever that he thought that the e-mail could not be traced because it was sent from his girlfriend's computer. In addition, Gallagher told Officer Devlin that he would not tell anyone where the e-mail had come from. It was within the exclusive province of the Commission, as a fact-finder, to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicting evidence. A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 898 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Petitioners' reliance on the old definition of cheating in Black's Law Dictionary is inapposite where 37 Pa. Code § 203.54(a) itself defines the term. That section prohibits any individual from "obtaining, furnishing, accepting, or attempting to obtain, furnish or accept answers or questions to examinations, or portions thereof." Id. It further provides that "[u]nauthorized possession of ... answers or answer keys relating to a test, examination or quiz shall constitute cheating." Id. (emphasis added). Under this definition, intent to violate the cheating policy is not an element of cheating. Petitioners admitted that they received the e-mail containing the test answers and forwarded it to other officers. As the hearing officer found, "[i]nstead of stopping the unauthorized dissemination of ... answers, [Petitioners] facilitated the process by forwarding them to other police officers." Hearing Officer's Proposed Decision and Recommendation for Freeman at 18 and Hearing Officer's Proposed Decision and Recommendation for Gallagher at 19. The evidence found credible by the hearing officer in her proposed decisions, adopted by the Commission, supports the revocations of Petitioners' certifications for cheating.
Accordingly, the final orders of the Commission are affirmed.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of July, 2012, the order of the Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of July, 2012, the order of the Municipal Police Officers' Education and Training Commission in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge