Opinion
No. 05-1715-pr.
November 3, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn,Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of dismissal be, and it hereby is, VACATED and the case REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings.
Appearing for Appellant: Brian Hail, Goodwin Proctor LLP (Warren D. Dodson, Haynes and Boone LLP, of counsel), New York, NY.
Appearing for Appellee: Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Julie S. Mereson, Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel) Albany, NY.
Pierre Fransua appeals the judgment of the district court granting a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss his complaint. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
By order of this court, Fransua, who had been proceedingpro se, was appointed counsel to represent him on appeal as to his claim that Dr. Sturtz, Dr. Vadlamudi, and T.G. Eagen violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The remainder of his appeal was dismissed.
We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for medical mistreatment in prison, the prisoner must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The prisoner must satisfy two requirements: "First, the prisoner must prove that the alleged deprivation of medical treatment is, in objective terms, sufficiently serious-that is, the prisoner must prove that his medical need was a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration or extreme pain. Second, the prisoner must prove that the charged official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This state of mind "need not reach the level of knowing and purposeful infliction of harm. . . . Deliberate indifference is a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness, as the term is used in criminal law. This mental state requires that the charged official act or fail to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result." Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
While Fransua makes several allegations regarding the seriousness of his medical needs and the lack of adequate care given to him by state prison officials and doctors, his complaint does not allege facts upon which a reasonable juror could infer that defendant doctors possessed the subjective reckless state of mind needed to permit a successful Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. He does not allege that defendant doctors were aware of the serious risks to which they allegedly subjected him. Fransua's claim against defendant Eagen was, therefore, also properly dismissed, because Fransua failed to plead an underlying constitutional violation needed to ground a claim based on supervisory liability. See id. at 283.
Because Fransua failed adequately to plead a cause of action, the grant of a motion to dismiss without leave to replead would ordinarily be appropriate. But under the unusual circumstances of this case, where he was proceeding pro se when he filed the complaint, but is now represented by counsel, we conclude that he should be permitted leave to amend his complaint to attempt to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[D]ismissal of [this] case would normally be proper. However, `a pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.'" (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991))).
We therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of Fransua's complaint with prejudice, and direct the court to enter a similar order of dismissal without prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is hereby VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district court.