Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-06-003 RSG.
Date Submitted: January 4, 2000.
Date Decided: April 28, 2000.
Upon Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board: GRANTED.
ORDER
This 28th day of April, 2000, upon consideration of the papers filed by the parties and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. Michael Fraser ("Appellant") worked for Spectraguard, Inc. as a security guard for approximately three years. On March 22, 1998, Appellant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance. Appellant was found to be eligible and received benefits from March 28, 1998 to September 26, 1998.
2. During a hearing regarding Appellant's disqualification of benefits for refusing work offers, it was discovered that Appellant had been working part-time at St. Francis Hospital throughout the period of time he was receiving benefits. Appellant had failed to disclose that he was working part-time while continuing to receive unemployment benefits. Consequently, on March 30, 1999, the Claims Deputy, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315(6), disqualified Appellant from receiving benefits from March 28, 1999 until March 27, 2000.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3315 provides:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(6) If the Department determines such individual has made a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly has failed to disclose a material fact to obtain benefits to which the individual was not lawfully entitled, and such disqualification shall be for a period of 1 year beginning with the date on which the first false statement, false representation or failure to disclose a material fact occurred. A disqualification issued pursuant to this subsection shall be considered a disqualification due to fraud.
3. The decision of the Claims Deputy was appealed and on May 3, 1999 the Appeals Referee for the Department of Labor affirmed the disqualification. At the hearing before the Appeals Referee, Appellant claimed that he was told by the clerks at the Department of Labor when he first started filling out the unemployment claim forms that he did not have to disclose the part-time employment at St. Francis Hospital. The Appeals Referee determined that Appellant's testimony as to what the claims processor told him about reporting wages was hearsay evidence and not entitled to any weight in deciding the case. The Appeals Referee found the language on the claim forms regarding disclosure of supplemental income to be clear and found that Appellant fraudulently failed to disclose the earnings from St. Francis Hospital.
While the alleged statements did not constitute hearsay as they were being offered to prove the state of mind of the appellant and not the truth of the matter asserted, this does not change the result in this case as the Referee found the clear language on the Department claim form to be controlling.
4. The decision of the Appeals Referee was appealed and on May 19, 1999 the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") affirmed the denial of Appellant's benefits. The Board adopted the Appeals Referee's finding of fact stating that the facts were supported by the evidence presented to Referee; and as a matter of law the Referee was bound to order repayment.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3325 provides:
Any person who has received any sum of benefits under this chapter to which it is finally determined that the person was not entitled shall be liable to repay in cash said overpayment . . . The person shall be so liable regardless of whether such sum was received through fraud or mistake, or whether that person was legally awarded the payment of benefits. . .
5. On June 7, 1999, Appellant filed an appeal in this Court pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3323. Appellant raises three claims on appeal: 1) failure to have a fair hearing, 2) improper decision by the Referee, and 3) incorrect information by employees and staff at the Department of Labor. On November 10, 1999, the Division of Unemployment Insurance of the Delaware Department of Labor ("Appellee") filed a Motion to Affirm the decision of the Board. The following is the Court's decision on Appellee's Motion.
6. Both the Appeals Referee and the Board considered testimony from the Appellant and the Department of Labor in determining that Appellant should be denied benefits for fraudulently failing to disclose the earnings from St. Francis Hospital on the claims forms. Specifically, the Appeals Referee held:
The language on the pay order form is clear. The claimant was required to set forth the wages which he received during the week to which the claim form applies. The claimant failed to do so. The claimant has completed several years of college, and the information which he was required to set forth on the pay order form could easily be understood by him. In failing to complete the form to reflect wages which he received, the claimant made a false statement for the purposes of obtaining benefits to which he was not lawfully entitled. His conduct was fraudulent.
Appeals Ref dec. of 5/3/99 at 3.
The Board affirmed this decision and further stated:
The appeal is without merit because the issue on appeal from the Appeals Referee is factual, and a record indicates that evidence supports the findings of fact below and the Board adopts these findings.
Bd. dec. of 5/19/99 at 2.
7. The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr. 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battisa v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66.
8. The Appeals Referee and the Board considered the testimony from the Appellant and the Department of Labor. The Appeals Referee and the Board determined questions of credibility and made factual findings in arriving at their decision. This Court may not weigh the evidence or determine credibility. Therefore, the Court finds that the issues raised in this appeal are factual and that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision.
9. The standard of review on a motion to affirm is whether, based on appellant's opening brief, it is clear that the appeal is without merit because "the issue on appeal from a commission or board is factual, and clearly there is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact below; . . ." Therefore, having found that the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, Appellee's Motion to Affirm is GRANTED.
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72. 1(b)(3).
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.