It does not prevent plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief or post-filing damages." Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, 305 F.3d 397, 412 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Kellogg Company v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (also a claim under the Lanham Act)). See also Morel Acoustic, LTD. V. Morel Acoustics USA, Inc., No. 04-CV-348, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32864, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2005) ("Laches does not bar injunctive relief and does not bar damages that occur after the filing of the suit."); Freed v. Farag, 994 F. Supp. 887, 891 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (proclaiming in the context of a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, "Prospective relief in an infringement action is not barred by a finding of laches."). As other courts have recognized, the primary basis for the distinction is that "[l]aches stems from prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the plaintiff's past delay, but almost by definition, the plaintiff's past dilatoriness is unrelated to a defendant's ongoing behavior that threatens future harm."

"Summary judgment is just as appropriate in a trademark infringement case as in other litigation and is granted or denied on the same principles." Freed v. Farag, 994 F. Supp. 887, 889 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (citing WSM Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1086 (6th Cir. 1983); SCI Sys, Inc. v. Solidstate Controls, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (S.D. Ohio 1990)). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

{¶ 32} "Under Ohio law, a party invoking laches, to be successful, must show that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting the claim. State ex rel. Caspar v. Dayton (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 558 N.E.2d 49; Freed v. Farag (1997), 994 F. Supp. 887, 891. {¶ 33} "In AK Steel Corp. v. Chamberlain (1997), 974 F. Supp. 1120, 1126, the court provided the following overview of the doctrine of laches:

Under Ohio law, a party invoking laches, to be successful, must show that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting the claim. State ex rel. Caspar v. Dayton (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 558 N.E.2d 49; Freed v. Farag (1997), 994 F. Supp. 887, 891. In AK Steel Corp. v. Chamberlin (1997), 974 F. Supp. 1120, 1126, the court provided the following overview of the doctrine of laches: