(2) Once the court record of a transferred case is received and docketed by the court clerk of the transferee-court, the jurisdiction of the transferring court ceases, and jurisdiction becomes vested in the transferee-court. Simpkins v. Parsons, 1915 OK 579, ¶ 0(1-2), 151 P. 588 (the Court's syllabus ¶¶ 1 and ¶ 2); Freeman v. Bryant, 1919 OK 261, ¶ 16, 184 P. 76, 78; In re Nichols' Will, 1917 OK 341, ¶ 5, 166 P. 1087, 1092. (3) The transfer ordered by the Beaver County judge was never perfected, because the case was never "docketed" or entered on the appearance docket by the court clerk in Pittsburg County.
"The superior court or judge thereof may, at any time, in its discretion, transfer to the district court of said county any cause pending and undetermined therein which may be within the jurisdiction of the district court." Under the above section an order of transfer from one court to another divests the jurisdiction of the first court and vests jurisdiction in the second court. Freeman v. Bryant, 76 Okla. 51, 184 P. 76. It follows, therefore, that if the order of transfer was not void, the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. Since Judge Presson had been attorney for the plaintiff, he properly recused himself (sec. 2911, O. S. 1931, 22 Okla. St. Ann. § 571; 15 R.C.L. p. 535). It does not follow, however, that he could not make the order of transfer which he did. As stated in 15 R.C.L. p. 542:
"This court in a long line of decisions has announced the following principle of law, to wit: 'While great discretion is allowed the trial court in the control of its judgments and orders, and in the exercise of its power to vacate or modify the same at the term at which the same were rendered or made, yet the court is without jurisdiction, at a subsequent term, to take any steps toward vacating or modifying a judgment or order of the court unless there is a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute.' See Continental Gin Co. v. Arnold, 66 Okla. 132, 167 P. 613; Freeman v. Bryant, 76 Okla. 51, 184 P. 76; Allen v. Gaston, 74 Okla. 320, 189 P. 183; Maston v. Chandler Bldg. Loan, 61 Okla. 230, 157 P. 366; McKee v. Howard, 38 Okla. 422, 134 P. 44; McAdams v. Latham, 21 Okla. 511, 96 P. 584; Jenkins v. Brown, 46 Okla. 132, 148 P. 697."
"While great discretion is allowed the trial court in the control of its jurisdiction and orders, and in the exercise of its power to vacate or modify the same at the term at which the same was rendered or made, yet the court is without jurisdiction, at a subsequent term, to take any steps toward vacating or modifying a judgment or order of the court, unless there is a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute." Continental Gin Co. v. Arnold, 66 Okla. 132, 167 P. 613; Freeman v. Bryant, 76 Okla. 51, 184 Pac, 76. This question is fully discussed and disposed of in the case of Dougal v. White, 89 Okla. 107, 213 P. 868, and at page 869 the following language is used:
"While great discretion is allowed the trial court in the control of its judgments and orders, and in the exercise of its power to vacate or modify the same at the term at which the same were rendered or made, yet the court is without jurisdiction, at a subsequent term, to take any steps toward vacating or modifying a judgment or order of the court unless there is a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute." See Continental Gin Co. v. Arnold, 66 Okla. 132, 167 P. 613; Freeman v. Bryant, 76 Okla. 51, 184 P. 76; Allen v. Gaston, 74 Okla. 320, 189 P. 183; Maston v. Chandler Bldg. Loan, 61 Okla. 230, 157 P. 366; McKee v. Howard, 38 Okla. 422, 134 P. 44; McAdams v. Latham, 21 Okla. 511, 96 P. 584; Jenkins v. Brown, 46 Okla. 132, 148 P. 697. In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant before vacating the judgment it was necessary that service of summons be had upon the defendant company.