Opinion
Civil Action 23-CV-4653
01-26-2024
QUINTON LAMAR FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
MIA R. PEREZ, J.
AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Quinton Lamar Freeman's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) it is ORDERED that:
1. The Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum.
2. Freeman may file a third amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any third amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the third amended complaint, shall clearly state the factual basis for Freeman's claims against each defendant, and shall clearly state the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The third amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the prior complaints or other papers filed in this case to state a claim or establish jurisdiction. When drafting his third amended complaint, Freeman should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims for lack of jurisdiction as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of a third amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Freeman a blank copy of this Court's current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Freeman may use this form to file his third amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
4. If Freeman does not wish to amend and instead intends to stand on his Second Amended Complaint as pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Second Amended Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
5. If Freeman fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that
Freeman intends to stand on his Second Amended Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on her complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).