Fraser v. Alexander

7 Citing cases

  1. Westfeldt v. Reynolds

    133 S.E. 168 (N.C. 1926)   Cited 20 times
    In Westfeldt v. Reynolds, 191 N.C. 802, 133 S.E. 168, a devise of one-half of the property to Lulie Westfeldt, "and should Lulie Westfeldt die without heirs the property to go over to Overton Westfeldt Price's children," was, under the particular circumstances of the parties in that case, held to convey a fee simple.

    And where a general disposition of the whole of the testator's property is preceded by specific devise of only a small part, it is held that the former must be understood as impliedly subject to the latter, and the property conveyed by the special devise will pass thereunder rather than under the universal disposition. Rice v. Saterwhite, 21 N.C. 69; Fraser v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348; Dalton v. Scales, supra. It follows, therefore, that Jenny Fleetwood Westfeldt and Lulie Westfeldt each take a one-half undivided interest in fee (C.S., 4162) in the Rugby Grange property under the first devise.

  2. Bunting v. Harris

    62 N.C. 11 (N.C. 1866)   Cited 4 times

    This, we are satisfied, was the meaning of the testator, and in looking at the cases we are gratified to find that there is nothing to force us to the conclusion that this man died intestate as to his slaves, horses, cattle, etc., which being present, and so forcing themselves on the attention, are the primary subjects for the payment of debts, and the first things ordinarily disposed of by will. Fraser v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348, and Clark v. Hyman, 12 N.C. 382, were cited on the argument by the counsel for the defendant as governing this case. In Fraser v. Alexander, there is an express direction to sell the negroes at private sale; that case has no application.

  3. Champion ex Parte

    45 N.C. 246 (N.C. 1853)   Cited 5 times

    Hence there is a mistake in the enumeration of the particulars of a class ejusdem generis; and no more forcible instance of the wisdom of this rule, that such as mistake shall not be allowed to defeat a legacy or devise, could possibly be suggested. Clark v. Hyman, 12 N.C. 382, and Fraser v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348, were cited in the argument as opposed to out conclusion. The distinction between those cases and the present one is this: there the enumeration was in reference to classes — here the enumeration is in reference to the particulars of a class. If one gives "all of his property, consisting of both personal and perishable," that will not include his land: so if one gives all his property, consisting of lands, stock of any kind, household and kitchen furniture, wagon and farming tools" — that will not include his negroes, especially if he makes another disposition of them in the same will. Otherwise, if one gives all of his land consisting of the following tracts, c., and all of his negroes, consisting of Peter, Amy, c., and all of his stock of horses, consisting of, c., all of his cattle, consisting of, c. Although he should omit in the enumeration a tract of land, a negro, a horse, or a cow, all would pass under the general words, which include the whole of each class; and the reason of

  4. Kirkpatrick v. Rogers

    42 N.C. 44 (N.C. 1850)   Cited 2 times

    Robards v. Wortham, 17 N.C. 173. A direction to sell the residue, and then, that the money thence arising should be disposed of as follows, viz: All my just debts be paid; and then to A and B $50 each, and all the balance to C was held in Fraser v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348, to be a precise division and appropriation of that fund to those purposes, and that, as C was only to have the balance of the "money thence arising," he could only get what remained of that fund, after the other purposes had been answered out of it. But there is no such precise direction in this case, nor anything more than simply a recognition of the charge of the debts, imposed by law on the residue of her estate, which she knows and says must be paid before the donees of the residue can have it. There is no declaration, that the debts are to be paid, at all events, out of the residue thus given, but a charge merely, which expresses no more than the law would, had the will contained not a word on the subject. Upon such a case, besides the authorities already cited, Dicken v. Cotten, 22 N.C. 272, is directly in point, that the other parts of the estate, thus charged, are not liable, but upon a deficiency of an undisposed surplus.

  5. Alexander v. Alexander

    41 N.C. 229 (N.C. 1849)   Cited 4 times

    It the notes were so sold, they would produce but notes or bonds, or evidences of debt. In Fraser v. Alexander 17 N.C. 348, the will commenced, "As to what worldly substance it has pleased God to bless me with, I dispose of in the following manner," etc. There it was manifestly the intention of the testator not to die intestate as to any of his property, yet the Court decided that he had not disposed of the whole. In the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice it is declared that the term "all my property" could not embrace money or bonds, if the testator had left any, because the property thereby given is to be sold at public sale, which is altogether inapplicable to money, whether due or in hand.

  6. Clark v. Hyman

    12 N.C. 382 (N.C. 1828)   Cited 5 times
    In Clark v. Hyman, 12 N.C. 382, Taylor, C. J., says: "That the words `property, possessions, or estates' are sufficient, if not qualified to carry real estate, is well settled by many decisions; but it is otherwise, if it appears from the context that personal estate only was in contemplation of the parties.

    Judgment affirmed. Approved: Fraser v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348; Foil v. Newsome, 138 N.C. 117. Distinguished: Champion, ex parte, 45 N.C. 246; Bunting v. Harris, 62 N.C. 11.

  7. Harris v. Mills

    4 N.C. 149 (N.C. 1814)   Cited 1 times

    NOTE. — Under the act of 1784 (1 Rev. Stat., ch. 122, sec. 10) a devise of real estate to any person is to be construed a devise in fee, unless an estate of less dignity is given in express words, or an intention to that effect manifestly appear in the will or some part thereof. As to what passes by a residuary clause in a will, see Arrington v. Alston, 6 N.C. 321; Powell v. Powell, post, 727; Reeves v. Reeves, 16 N.C. 386; Speight v. Gatling, 17 N.C. 5; Frazer v. Alexander, 17 N.C. 348; Harrell v. Hoskins, 19 N.C. 479. Cited: Clark v. Hyman, 12 N.C. 385; Page v. Atkins, 60 N.C. 270.