Opinion
2:23-cv-284
05-01-2024
JAMES FRANTZ, Plaintiff, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford.”) (ECF No. 29) be granted.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff James Frantz, a former inmate at the Westmoreland County Prison (“WCP”) filed a Complaint against WCP and multiple WCP employees. (ECF No. 1.) He subsequently filed the operative Amended Complaint, adding as defendants Wexford and “John Doe Defendants 11-20,” who are identified as “individual employees of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and were responsible for providing medical care to Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 18.) Frantz asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims.
The named WCP defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 21.) Wexford filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a Brief in Support. (ECF Nos. 2930). Frantz subsequently filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 37.) The motion is ripe for consideration.
B. Factual Allegations in Complaint
On January 3, 2022, Frantz was arrested and subsequently incarcerated at WCP. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 12.) On that same date, Frantz was moved to isolation/solitary confinement following an altercation with another inmate. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On January 20, 2022, Franz was transported by Mutual Aid EMS from WCP to Excela Westmoreland Regional Hospital. (Id. ¶ 14.) He was displaying incoherent speech, altered mental status, hypothermia, and shivering. (Id. ¶ 15.) His body temperature was 83.8 degrees Fahrenheit. (Id.)
Frantz was admitted to the hospital on January 21, 2022, and was diagnosed with septic shock, COVID-19, a urinary tract infection, and a large sacral decubitis ulcer. (Id. ¶ 16.) Prior to his incarceration at WCP, he was fully physically capable and had not been diagnosed with any of the above-described maladies. (Id. ¶ 18.) On March 3, 2022, Frantz was released to a rehabilitation facility; he remains at another facility, bedbound and without the use of his legs and lower body. (Id. ¶ 17.)
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Wexford was the entity responsible for providing medical care to inmates at WCP. (Id. ¶ 5.) Frantz alleges that on information and belief, he was left in solitary confinement and was not checked on for more than twelve hours. (Id. ¶ 19.) He asserts that “Defendants intentionally and willfully disregarded Plaintiff's medical condition and delayed provided necessary medical care” to him. (Id. ¶ 20.)
No date or time is provided for this twelve-hour period.
C. Legal Standard
A complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accepting] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11. Further, in considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally considers only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
D. Discussion
Frantz brings claims against Wexford under the United States Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and Pennsylvania state law. Wexford moves to dismiss all claims against it, arguing that Frantz's Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations concerning the conduct of Wexford or its agents.
1. Federal claims
a. Counts I, II and IV: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
In Counts I and II, Frantz asserts that Wexford violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when it willfully and deliberately ignored his needs for adequate medical treatment. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 22-29.)
In the Amended Complaint, Frantz also includes his placement into solitary confinement as a claim asserted against all Defendants (ECF No. 18 ¶ 24). However, as he clarifies in his Brief in Opposition to the instant motion, his claims against Wexford only relate to his medical treatment. (ECF No. 37 at 5-6.) Moreover, the Amended Complaint does not include any factual allegations that state or even suggest that Wexford had any role in the decision of where he was to be housed at WCP.
Although Frantz does not specifically indicate his offender status at the relevant time, he does allege that he was incarcerated at WCP on the same date that he was arrested. This allegation supports an inference that he was a pretrial detainee at that time of the events at issue and Frantz does not allege otherwise. Assuming he was a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Amendment is not applicable to his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until after sentence and conviction.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
As such, Frantz's claim must be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979) (“under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”) (citations omitted). Frantz raises such a claim in Count IV, in which he asserts that “Defendants,” including Wexford, willfully ignored his suffering and disregarded his need for medical treatment and care, depriving him of his substantive due process rights. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 46-51.)
As the Third Circuit has explained, “the substantive due process guarantees afforded detainees ... at least as robust as Eighth Amendment protections afforded prisoners.” Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2020). In either case, a plaintiff must allege facts that would demonstrate: “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, regardless of whether Frantz was a pretrial detainee or a post-conviction inmate, the same legal standard applies to Counts I, II and IV and they can be collectively analyzed.
Deliberate indifference in the medical context has been explained as follows:
It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” As the Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)] Court noted: “In the medical context, an
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'” Id. at 105; see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation.”); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted) (“Certainly no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor. There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness.”). “Deliberate indifference,” therefore, requires “obduracy and wantonness,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986), which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 128 L.Ed.2d 811, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (stating that “it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”).Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference has been found when there is an intentional refusal to provide medical care despite knowledge of the need to do so, a delay in treatment for a non-medical reason, or action that prevents a prisoner from receiving necessary medical treatment. Id.
As it relates to Count IV, while Frantz asserts that Wexford intentionally and willfully disregarded his medical condition and delayed medical care that was necessary, the Amended Complaint does not allege any facts to support this conclusory statement. The only factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that even infer issues about Frantz's medical care are that he was in solitary confinement and was not checked on for more than twelve hours. Frantz was incarcerated at WCP between January 3, 2022, and January 20, 2022. He does not identify the time frame in which he was not checked on for twelve hours. As Wexford correctly argues, Frantz has not even alleged that Wexford was informed of or otherwise knew of his medical condition at any time between January 3, 2022, and January 20, 2022, or that it had some prior knowledge of an on-going medical condition that would have required its personnel to check on him during the unidentified twelve-hour period. Similarly, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Wexford refused to treat him, prevented him from getting treatment or delayed treatment. Simply put, there are no facts alleged in the Amended Complaint that relate to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of Wexford. Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim of deliberate indifference against Wexford.
Frantz responds as follows:
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to create a reasonable inference that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's constitutional rights by denying him adequate medical care, given that the Amended Complaint alleges facts demonstrating that Plaintiff interested [sic] the prison in a physically healthy condition and three weeks later was transported out of the prison in a life threatening condition after being placed in solitary confinement. The medical condition of the Plaintiff, the timing of that medical condition and the fact that Wexford was responsible for the provision of medical care of the Plaintiff creates a reasonable inference that the Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by Defendants.(ECF No. 37 at 6.)
This argument is unpersuasive. Certainly, the alleged facts permit an inference that Frantz sustained a medical event or events while housed at WCP. However, there are no allegations concerning, inter alia, the onset and development of Frantz's medical issues or if and when Wexford was advised of or otherwise knew about these issues. In short, the Amended Complaint fails to make any connection between Frantz and Wexford from which one could infer that Wexford acted with recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk as to Frantz's health.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be granted as to Counts I, II, and IV without prejudice.
b. Count V: Monell claim
In Count V, Frantz asserts a Monell claim against all Defendants for instituting policies and procedures at WCP with indifference to the constitutional rights of the inmates, including Frantz. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 52-58.)
In Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court held that a municipality could be liable under Section 1983 “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts injury that the government as an entity is responsible . . .,” 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). This liability extends to “[p]rivate corporations . . . which provide medical services under a contract with the [prison],” but only “if they had a policy or custom causing its agents to deprive care to the level of a constitutional violation” or “failed to train, supervise, or discipline their employees reflect[ing] a deliberate or conscious choice that caused [a] constitutional injury.” Plummer v. Wellpath, 2023 WL 2873883, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2023) (citing Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 n.4, 583 (3d Cir. 2003), Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020), and Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted)).
To establish Section 1983 liability, a plaintiff must prove that a municipal “policy or custom” is the “moving force” of the constitutional violation at issue. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, to state a claim for liability against Wexford, Frantz must allege that its policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violations. Id.; Natale, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). Further, he “must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading standard. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
In the Amended Complaint, Frantz identifies three allegedly unconstitutional policies: (1) creating and promoting an atmosphere where corrections officers ignore inmates' requests for medical treatment; (2) placing inmates in solitary confinement without lawful justification; and (3) placing mentally ill or mentally disabled inmates in solitary confinement without sufficient supervision or provision of adequate medical care. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 55-57.) As Wexford correctly points out, Frantz identifies Wexford as the entity responsible for providing medical care to inmates at WCP. As defined by Frantz, the policies at issue are not those that would be promulgated by a medical provider. Frantz has not pleaded any facts that support a claim that Wexford supervises correctional officers, is responsible for placing an inmate in solitary confinement or is consulted about which detainees should be placed in solitary confinement. Rather, the identified policies are matters of prison administration. Thus, to the extent that Frantz intended to bring a Monell claim against Wexford in Count V, it should be dismissed without prejudice.
2. State law claims
a. Count III: Cruel and inhumane treatment
In Count III, Frantz brings a claim against all Defendants for “cruel and inhumane treatment,” under the Pennsylvania Constitution. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 39-44.) There is no private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution, however. Pocono Mt. Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mt. Sch., 442 Fed.Appx. 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (“[N]either Pennsylvania statutory authority nor appellate case law has authorized the award of money damages for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”). Nor has Frantz identified any other state law claim for “cruel and inhumane treatment.” Accordingly, Count III should be dismissed with prejudice.
b. Count VII: Negligence
In Count VII, Frantz brings a state law negligence claim against Wexford and unknown employees of Wexford. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 73-79).
Frantz asserts that Wexford and its employees were negligent in failing to: (1) obtain his medical records; (2) perform a proper medical assessment/examination; (3) recognize the signs and symptoms of sepsis, mental illness, and metabolic encephalopathy; (4) perform routine monitoring of his health; (5) provide him with medication; (6) exercise adequate medical skills; (7) properly manage his medical conditions; and (8) timely transport him to an emergency medical facility. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 75.)
Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim “must allege facts which establish the breach of a legally recognized duty or obligation of the defendant that is causally connected to actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.” Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 596 (Pa. 2012). Wexford moves to dismiss the negligence claim on the basis that Frantz has not pleaded any facts to support the breach of a duty or obligation on the part of Wexford. (ECF No. 30 at 11-12.) Wexford argues that “plaintiff has simply failed to plead facts sufficient to show any contact between Wexford and himself, such that a breach of the standard of care or duty (whether corporate or individual) and causation could be established.” (Id. at 11.)
Wexford also noted that Frantz failed to file a certificate of merit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1042.1, et seq. (ECF No. 30 at 11 n.5.) Frantz has since filed a certificate of merit. (ECF No. 36.) While Frantz may possess facts that support his claim or a certificate of merit, he did not include them in the Amended Complaint.
Wexford is correct. The Amended Complaint fails to allege a factual basis which supports a claim of negligence against Wexford. The Amended Complaint simply lists a series of boilerplate statements about conduct attributed to Wexford. It fails to provide the necessary connection by, at a minimum, alleging that Wexford was advised about or otherwise knew about medical issues related to Frantz that required treatment, when it knew about any medical issues, and whether it was asked to render treatment and either treated Frantz, or failed to do so, in a negligent manner. The only facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are that at some unknown date and time while in solitary confinement, Frantz was not checked on for twelve hours, and that he was transported to Excela on January 20, 2022. Without any context, Frantz's conclusory statements about negligent conduct are insufficient to state a claim against Wexford. Given the failure to allege any actual connection between Frantz and Wexford during his confinement at WCP, the negligence claim should be dismissed without prejudice.
c. Count VI: Corporate liability
In Count VI, Frantz brings a claim against Wexford and unknown employees of Wexford for corporate negligence. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 60-72.) As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained:
While the subtitle of this Count indicates that the claim is asserted against both Wexford and John Does 11-20, all of the Does are identified in the Amended Complaint as individual employees of Wexford. Further, all of the allegations in this Count are directed to Wexford. Therefore, it appears that Does 11-20 were erroneously included in the subtitle as the Amended Complaint provides no basis for imposing corporate liability upon these individuals.
... [T]he corporation's liability is derivative of [its] agents' breach of their duties of care to the plaintiff. But, this Court has also recognized that a corporation may also owe duties of care directly to a plaintiff, separate from those of its individual agents, such as duties to maintain safe facilities, and to hire and oversee competent staff.Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 598 (Pa. 2012).
Frantz asserts that Wexford had a duty to provide an acceptable level of medical care to the prisoners it served. According to the Amended Complaint, Wexford had a duty to “formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate policies, practices and procedures” to ensure that such care was provided. (ECF No. 18 ¶ 65.) Frantz alleges that Wexford failed to have policies in place to perform this medical care, failed to properly train its doctors and staff and failed to correct inadequate performance by doctors and staff. (Id. ¶ 66.) As a result, Frantz alleges, Wexford's conduct resulted in the failure to (i) properly assess Plaintiff's medical condition, (ii) review his medical records, (iii) perform a proper medical screening, (iv) perform routine medical assessments, (v) medically manage Plaintiff's schizophrenic condition and sepsis, and (vi) timely transport Plaintiff to a hospital for emergency medical care. (Id. ¶ 69.)
In support of its motion to dismiss, Wexford again relies upon Frantz's failure to provide any factual basis for this claim. (ECF No. 30 at 11-12.) As addressed in the context of the negligence claim, and for the same reasons, Count VI of the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim. Since there are no allegations of any wrongful conduct on the part of a Wexford employee or agent as it relates to Frantz beyond mere boilerplate, there is no factual basis to support a claim against Wexford for alleged policy failures, failure to train or failure to correct inadequate rendering of medical care. Thus, Count VI should be dismissed without prejudice.
E. Amendment
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. A curative amendment should be permitted in this case.
F. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc., ECF No. 29, as follows:
1. Count III should be dismissed with prejudice;
2. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI and VII should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties may, within fourteen (14) days, file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).