Likewise, we need not discuss the cases involving very different circumstances in which the Court has held no relief was warranted. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 641, 642-643 (2), 748 S.E.2d 896 (2013) ; Walker v. Hagins, 290 Ga. 512, 515, 722 S.E.2d 725 (2012) ; Young v. State, 290 Ga. 392, 393-395 (2), 721 S.E.2d 855 (2012) ; Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 882 (6), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011) ; Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98, 101 (2) (b), 701 S.E.2d 189 (2010) ; Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 67 (2) (b), 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010) ; State v. Parlor, 281 Ga. 820, 820-821, 642 S.E.2d 54 (2007) ; Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 80 (7), 597 S.E.2d 332 (2004) ; Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 379 (2), 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001) (providing dictum); Presnell v. State, 274 Ga. 246, 248 (2), 551 S.E.2d 723 (2001) ; Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 17, 17-18 (2), 354 S.E.2d 433 (1987) ; Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 197 (1) (c), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986) ; Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 143-147 (1), 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980) ; Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 347-348 (2) (d), 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979) ; Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 37-38 (3), 257 S.E.2d 543 (1979) ; McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470, 471 (3), 207 S.E.2d 457 (1974) ; Haden v. State, 176 Ga. 304, 307, 168 S.E. 272 (1933) ; Hulsey v. State, 172 Ga. 797, 805-809, 159 S.E. 270 (1931) ; Turner v. State, 78 Ga. 174, passim (1886) (denying relief on one ground and providing dictum on another); Roby v. State, 74 Ga. 812, passim (1885); Stevenson v. State, 69 Ga. 68, 74 (1882) ; Rafe v. State, 20 Ga. 60, 64 (1856). We cannot quarrel with the proposition that every one of our prior cases might be factually distinguished from this case on some material ground, inasmuch as no case exactly like this one appears to have previously come before the Court.
Regardless of which section applied, we find here no disregard of the substantive provisions of the law as would vitiate the array. Cf. Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (1) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980). Moreover, the privilege of exemption belonged to the juror and does not provide defendant with grounds to object to her service on the grand jury.
We note that Pope has not shown that there were fewer than six members on the board when the jury list was last revised (and the board is not involved in the drawing of individual venires from the list) but, in any event, we "do not find here such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the arrays." Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 147 (1) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980). (d) Drawing the venire was not a "critical stage" of the proceedings requiring Pope's presence.
Thus, we do not further consider the defendant's twelfth enumeration. We note, however, that identical charges have been approved by this court in other cases. See, e.g., Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776 (10a) ( 301 S.E.2d 234) (1983); Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417 (5) ( 271 S.E.2d 817) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980). 10.
The purpose of making the defendant's record known to him is to allow counsel and the defendant to determine if there are any defects which would render these documents inadmissible during the presentencing phase of the trial. See Adams v. State, 142 Ga. App. 252, 254 (7) ( 235 S.E.2d 667); Herring v. State, 238 Ga. 288 ( 232 S.E.2d 826); Black v. State, 146 Ga. App. 226 ( 246 S.E.2d 133); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 ( 263 S.E.2d 666). This was done here. No objection was made at the sentencing phase of the trial nor has the defendant pointed out before this court in what way or manner any of the evidence used in aggravation was subject to objection.
" Thus the jury could not have understood the complained-of charge to place any burden on the defendant. See Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8) ( 263 S.E.2d 666), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980). 6.
Since they were accurate and correct representations of material fact, their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect and the trial court did not err in admitting them. Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (3) ( 263 S.E.2d 666), cert. denied 447 U.S. 930 (1980). 12.
". . . . "In rejecting the attack upon the array in Franklin [ v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980)], we held: 'We do not find here such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the arrays. . . . The case relied upon by Franklin involved the integrity of the jury selection process, not (as here) the incidental procedures.
Although the record does not contain an affidavit for every excused juror, after a thorough review of the trial court's procedure, “we do not find ‘such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the array( ).’ [Cit.]” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 882(6), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011). See also Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 17, 18(2), 354 S.E.2d 433 (1987); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 147(1)(e), 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999). 3. Appellant contends that the convictions for eight of the alleged offenses were improper because the trial court effectively lowered the State's burden of proof by allowing the prosecutor to argue that he was guilty of these offenses as a party to the crime even though the indictment alleged that he was the actual perpetrator of these offenses.
Although affidavits were not provided to potential jurors, before granting any excusal the trial court examined on the record individually and under oath those potential jurors who identified themselves as primary caregivers as defined in OCGA § 15-12-1 regarding their role as caregivers and their statutory right to be excused. While the trial court failed in some cases to inquire about what alternative childcare was available to the prospective juror, we do not find "such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the array[]." Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 147 (1) (e) ( 263 SE2d 666) (1980), overruled on other grounds by Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 281 ( 519 SE2d 893) (1999). 7. Bryant asserts that the State's use of peremptory strikes to excuse two African-American prospective jurors, Jurors Sparks and McIntosh, violated the principles established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 ( 106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986).