) This provision of the Administrative Code so violated by this respondent was designed to prevent, among other hazards, the very injury of which this respondent complains, and "was a proximate and effective cause of the accident." ( Frazier v. Reinman, 230 App. Div. 394, 395, affd. 256 N.Y. 626.)
We think this contention has merit. The question is a novel one and so far as our research goes has never been passed upon directly by the courts of this State. The case of Frazier v. Reinman ( 230 App. Div. 394; affd., 256 N.Y. 626), relied upon by defendant, is not controlling. The question at issue here was not presented to or passed upon by the court in that case. An infant is not guilty of contributory negligence if he has exercised the degree of care which may reasonably be expected from a child of like age, intelligence and experience. ( Camardo v. New York State Railways, 247 N.Y. 111; Gloshinsky v. Bergen Milk Transportation Co., 279 id. 54; Trudell v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 281 id. 82.)
We interpret the enactment as designed to free the users of city sidewalks and streets from those dangers which are commonly known to attend coasting as a pastime or sport. Applying such a concept to the record proof before us, we cannot say as matter of law that at the time of the fatality the decedent was guilty of prima facie fault because of a statutory violation or that such violation was the proximate cause of his death. Had decedent, at the time and place of the accident, been engaged in the pastime or sport of coasting down a city street, as was the case in Frazier v. Reinman ( 230 App. Div. 394; affd., 256 N.Y. 626), and had the record established that his conduct was the proximate cause of his death, our problem would be different. In the case last cited the plaintiff, while engaged in winter coasting, was injured on a city street when he suddenly emerged on his handsled from an intersecting side street and was struck by defendant's passing automobile.