The measure of such damages is generally confined to "the pecuniary loss shown to have been within the contemplation of the parties." Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The pain and suffering plaintiffs have alleged in this case had its source in plaintiffs' actual belief (which presumably was not the belief of their counsel) that the settlement amounted to an acknowledgment by Chris-Craft of wrongdoing, as well as an implied commitment by Chris-Craft to see that accidents like plaintiffs' could not be repeated.

No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed; therefore, we must presume that the trial court made the findings necessary to support its order, indulging every reasonable intendment in favor of the decision of the trial court. Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1950). Plaintiffs appeal contending that the trial court erred in:

Appellee maintains, however, that since there is no statement of facts before us, it must be presumed that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to support its findings and judgment. Oldham v. Medearis, 90 Tex. 506, 39 S.W. 919 (1897), Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969, writ ref. n.r.e.). Both appellant and appellee cite Alexander v. Texoma Wholesale Jewelers, 307 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Civ.App. 1957, writ ref. n.r.e.), as authority for their respective positions. For all practical purposes the facts in Alexander are identical to those at bar with one important difference.

There being no statement of facts in the record we do not know what constituted the evidence, but inasmuch as the court's judgment recites that evidence was heard, we must presume that the evidence, whatever it might have been, was sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court. Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 489, 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955); Lane v. Fair Stores, 150 Tex. 566, 243 S.W.2d 683 (1951); Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rea Express v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 447 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 14th 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carver v. City of Wichita Falls, 427 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Civ.App. — Ft.Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thrasher v. Hensarling, 406 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1966, n.w.h.). It is only in an exceptional case that an appellant is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's judgment in the absence of a statement of facts. Houston Fire Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walker, 152 Tex. 503, 260 S.W.2d 600 (1953).