or withdrawal." Id.; see Carrol v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 256-58 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (explaining that general allegations of a breakdown in communications and a lack of cooperation in pursuing certain defenses do not rise to an adequate showing to require a substitution of counsel); Boston v. State, 965 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (concluding that vague claims of a defendant's dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel are not sufficient to require the trial court to grant counsel's request to withdraw). Instead, "[a]n 'actual conflict of interest' exists [, for example,] if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel's own) to the detriment of his client's interest." Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)); see Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-66 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (determining that the trial court is within its discretion to deny a motion to withdraw when counsel fails to offer any specific facts to support assertions of a conflict of interest or irreconcilable differences with the defendant). In the present appeals, we find no evidence or even allegations that counsel had a conflict that required him to choose between his own interest or perhaps another client's or third-party's interest and that of appellant. See Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355. We find no specific facts to support appellant's assertions of a conflict or irreconcilable differences between trial counsel and appellant. See Frazier, 15 S.W.3d at 265-66. Rather, appellant's allegations appear to amount to no more than personality conflicts, disagreements concerning trial strategy, breakdowns in communications and a lack of cooperation, and general claims of an appellant's dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 566; see also Carrol, 176 S.W.3d at 256-58; Bos
See Calloway v. State, 699 S.W.2d 824, 830-31 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (finding no error where trial counsel did not elaborate on his claim of conflict of interest); Thompson v. State, 94 S.W.3d 11, 20-22 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding no error where attorney stated conflict arose from representation of another private client but refused to give details); Harrell v. State, No. 12-00-00356-CR, 2002 WL 31656213, at *3 (Tex.App.-Tyler Nov.26, 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (holding trial court was not obligated to conduct further inquiry following mere assertion of a conflict of interest); Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-66 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (finding no abuse of discretion to deny post-conviction motion to withdraw that alleged conflict of interest where trial counsel did not offer any specific facts).
The onus is on the attorney seeking withdrawal to present sufficient facts to support his motion. See Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265–66 (Tex.App.2000). We will reverse the trial court's decision only if it violates the defendant's right to counsel.
Instead, an abuse of discretion may be shown when "[a]n 'actual conflict of interest' exists[, for example,] if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel's own) to the detriment of his client's interest." Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)); see Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-66 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (determining that the trial court is within its discretion to deny a motion to withdraw when counsel fails to offer any specific facts to support assertions of a conflict of interest or irreconcilable differences with the defendant). B. Discussion
Having made this stipulation, and then making no objection to the introduction of the penitentiary packet, we fail to see how any meaningful fact issue was ever created as to the truth of the enhancement paragraphs. See Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex.App.--Waco 2000, no pet.)(in light of prior convictions proven up with fingerprints, no error was shown in failure to give Article 37.07 instruction). The Parties' Arguments
Moreover, because there is nothing in the record to explain the nature of the alleged conflict, the trial court had no duty to inquire further. See Stephenson, 255 S.W.3d at 656 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying motion to withdraw when counsel refused to elaborate on alleged conflict of interest for ethical reasons); Thompson v. State, 94 S.W.3d 11, 20 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd)(holding that trial court was not obligated to conduct a further inquiry when counsel refused to reveal the general nature of the conflict); Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-66 (Tex.App.--Waco 2000, no pet.)(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to withdraw that referenced unspecified "conflicts of interest"). Given the allegations in Appellant's pro se motion and his history of difficulty with other attorneys, Lettunich's use of the term "conflict of interest" could have referred simply to personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy. Such problems are not usually valid grounds for withdrawal. King, 29 S.W.3d at 566; cf. Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)(holding that an actual conflict of interest exists when counsel is required to make a choice between advancing either his client's interests or some other interests, including those of co-defendants or of counsel himself).
Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying this motion. See Green, 840 S.W.2d at 408; Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265-66 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.); Boston v. State, 965 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). Therefore, relator is not entitled to the relief sought, and the petition is denied.
The State cites us to several cases where the courts have held that the failure to give the reasonable doubt instruction at the punishment phase of the trial was not harmful. See Allen v. State, 47 S.W.3d 47 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Brown v. State, 45 S.W.3d 228 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Martin v. State, 42 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). But in all these cases, the prior offenses and bad acts of the defendant were proven by overwhelming evidence and were largely undisputed.
The State's evidence connected appellant to the September 1995 aggravated assault; the fingerprints and photograph attached to the adjudication matched appellant's. See, e.g., Webber v. State, 21 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex. App-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (a videotaped bad act leaves little doubt of the appellant's connection with the bad act evidence); Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (prior juvenile adjudications were properly proved up with the appellant's fingerprints). The jury assessed punishment well below the maximum punishment for each conviction.
The State frequently establishes this connection with evidence that the fingerprints in the penitentiary packet are those of the person on trial. See Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210; Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, no pet.); Smith, 998 S.W.2d at 687. The State may also prove this connection with photographs included in the penitentiary packet.