Opinion
Civil File No. A3-03-74.
January 26, 2004
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiffs for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Local Rule 54.1(c) (doc. # 33). Defendant filed a brief in opposition (doc. #40). Plaintiffs filed a reply brief (doc. #41).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may award a prevailing party attorney fees. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992). Plaintiffs are considered prevailing parties if they "succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. (citingHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). In this case, Plaintiffs succeeded in excising that portion of the law that extended the do-not-call list to people who engaged in their form of charitable solicitation. Plaintiffs are now free to call people on North Dakota's do-not-call list, so they achieved some benefit. Plaintiffs are a prevailing party. Id.
If the plaintiff is a prevailing party, the court may award reasonable attorney fees. Blissett v. Casey, 969 F. Supp. 118, 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Lilly v. County of Orange, 910 F. Supp. 945, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). A district court has broad discretion to determine what are reasonable attorney fees. Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1229 (D. Minn. 1979). District courts should award attorney fees with an eye toward moderation to avoid either the reality or appearance of awarding "wind falls." Blissett, 969 F. Supp. at 131 (citations omitted). In determining reasonable attorney fees, a court looks at both the hours expended on the case and the hourly rate charged. Id. at 130.
The determination of a reasonable hourly rate is based on the fees that would be charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area. Id. at 130-31. Regardless of where counsel are located, the "area" is defined as the community where the court sits. Id. at 131. A reasonable fee is the hourly rate as determined by the prevailing rate in this district, "irrespective of the fee usually charged by the attorney." Id. (quotingSegarra v. Messina, 158 F.R.D. 230, 234 (N.D.N.Y. 1994)). Some exceptions to this rule include the need for special expertise of counsel from a distant district, if local counsel was unwilling to handle the case, or if the lawyer filed the action in his or her home district and it was transferred to the forum district.Blissett, 969 F. Supp. at 131 n. 29.
This case was not transferred from another district, and there is no indication that local counsel was unwilling to handle the case. From local counsel's billing records, it is clear that he contributed to this case, so he is one identified local counsel that was competent to handle this case. The Court also has before it another First Amendment case where the plaintiffs are being represented by the legal aid clinic from Grand Forks. Other attorneys from this district have previously given excellent representation to their clients in First Amendment cases before this Court. Nothing about this case made it more difficult than other First Amendment cases this Court has seen. There was no need for special expertise of counsel from a distant district.
Since none of the exceptions apply, this Court will apply the prevailing rate of this district to determine a reasonable hourly rate. I have been a judge in this community for ten years. During that time period, I have reviewed numerous attorney bills from lawyers in this community. The prevailing hourly rate in this community for this type of work is $165. The Court will apply a $165 hourly rate to Attorneys Copilevitz, Raney, and Spaeth to determine reasonable attorney fees.
When determining whether hours were reasonably expended, a court should exclude hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Blissett, 969 F. Supp. at 130. Multiple, vague, identical billing entries are subject to reduction by a court as unreasonable time spent on the case. Id. at 132-33 (cutting in half an attorney's billing labeled "review file").
There are several entries in the Copilevitz bill that relate to working on, reviewing, or editing the complaint. The Spaeth bill also contains two entries that include working on the complaint. Since attorneys at the Copilevitz firm were responsible for drafting the complaint, Attorney Spaeth's efforts on it are duplicative. His bill is reduced by two hours. The Court also finds that the amount of time spent drafting what should have been a relatively simple and straightforward complaint is excessive. The Copilevitz bill is reduced by two hours.
DECISION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are awarded total fees in the amount of $21,654.96. Plaintiffs' request for an award of fees for the time expended defending their bills is DENIED.
The billing sheets for Attorney Spaeth's time only reflect a total of 30.80 hours. However, in the motion, Plaintiffs requested $6,390.00 for Attorney Spaeth's time, which reflects a discrepancy of 4.70 hours. The Court applied the rate of $165 to the hours Attorney Spaeth provided time sheets for with the reduction of two hours for the duplicative work.