Opinion
G062433
02-06-2024
Estate of ROBERT H. FREEMAN, Deceased. v. DONALD L. CORNWELL, Objector and Appellant. ERIC FREEMAN, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent,
Donald L. Cornwell, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant. Law Offices of Ila M. Tanchuk and Ila M. Tanchuk; Oldman, Sallus &Gold, Marc L. Sallus and Kimberley Parkins for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2019-01103309 Kim R. Hubbard, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Donald L. Cornwell, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.
Law Offices of Ila M. Tanchuk and Ila M. Tanchuk; Oldman, Sallus &Gold, Marc L. Sallus and Kimberley Parkins for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
In 2019, Robert H. Freeman died intestate and was survived by five siblings and the only child of a predeceased sixth sibling. The trial court entered judgment providing the estate be equally divided among Robert's siblings and nephew with one exception: The judgment excluded Robert's maternal half brother, objector Donald L. Cornwell, from receiving a share in the estate. The court concluded, because Donald had been placed for adoption in 1953 in the state of Colorado, he had lost the right to inherit from his natural family.
We refer to the parties and their relatives by their first names for clarity; we intend no disrespect.
We reverse and remand with directions. As explained in the Colorado Supreme Court's decision Estate of Wilson (1934) 95 Colo. 159 (Wilson), Colorado law at the time of Donald's adoption decree in 1953 provided an adopted child was the child of both the child's natural and adopting parents. Donald therefore retained the rights and benefits which inured to his status as the child of his natural mother whom he shared with Robert. Under Probate Code sections 6402, 6406, and 6450, Donald was therefore entitled to share in Robert's intestate estate.
STIPULATED FACTS
Mary Anne Jundt was born in 1928 in North Dakota. In 1950, Mary Anne gave birth to Sandra Kaye Jundt (now Sandra Kaye Voight) in North Dakota; the identity of Sandra's father is not included in the appellate record and is not material to the issues presented in this appeal. Sandra is a party to this action.
On December 16, 1952, Mary Anne gave birth to objector Donald in Aurora, Colorado. Donald's natural father was Mark Allan Stephensen. Donald's birth certificate shows his name at birth was Michael Allan Stephensen, but shortly thereafter was known by his mother's last name, Jundt.
At about eight months of age, in August 1953, Donald was adopted in Denver, Colorado by Donald E. Cornwell and Rosemary N. Cornwell. The certified copy of Donald's adoption decree issued by the Denver juvenile and family court showed Michael Allan Jundt was renamed Donald Lee Cornwell, at the request of his adoptive parents.
In November 1954, Mary Anne married Warren Richard Freeman. At the time of their marriage, Warren had a two-year-old son, Mark Richard Freeman, from a prior marriage. Mark is a party to this action.
Mary Anne and Warren had four children during their marriage: Robert, born in 1956; Cynthia Lee Freeman, born in 1957; Nowell Frederick Freeman, born in December 1959; and Eric Damon Freeman, born in 1962. Mary Anne and Warren divorced in 1973. Neither had any additional children. Mary Anne passed away in 1994 and Warren passed away in 2005. Nowell died in 2011 and was survived by his son Colin Francis Freeman. Cynthia, Colin (as Nowell's surviving heir), and Eric are also parties to this action.
In 2019, Robert died intestate in Long Beach. Before he moved to California in 2018, he lived in Minnesota under a conservatorship. Robert never married and had no issue, living or deceased.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
ERIC IS APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF ROBERT'S ESTATE AND PROPOSES EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE TO ALL SIBLINGS EXCEPT DONALD
In October 2019, Eric filed a petition for letters of administration with limited authority to administer Robert's estate, valued at approximately $824,000. In the petition, Eric asserted Robert had died intestate and neither married nor had children. Robert was therefore "survived by issue of [his] deceased parents," identified as Sandra (half sister), Mark (half brother), Cynthia (sister), Eric (brother), and Colin (identified as a nephew and the "[o]nly issue of predeceased brother, Nowell"). The petition also identified Donald as an "[a]lleged Half-Brother Adopted in infancy," but stated Donald was "not an intestate heir pursuant to [Probate Code] Section 6451." Sandra, Mark, Cynthia, and Colin nominated Eric to serve as administrator.
In January 2020, Eric was appointed administrator with limited powers of Robert's estate and, in February 2020, was issued letters of administration. In December 2020, Eric, acting as administrator, filed the "First And Final Account And Report of Administrator And Petition For Its Settlement, For Allowance Of Compensation To Personal Representative And Attorney For Ordinary Services, For Retainer For Closing Costs And For Final Distribution" (the final account and petition). The final account and petition proposed, pursuant to Probate Code section 6402, Sandra, Mark, Cynthia, Eric, and Colin should each receive an equal 20 percent share of Robert's estate. On December 17, 2020, the trial court set the matter for hearing on August 23, 2021.
II.
ERIC MAKES A $100,000 PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION FROM ROBERT'S ESTATE WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL
On December 18, 2020, without court approval, Eric made a $100,000 partial distribution from the estate, consisting of $20,000 payments to each of the five proposed distributees listed in the petition (i.e., Sandra, Mark, Cynthia, Eric, and Colin). Donald was not listed as a proposed distributee of the estate in the final account and petition, and he did not receive a distribution.
As a result of the December 2020 partial distribution, the final accounting and petition overstated the actual amount available for final distribution by $100,000. At the review hearing on August 11, 2021, Eric's counsel failed to inform the court of the $100,000 partial distribution from the estate and the consequent inaccuracy of the final accounting and report. (Eric and his counsel also failed to inform the court about the $100,000 partial distribution when they appeared for further hearings in late August and November 2021.)
III.
DONALD OBJECTS TO THE FINAL ACCOUNTING AND PETITION
On August 16, 2021, Donald filed a verified objection to the final accounting and petition (the objection). On August 26, 2021, Donald filed a verified petition to determine his right to receive a share of Robert's estate under Probate Code section 11700 (the section 11700 petition).
On February 22, 2022, Donald filed a supplemental objection to the final accounting and petition on the ground Eric had made the $100,000 partial distribution without court authorization in violation of Probate Code section 10501, subdivision (a)(4). Donald also argued the court should surcharge Eric interest on the amount of the partial distribution pursuant to Probate Code section 9602 and issue an order to show cause why monetary sanctions should not be imposed against Eric's counsel.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDES DONALD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISTRIBUTION OF A SHARE OF ROBERT'S ESTATE BY VIRTUE OF DONALD'S ADOPTION AND APPROVES THE FINAL ACCOUNT AND PETITION
The trial court set forth its ruling on the final accounting and petition, the section 11700 petition, and the objection in its minute order dated November 22, 2022: "The Court bifurcated the petition on its own motion. The initial issue is whether or not Donald L. Cornwell (hereinafter referred to as Donald) can inherit through his natural mother when he was adopted in Colorado in 1953. The second issue concerns Donald's objections to the accounting filed by [Eric]. If he is entitled to inherit through his natural mother, then he has standing to bring his objections. However, if it is found he cannot inherit through his natural mother, he has no standing to object to the accounting.
"The issue of inheritance was orally argued and fully briefed and the Court took the matter under submission the same day.
"The parties had also stipulated to some facts . . . [Donald] was born in 1953 [sic] in Colorado to Mary Anne and adopted on August 13, 1953. Further, there appears to be no dispute that the adoption laws in effect in Colorado in 1953 are controlling.
"The adoption statute, section 15-11-109, as it existed in Colorado in 1953 provided as follows:
"'Legal effects of final decree. -From and after entry of a final decree of adoption the following legal effects shall result: (1) the person adopted shall be to all intents and purposes, the child of Petitioner or Petitioners. He shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges and be subject to all the obligations of a child born in lawful wedlock to the petitioner or petitioners. (2) The natural parents shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the foster child, and the adopted child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to the natural parents. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to divest any natural parent of any legal right or obligation where the adopting parent is a stepparent and is married to said natural parent.'
"As pointed out in Estate of David v. Snelson 776 P[.]2d 813 (1[9]89) this statute is ambiguous. That case from the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted 15-11-109 due to the ambiguity and found that the General Assembly of Colorado intended to require a probate court determining the heirs of a natural father who died intestate to consider adoption and inheritance laws in effect at the time of the adoption. Petitioner herein alleges this case is controlling. However, this matter is a California case and California law will be applied.
"Estate of O'Dea 29 Cal.App.3d 760 (1973) held that 'Under rules of conflict of laws and principles of comity, the status of adoption is determined by the laws of the jurisdiction where the adoption was effected, and the rules of inheritance are determined by the laws of the jurisdiction of domicile of the decedent at time of death.' See also Estate of Obata 27 Cal.App.5th 730 (2018).
"Therefore, whereas the adoption issue must be considered on the basis of Colorado adoption law in effect in 1953, the inheritance law of California in 2019 must be applied as to intestate heirs.
"Probate Code section 6451, in effect in California on the date of Decedent's death, provides as follows: (a) An adoption severs the relationship of parent and child between an adopted person and a natural parent of the adopted person unless both of the following requirements are satisfied: (1) The natural parent and the adopted person lived together at any time as parent and child, or the natural parent was married to or cohabiting with the other natural parent at the time the person was conceived and died before the person's birth. (2) The adoption was by the spouse of either of the natural parents or after the death of either of the natural parents."
"Neither of the requirements were met and the definition of divest is 'to take away an estate or interest in property vested in a person.'
"Petition (Subsequent) filed by Donald L. Cornwell is denied. "All objections by Donald L. Cornwell are deemed waived. "Petition for Final Distribution filed by Eric Freeman is approved as supplemented." V. THE JUDGMENT
In March 2023, the probate court entered judgment reiterating its findings and ruling in the November 22, 2022 minute order, and further stated:
"WHEREFORE, it is adjudged and ordered:
"1. The above-named Decedent died intestate on August 20, 2019, leaving surviving as his only heirs the persons whose name and relationships to the Decedent are as follows: [¶] [Sandra, Cynthia, Eric, Mark and Colin, each awarded a 20 percent interest in Robert's estate;]
"2. The administration of this estate is hereby brought to a close; "3. The first and final account of [Eric] as administrator is hereby confirmed and approved;
"4. [Eric] has in his possession belonging to the estate a balance of $910,207.63, all of which is in cash;
"5. [Eric] as administrator is hereby authorized to pay himself $22,427.27 statutory compensation for services to the estate;
"6. [Eric] as administrator is hereby authorized and directed to pay to [Eric's attorney] $22,427.27 statutory compensation for services to [Eric] as administrator and to the estate;
"7. [Eric] as administrator is hereby authorized to retain $3,000.00 in cash for closing expenses of administration and to deliver the unused part to the distributees of the estate, as set forth in the petition, without further court order, after the closing costs and compensation, set forth above have been paid; and
"8. Distribution of the estate in [Eric's] hands as administrator and any other property of [Robert] or the estate not now known or discovered be made to the persons entitled to it, as set forth in this judgment and order."
Donald appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As acknowledged by the parties in their respective appellate briefs, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of law to stipulated facts. (See Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655, 666; Kettenring v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 507, 512.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING DONALD WAS INELIGIBLE TO INHERIT THROUGH MARY ANNE BECAUSE OF HIS ADOPTION DECREE
A. Colorado Law in Effect at the Time of Donald's Adoption Decree Determines Donald's Legal Status
"It has been said that section 1913 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the California reflection of the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution by which 'full faith and credit [must] be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.'" (Ehrenclou v. MacDonald (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 364, 373, fn. 6 (Ehrenclou).) Section 1913, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part: "[T]he effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this state as in the state where it was made."
"Without question, an adoption decree is a judicial record within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1913." (Ehrenclou, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 373; see Ross &Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 3:149.2 ["The legal status of an adopted child is determined by the law of the state where the adoption was effected. If that state's law does not put the adopted child and adopting person in a parent-child relationship, the adopted child has no right to inherit through the adopting parent as their 'issue' under California law"].)
California law, in the form of section 1913 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus requires the application of 1953 Colorado law to determine the legal effect of Donald's adoption in Colorado. (See Ehrenclou, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.) Here, in its minute order, the trial court agreed "there appears to be no dispute that the adoption laws in effect in Colorado in 1953 are controlling."
B. In 1953, Colorado Law Provided an Adopted Child Was Entitled to the Rights and Benefits Attendant to Being the Child of Both the Natural and Adopting Parents
For the reasons we will explain, we conclude a Colorado adoption decree in 1953 conferred upon an adopted child the rights and benefits attendant to being a child of both the child's natural and adopting parents.
In Wilson, supra, 95 Colo. at pages 163-164, the Colorado Supreme Court held, unless and until the Colorado Legislature enacted a statute which expressly stated otherwise, an adopted child in Colorado could inherit from both its adoptive parent and from or through its natural parent. In Wilson, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the claim of a child, who had been adopted by his grandfather following the death of the child's parents, after the grandfather's death intestate. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling the child could inherit both in his capacity as the adopted child of the deceased grandfather, and also as his grandchild (i.e., the son of the child's natural father).
We acknowledge we look to 1953 Colorado law to determine Donald's legal status following the adoption decree but, as discussed post, we thereafter apply California intestate inheritance law to determine whether Donald is entitled to a share of Robert's estate. While Wilson is an inheritance case, it also speaks to an adopted child's legal status at the time the decision was issued.
In explaining the reasoning of its holding, the Colorado Supreme Court summarized the governing law at the time regarding the legal effect of adoption in Colorado:
"The grandchild, a minor, as such, could not and did not surrender his right of inheritance from [his] natural father. Natural inheritable interests follow the blood and the law of adoption does not change the law of descent. Our statute of adoption deprives the child adopted of nothing, but confers on it simply the ordinary rights of inheritance.
"'An adopted child is, in a legal sense, the child both of its natural and of its adopting parents, and is not, because of the adoption, deprived of its right of inheritance from its natural parents, unless the statute expressly so provides. It would seem that an adopted child is also entitled to inherit as a child of his natural parent in the event of the death of such parent in the lifetime of the ancestor. By some authorities this has been held to apply even where the adoptive parent is in fact the grandparent of the children, so that on his death, after the death of the natural parent of the children, such children inherit in the double capacity of children and grandchildren.' [Citation.]
"'In the absence of statute to the contrary, an adopted child may inherit both from [his/her] adoptive parent and from or through [his/her] natural parent. In some states the adopted child has even been permitted to inherit from the same person in the dual capacity of a blood relative and of an adopted child, but under other statutes the right to inherit from the same person in such dual capacity has been denied.' [Citation.]
"Being a minor child and the subject of the transfer of control, [the child] has no voice in the matter, makes no choice and gives no consent, but, whatever takes place, [the child] never ceases to be the issue of its natural parent. Only by express statute does [the child] ever lose that right which may come to [the child] by succession. There is nothing in our adoption statute that makes inapplicable the rules of descent. The statute gives additional rights, but takes nothing away, and nothing is lost unless expressly specified." (Wilson, supra, 95 Colo. at pp. 163-164, italics added.)
About seven years after Wilson, in 1941, the Colorado Legislature enacted the following statutory provision, which remained in effect at the time of Donald's adoption in 1953:
"Legally adopted children and their descendants shall be to all intents and purposes, descendants of the persons adopting such children, and such adopted children and their descendants shall be entitled to inherit under the intestate laws of this state as if such adopted children had been born in lawful wedlock to such foster parents, and when an adopted child or his descendants are related both by blood and adoption to a person dying intestate the adopted child or his descendants shall inherit from the estate of such intestate either as a blood relative or by virtue of said adoption, but not both ...." (Colo. Laws 1941, c. 235, § 16; C.R.S. 1953, 152-2-4.)
The Colorado Legislature thus established an adopted child, related both by blood and adoption to a person who has died intestate, must elect whether to take his or her inheritance as a blood relative or by virtue of the adoption-but not in both capacities as permitted in Wilson. Notably, the newly enacted statute did not expressly (or impliedly) deprive an adopted child of the right to inherit from his or her natural parents by virtue of the child's adoption; to the contrary, the statute's language tacitly affirms an adopted child's right to inherit from and through the child's natural family. (See Comment, Adoption and Intestacy in Colorado (1953) 26 Rocky Mntn. L.Rev. 65, 75-76 ["When the amendment of 1941 was passed the case law had already been established, and the legislature could have expressly negatived the right of a child to inherit from or through the natural parents. However, it modified the Wilson decision only to the extent that an adopted child related both by blood and by adoption to the deceased is limited to taking in but one capacity. The statute did not specifically consider the rights of the child with respect to the intestate property of his natural parent"].)
In 1949, the Colorado Legislature repealed a different statute and replaced it with former Colorado Revised Statute 4-1-11 (former section 4-1-11), which also remained in effect as of the time of Donald's adoption decree: "Legal Effects of Final Decree of Adoption.- From and after the entry of a final decree of adoption the following legal effects shall result: [¶] (1) The person adopted shall be to all intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner or petitioners. He shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges and be subject to all the obligations of a child born in lawful wedlock to the petitioner or petitioners. [¶] (2) The natural parents shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the foster child, and the adopted child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to the natural parents." (Colo. Laws 1949, c. 106, § 11; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 4, § 17 (Cum. Supp. 1949), italics added.)
Again, the Colorado Legislature declined the opportunity to specify an adoption decree severs the adopted child's parent-child relationship with the child's natural parents. While former section 4-1-11 expressly divested an adopted child's natural parents "of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the foster child," it did not deprive the adopted child of anything. (See Wilson, supra, 95 Colo. at p. 163.) Instead, the statute freed an adopted child "from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance" as to the child's natural parents. Consequently, as of 1953, an adopted child in Colorado remained "in a legal sense, the child of both his natural and adoptive parents and entitled to take his share upon the deaths intestate of any or all of them." (See Comment, Adoption and Intestacy in Colorado, supra, 26 Rocky Mntn. L.Rev. at p. 76.) As commentator Catherine F. McCleary observed in a 1953 law review article: "The net result is that [1953] Colorado law may not be desirable from either a social or practical standpoint. It must stand, nevertheless, until the legislature exercises its power to give the courts an unequivocal mandate that an adopted child shall, for every possible purpose, be considered a child of the blood of the adopting parent and his blood relations of every degree and no longer related in any manner to his natural parents or their relatives." (Comment, Adoption and Intestacy in Colorado, supra, 26 Rocky Mntn. L.Rev. at p. 78.)
The Colorado Legislature eventually passed such legislation. Colorado Revised Statute 19-3-708(1) currently provides "[a]n order for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parent of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other, but it shall not modify the child's status as an heir at law which shall cease only upon a final decree of adoption." (Italics added; see also In re Estate of David v. Snelson, supra, 776 P.2d 813, 820 [legislation provided children adopted in Colorado after May 1961 "could not inherit from their natural parents, because the inheritance law in effect at the time of their adoption divested them of this right"]; In re Estate of Bomareto (1988) 757 P.2d 1135, 1137 ["Prior to 1961, when the intestate succession statute was amended to cut off an adopted child's right to inherit from his natural parents, our appellate court interpreted the language of C.R.S. 1953, 4-1-11, and its predecessors to allow an adopted child to inherit from his natural parents"], disapproved on other grounds in In re Estate of David v. Snelson, supra, 776 P.2d 813.)
C. California's Inheritance Law Provides for the Equal Distribution of Robert's Estate Among His Siblings
While "'the status of adoption is determined by the laws of the jurisdiction where the adoption was effected . . . the rules of inheritance are determined by the laws of the jurisdiction of domicile of the decedent at the time of death.'" (Estate of Obata (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 730, 733.) As Robert died in California, California inheritance law applies.
"[A] relationship of parent and child exists for the purpose of determining interstate succession by, through or from a person . . . [when] [t]he relationship of parent and child exists between a person and the person's natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents." (Prob. Code, § 6450, subd. (a).) When a decedent is not survived by a spouse, issue, or a parent, the entire intestate estate passes to "the issue of the [decedent's] parents or either of them, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent." (Id., § 6402, subd. (c).) "[R]elatives of the halfblood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole blood." (Id., § 6406.)
The parties stipulated Robert's mother, Mary Anne, was also Donald's natural mother. Therefore, unless an exception applied, Donald was entitled to an equal share of Robert's intestate estate as that received by Robert's other siblings. (See Prob. Code, § 6406.)
D. Because Donald's Adoption Decree Did Not Divest Him of the Rights and Benefits Attendant to His Being a Natural Child of Mary Anne, He Was Eligible to Inherit Through Mary Anne
Citing Probate Code section 6451, the trial court concluded Donald's statutory right to inherit from Robert was severed upon the issuance of Donald's adoption decree. Probate Code section 6451, subdivision (a) establishes the legal effect of an adoption in California, stating in relevant part: "An adoption severs the relationship of parent and child between an adopted person and a natural parent of the adopted person unless both of the following requirements are satisfied: [¶] (1) The natural parent and the adopted person lived together at any time as parent and child, or the natural parent was married to or cohabiting with the other natural parent at the time the person was conceived and died before the person's birth. [¶] (2) The adoption was by the spouse of either of the natural parents or after the death of either of the natural parents." (Italics added.) The trial court further concluded, because neither of the requirements specified in section 6451, subdivision (a) were satisfied, Donald's parent-child relationship with Mary Anne was severed at the time of his adoption decree, thereby disqualifying him from taking a share of Robert's intestate estate.
But as discussed ante, "'[t]he status of an adopted child is determined by the laws of the state in which the adoption was effected.'" (Ehrenclou, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.) In other words, we must consider what it meant, legally, to be adopted in 1953 Colorado, and not in California today. If we simply import the legal effect of an adoption in California pursuant to Probate Code section 6451, subdivision (a) in determining Donald's inheritance rights, we would violate Code of Civil Procedure section 1913's requirement that Colorado law determine the legal effect of a Colorado adoption decree.
While former section 4-1-11, as was in effect at the time of Donald's adoption decree, divested Mary Anne "of all legal rights and obligations" as to Donald, Donald was not mutually so divested with regard to her. Instead, former section 4-1-11 provided an adopted child in Donald's shoes was thereafter freed from legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to the child's natural parents; it did not speak to Donald being divested of any legal rights or benefits he had as a natural child of Mary Anne. (See In re Estate of Bomareto, supra, 757 P.2d at p. 1137 [although former section 4-1-11, as incorporated into an adoption decree, divested a natural parent of his rights and obligations with respect to an adopted child, the statute "terminated only the child's obligations to her natural parents, not her rights"], disapproved on other grounds in In re Estate of David v. Snelson, supra, 776 P.2d at p. 820.) Consequently, Donald's 1953 adoption decree in Colorado did not sever his parent-child relationship with Mary Anne. (See Wilson, supra, 95 Colo. at p. 164 ["'An adopted child is, in a legal sense, the child both of its natural and of its adopting parents'"].)
As Donald remained in legal effect in a parent-child relationship with Mary Anne following the 1953 adoption decree, he was entitled to share in Robert's intestate estate with Robert's other siblings pursuant to Probate Code sections 6450, subdivision (a) and 6402. (See Ehrenclou, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 ["[t]he existence of a parent-child relationship is the sine qua non for an adopted person to qualify as 'issue' under California law. The simple incantation that a person was 'adopted' does not suffice"].)
The Colorado Supreme Court in Wright v. Wysowatcky (1961) 147 Colo. 317 (Wright) did not hold otherwise. In Wright, the court concluded former section 4-111 provided an adopted child was "'subject to all the obligations of a child born in lawful wedlock,'" and therefore the statute could not "be considered otherwise than establishing a parent and child relationship" with the child's adopted parents. (Id. at p. 323.) The Wright court, overruling the trial court, held an adoptive parent is therefore entitled to inherit under the intestate law of Colorado from an adopted child who dies intestate. (Id. at pp. 318-319.)
The relevant question here, however, is not whether 1953 Colorado law recognized a parent-child relationship between an adopted child and the child's adopted parents; former section 4-1-11 expressly establishes an adopted child is for all intents and purposes the child of the adopted parents. The relevant question is whether, from the adopted child's standpoint, the adopted child also remains in a parent-child relationship with the natural parents or whether that relationship has been entirely severed as a result of an adoption decree. As discussed ante, the Colorado Supreme Court in Wilson (which the Wright court does not mention) held that unless and until the Colorado Legislature passed legislation expressly taking away rights and benefits an adopted child would enjoy as the child of the natural parents (in addition to that of the adopted parents) upon the child's adoption, such adopted children enjoy the rights and benefits of a dual legal status. Although the Wright court expressed that natural parents' rights are "cut off" upon the adoption of their child, the court did not speak to the rights and benefits of the adopted child in its capacity as a child of the natural parents.
III.
ON REMAND, THE TRIAL COURT SHALL CONSIDER THE MERIT OF DONALD'S OBJECTION TO THE DECEMBER 2020 PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION
In its minute order, the trial court concluded Donald did not have standing to object to the December 2020 $100,000 partial distribution made by Eric as administrator without court approval. Consequently, the trial court did not address Donald's supplemental objection challenging that distribution and requesting Eric be surcharged under Probate Code section 9602. On remand, the trial court shall consider the merit of Donald's supplemental objection to the partial distribution.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions the trial court consider and rule on Donald's supplemental objection regarding the $100,000 partial distribution made in December 2020 without court approval. Appellant to recover costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: DELANEY, J. GOODING, J.