Frazier v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

Full title: WILLIE FRAZIER, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS…

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

Date published: Feb 12, 2021

C/A No. 4:19-1272-MGL-TER (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2021)

Opinion

C/A No. 4:19-1272-MGL-TER

02-12-2021

WILLIE FRAZIER, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WARDEN CANNING, MAJOR SMITH AND CAPTAIN DAVIS, Defendants.

Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge

Report and Recommendation

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ¹ on May 1, 2019, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights based on conditions of confinement while housed at the Kershaw Correctional Institution (KCI). Plaintiff is currently housed at the McCormick Correctional Institution. On December 18, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment along with a memorandum, exhibits, and affidavit in support. As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court issued an order on or about December 28, 2019, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4^th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. Plaintiff filed a response on January 21, 2021, and Defendants filed a reply on January 28, 2021.

1 All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, the report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4^th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4^th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4^th Cir. 1993).

To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, if any." Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4^th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4^th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated while he was housed at the KCI. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

There is a complete shortage of STAFF here at Kershaw Correctional Institution officers are using food deprivation; There are no 24 hr medical service, shortage of nursing; no sickcall, mold build up in Plaintiff's cell; no adequate grievance procedure; filt[h]y living conditions, no cell cleaning, no shower cleaning, no outside recreation.

(ECF No. 1 at 6 of 12).

These are the only allegations raised in the complaint. Plaintiff states under the injuries section that "conditions places plaintiff at risk and could effect health and safety." (Id.). Plaintiff requests "250,000 punitive damages."

ANALYSIS

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Defendants first argue that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the constitution. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them, in their official capacity, fail as a matter of law, as they are not a "person" amendable to suit and are entitled to immunity.

When a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity, the suit is frequently intended as one against the state, the real party in interest. If review of the pleadings indicates that the state is, in fact, the party being sued, then a judgment awarding damages is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Although declaratory and/or injunctive relief may be granted, damages may not be awarded against the state. The Eleventh Amendment immunity granted to the states "applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes," but the court found that state agencies, divisions, departments and officials are entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). In reaching this conclusion, the court held that a suit against state officials acting in their official capacities is actually against the office itself, and therefore, against the state. State officials may only be sued in their individual capacities.

The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). A plaintiff "is not entitled to monetary damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacities." Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 F. App'x 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose 'individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.") (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant SCDC is not a person amenable to suit and should be dismissed as a party defendant. It is undisputed that at the time of the matters alleged in the complaint, Defendants were SCDC employees. To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit under §1983, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding claims brought against them in their official capacity for monetary damages. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

As stated above, Plaintiff alleges that there was a shortage of staff at KCI resulting in food deprivation, not having twenty-four hour medical service, a shortage of nurses with no sick call, mold buildup in his cell, no adequate grievance procedure,² not having someone clean the cells and showers resulting in "filfhy" living conditions, and no outside recreation. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any allegations against any of the individually named Defendants as to their participation or deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion for summary judgment generally restating the allegations raised in his complaint. Plaintiff does not allege specific actions by the individual defendants or allege any evidence of significant physical injury. Plaintiff attached some grievance forms that were returned unprocessed due to not submitting a kiosk form. However, in these grievances, there no discussion by Plaintiff as to individual defendants personal involvement.

2 It is recommended that allegations pertaining to the grievance system be dismissed as there is no constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4^th Cir. 1994).

To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy two elements. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement." De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). "[T]o demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's exposure to the challenged conditions." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a prisoner must present evidence that the prison officials had a " 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.' " Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). When an inmate challenges the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth Amendment, the requisite "state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). A prison official shows deliberate indifference if he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. "In addition, prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety." Id. at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to show any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference, he has not shown extreme deprivations of basic human needs or "serious or significant" pain or injury. If a prisoner has not suffered serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged conditions, he "simply has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the [Eighth] Amendment." Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence showing he sustained any serious or significant physical or emotional injury as a result of the aforementioned conditions. Further, Plaintiff has not made any specific allegations of personal involvement by the named Defendants. Because Plaintiff cannot establish the elements required for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claims set forth in his Complaint. See also, Benjamin v. Lewis, 2020 WL 8083690, at *8-9 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 62501 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2021).³ PENDENT JURISDICTION

3 "In light of this recommendation, the Court need not address the Defendants' argument regarding qualified immunity.

Assuming Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is dismissed by this Court and Plaintiffs' complaint somehow can be conceived to state an additional claim for relief under any state common law theory, the undersigned concludes that such claim(s), if any, ought to be dismissed as well for want of jurisdiction. Specifically, this Court can decline to continue the action as to the pendent claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 56) be GRANTED.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Thomas E. Rogers, III

Thomas E. Rogers, III

United States Magistrate Judge February 12, 2021
Florence, South Carolina

The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.