The rules are compatibly applied in our construction of the sentence in subsection (e) which is at issue, because the ordinary significance of the words makes the legislature's intention plain. Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 304 (2) ( 444 S.E.2d 778) (1994). SMITH, Judge, dissenting.
A statute containing a gender-based classification violates equal protection unless the classification furthers important governmental objectives, and the discriminatory means employed are "substantially related" to the achievement of those governmental objectives. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 ( 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.E.2d 225) (1971); Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 303 (1) ( 444 S.E.2d 778) (1994). The justification for making a gender-based classification proffered by the State must be "exceedingly persuasive," genuine, and not hypothesized, United States v. Virginia, supra at 533, and it "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Therefore, ยง 6-5-351 creates a gender-based classification. See Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 444 S.E.2d 778 (1994), where the Georgia Supreme Court found a similar statute to be unconstitutional. To withstand a constitutional challenge, a gender-based classification "must serve an important governmental objective and [must] be substantially related to the achievement of that objective."