Opinion
Civil No. 4:CV-18-569
02-27-2019
ARNULFO FRAYRE-CASTANEDA, Petitioner v. CRAIG LOWE, et al., Respondents
(Judge Brann)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
The petitioner, Arnulfo Frayre-Castaneda, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued immigration detention pending the adjudication of removal proceedings brought against him, (Doc. 1), and filed a motion to expedite resolution of this petition on November 5, 2018. (Doc. 7.) On January 18, 2019, this case was referred to the undersigned for our consideration Shortly thereafter, on February 27, 2019, the respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, representing that the petitioner was removed from the United States on February 11, 2019, and providing the Court with a copy of the warrant of removal. (Doc. 9 and Ex. 1.)
On these facts we agree this case is now moot. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition and motionbe dismissed.
II. Discussion
The mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: "[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). In the context of habeas corpus petitions mootness questions often turn on straightforward factual issues. Thus:
[A] petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631(1982). This general principle derives from the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution, which "subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ... the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit."Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. at 477(citations omitted).DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 441-442 (3d Cir. 2005).
The mootness doctrine often applies with particular force to habeas petitions filed in immigration matters. In the context of federal habeas petitions brought by immigration detainees, it is well-settled that administrative action by immigration officials addressing the concerns raised by an alien's petition renders that petition moot. Burke v. Gonzales, 143 F. App'x 474 (3d Cir. 2005); Gopaul v. McElroy, 115 F. App'x 530 (3d Cir. 2004).
Thus, for example, the deportation of an alien frequently makes an immigration habeas petition moot. See Lindaastuty v. Attorney General, 186 F. App'x 294 (3d Cir. 2006). While the Lindaastuty decision is not precedential, it is highly persuasive as a "paradigm of the legal analysis [this Court] should . . . follow." Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 n.12 (3d Cir. 1996). In this case we find the reasoning in Lindaastuty compelling and conclude that the dismissal of this petition as moot is appropriate here since the petitioner has now been removed from the United States. See Purveegiin v. Chertoff, 282 F. App'x 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of ICE detainee's petition challenging continued detention as moot based on petitioner's removal from United States). We further recommend that the motion to expedite (Doc. 7) also be dismissed as moot.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this petition for writ of habeas corpus, the suggestion of mootness filed by the Government in this case, and the fact that Patel is no longer in ICE custody, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition (Doc. 1) and the petitioner's motion to expedite (Doc. 7) be DISMISSED as moot.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 27th day of February 2019.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge