Opinion
A146391
03-27-2018
WELBORN FREEMAN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG14749865)
Appellant Welborn Freeman appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus seeking review of respondent California State Teachers' Retirement System's (CalSTRS) denial of his claims relating to his retirement benefits. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant Freeman became a CalSTRS member in November 1978. He was injured in December 2001 while working as a teacher with the Oakland Unified School District. His last day of work was in February 2002, and his last day of compensation was in May 2003. In February 2004, CalSTRS notified Freeman that he had not applied for a disability benefit. An application for disability benefits was eventually approved in December 2004, retroactive to April 1.
In December 2007, CalSTRS informed Freeman that his disability allowance would be terminated on his 60th birthday (May 20, 2008), that thereafter he would be eligible for a service retirement allowance, and that he would need to submit an application in order to receive the retirement benefits. CalSTRS did not receive Freeman's service retirement application until October 2008. CalSTRS informed Freeman that, under former section 24204, subdivision (e) of the Education Code, the effective date of Freeman's service retirement was October 1, 2008.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Education Code.
In December 2008, Freeman requested that his disability allowance be backdated to December 2001 and that his service retirement benefits be backdated to May 2008. He also sought service credit for having served in the military in the Vietnam War. CalSTRS conducted an "Executive Review" and denied Freeman's requests in April 2010.
A hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) took place in April 2014. The ALJ denied Freeman's claims regarding the effective date of his disability and retirement benefits, as well as his claim for credit for military service. The ALJ also rejected Freeman's challenge to a CalSTRS determination temporarily reducing his retirement benefits to account for an overpayment due to a mistakenly applied Cost of Living Adjustment. In July, the Teachers' Retirement Board Appeals Committee adopted the ALJ's proposed decision, with minor technical corrections.
Freeman filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In August 2015, the trial court denied the petition. This appeal followed.
Although Freeman's May 2015 amended petition also references Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, Freeman's briefs on appeal do not articulate an argument for a writ of mandate under that section.
DISCUSSION
Freeman contends the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Review of CalSTRS' administrative decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), is limited to determining whether CalSTRS "has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion." Freeman has not shown error.
At the outset, we observe that, "[t]o demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.' [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail. [¶] In addition, appellant's brief 'must' '[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .' [Citations.] This is not a mere technical requirement; it is 'designed to lighten the labors of the appellate tribunals by requiring the litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.' " (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Many of the contentions in Freeman's briefs on appeal lack adequate supporting citations and analysis, and the briefs largely lack headings and subheadings identifying the various arguments. Although this court could reject Freeman's appeal in its entirety for these failings, we have endeavored to "extricate" Freeman's few adequately supported contentions "from the mass" in order to resolve those claims on the merits. (Ibid.)
First, Freeman challenges the denial of credit for his military service. Section 22805 provides that a member may receive credit for time served in the military only if "[t]he member was employed to perform credible service . . . within one year prior to entering" the military service. In the present case, CalSTRS concluded Freeman did not qualify for credit for his service in the Vietnam War because he did not become a member of CalSTRS until 1978. Freeman does not argue he qualifies for credit under the terms of section 22805, but he contends the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because section 22806 allows certain veterans who served prior to 1950 to receive limited credit without having first been employed in a position providing creditable service. (See Del Monte v. Wilson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1009, 1025 [statute that provided veterans' benefits only "to those who were natives or residents of the state at the time of entry into active service" violated equal protection clause].) The claim fails. Contrary to Freeman's assertion, sections 22805 and 22806 do not make a distinction between California residents and non-residents; instead, the statutes distinguish between veterans who served before 1950 and those who served after. (Cf. Del Monte, at p. 1020 ["Benefits are available only to a certain class of resident veterans, that is, to those who were California natives or residents at the time they entered active military service. Other resident veterans, because they were not residents of the state at a fixed point in the past, are for all practical purposes permanently denied benefits."].) Freeman does not show the Legislature lacked a rational basis for offering additional, limited service credits to the former group of veterans. (Cf. id. at p. 1021 ["veterans who joined the military as residents of California suffered no more than others who joined as residents of other states and subsequently migrated to California"].)
Section 22806, subdivision (a) provides, "A member who is a state employee who retired on or after December 31, 1981, and who was at retirement a state employee may elect to receive credit under this part, of not to exceed four years, for time served of not less than one year, prior to membership in the Defined Benefit Program, in the armed forces of the United States or in the Merchant Marine of the United States prior to January 1, 1950. Service credit shall not be granted if that service terminated with a discharge under dishonorable conditions. The service credit to be accorded pursuant to this section for that service shall be on the basis of one year of credit for each five years of credited service, but shall not exceed a total of four years of service credit regardless of the number of years of either that service or subsequent service. A member electing to receive credit under this part for that service shall have been credited with at least 10 years of service on the date of election or the date of retirement."
For the same reason, also without merit is Freeman's challenge based on the right to travel under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution. (See Del Monte, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1019.)
Second, Freeman contends CalSTRS was required to backdate the effective date of his service retirement benefit to May 2008, which was the month of his sixtieth birthday and the month in which he was first eligible for service retirement. CalSTRS received Freeman's application in October 2008 and at the time former section 24204, subdivision (a)(7) provided the effective date for benefits "is no earlier than the first day of the month in which the application is received in the systems' headquarters office." (Former § 24204, subd. (a)(7), amended by Stats. 2014, ch. 755, § 33.) Freeman does not dispute CalSTRS's interpretation of that former subdivision, but he argues the benefit should have been backdated because a CalSTRS employee allegedly told him "he would not have to retire because the [d]isability will roll-over to [r]etirement." The record reflects that on December 18, 2007, CalSTRS informed Freeman his disability allowance would expire on his 60th birthday (May 20, 2008), and that he would need to submit an application before receiving retirement benefits. The letter emphasized, "[p]lease note that [CalSTRS] must receive the application no later than the last day of the month in which you wish your retirement to take effect." Freeman does not explain how, in light of that letter, he could reasonably rely on any oral representation from a CalSTRS employee suggesting he need not submit an application.
For the first time in his reply brief, Freeman argues he should benefit from the current version of section 24204, which omits subdivision (a)(7) and thus provides the effective date is "any date designated by the member," even if before the month the application was received. He argues the amendment applies retroactively. We need not address the contention, which has been forfeited. (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 214; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.) In any event, "It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent." (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 153.) Freeman points to nothing clearly demonstrating the Legislature intended retroactive application.
Third, Freeman contends section 24213, which provides for termination of a disability allowance when a member attains normal retirement age, is invalid because it discriminates on the basis of age. He relies on Smith v. Alum Rock Union Elementary School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1651, 1657-1658, which held that former section 23902 was invalid under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the extent it resulted in involuntary retirement by excluding members age 60 or older from eligibility for disability allowance. However, Freeman has not shown the requirement that he transition from disability to retirement benefits after his 60th birthday had any adverse consequences for him. Unlike the plaintiff in Smith, Freeman does not allege he sought to return to work after applying for retirement benefits. (Smith, at p. 1654.) The present proceeding is a petition (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) seeking review of the administrative decision resolving Freeman's objections to the calculation of his retirement benefits. Because Freeman has not shown how his contentions about section 24213 undermine the findings of the administrative decision under review, his contentions provide no basis for relief.
Section 24213, subdivision (a) provides in part, "When a member who has been granted a disability allowance under this part after June 30, 1972, attains normal retirement age, or at a later date when there is no dependent child, the disability allowance shall be terminated and the member shall be eligible for service retirement."
It appears Freeman framed this issue below as age discrimination resulting from differences between disability benefits under "Schedule A" and "Schedule B." It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to detail the differences, but it is worth noting Freeman does not challenge the trial court's finding that "[t]here is no showing that the differences between Schedule A and Schedule B benefits support [Freeman's] demand that his service retirement be backdated to May 2008 and no other relief appears to be sought."
Fourth, Freeman contends he did not receive a fair hearing because, among other things, the ALJ went off the record, failed to issue a subpoena, harbored bias against him, "coach[ed]" witnesses, and showed "favoritism" towards CalSTRS's counsel. However, Freeman fails to discuss his allegations within the context of the applicable legal standards. (See People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 996 [to establish violation of due process, "based on an objective assessment of the circumstances in the particular case, there must exist ' "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable" ' "].) Where Freeman has provided citations to the record, the cited pages of the hearing transcript do not disclose anything indicative of actual bias.
Freeman also alleges he could not hear portions of the hearing and did not receive certain exhibits, but he makes no effort to show any likelihood he was prejudiced by such matters. --------
Freeman's remaining contentions require little discussion. He makes a difficult to follow argument about allegedly improper attachment of or deductions for workers' compensation proceeds, but he does not dispute the trial court's conclusion that "issues involving the Workers Compensation Appeals Board were not part of the administrative hearing." Freeman's briefs on appeal do not show the trial court made any error with respect to CalSTRS's deductions for reimbursement of an improperly applied cost of living increase. Neither do Freeman's briefs show any error in the trial court's rejection of his claim related to backdating of his disability allowance. Finally, Freeman's briefs make reference to breaches of "ministerial" duties by the Oakland Unified School District and "confiscat[ion]" of funds from INTEL, without adequate supporting citations or analysis explaining how such claims provide a basis to reverse the trial court's ruling.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying Freeman's petition is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to CalSTRS.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.