Officer C.C., based on his training, experience, and observations at the scene—including the length of the skid marks and the extensive damage to both the tree and the vehicle—testified that Roseman had been driving sixty to sixty-five miles per hour in a residential area with a posted speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour. A jury could determine that such conduct was reckless. See State v. Chekmizoff, 82 Ariz. 176, 179-80, 309 P.2d 796, 798 (1957) ("reckless driving is to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances"); Fraser v. State, 589 S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("speeding, unaccompanied by other traffic violations, can form the basis for a reckless driving conviction if the state presents evidence 'that a defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed given the posted speed limit and the driving conditions'"), quoting Klaub v. State, 564 S.E.2d 471, 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Norfolk v. State, 360 P.2d 605, 609 (Wyo. 1961) (jury instruction that "mere speed" could support conviction for reckless driving, in some circumstances, not misleading). ¶12 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, the state produced sufficient evidence by which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Roseman recklessly damaged the property of another.