Rule 27(j); Barrett v. Adkins Furniture Co., supra; Heslop v. Robert A. Grahame, Inc., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 856. Smith v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 71 A.2d 766; Levy v. Bryce, D.C.Mun.App., 46 A.2d 765; Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., Inc., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871; see also Marvin's Credit v. Hall, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 129 F.2d 57. If it was the intention of the trial judge that counsel for the appellee should prepare this revised counterstatement so that some semblance of order should evolve out of the dispute, it was still error, under the circumstances, to approve such statement without, at least, hearing the objections of the appellant, or submitting to appellant the statement proposed to be signed in order to learn her objections to it.
See Platt v. Platt, D.C.Mun.App., 51 A.2d 179. Ruppert v. Ruppert, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 134 F.2d 497; McWilliams v. Shepard, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 127 F.2d 18; Shlopak v. Davison, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 126; Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871. District National Bank v. Maiatico, 61 App.D.C. 242, 60 F.2d 1078; Fitzgerald v. Dodson, 58 App.D.C. 150, 26 F.2d 522; Mandes v. Midgett, supra; Franklin v. Chas. C. Shulman Co., supra.
United States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286, 11 L.Ed. 977; Petrified Bone Mining Co. v. Rogers, C.C.E.D. Pa., 159 F. 1019; Eaton v. Cleveland, St. L. K. C. R. Co., C.C.E.D. Mo., 41 F. 421; Lineker v. Dillon, D.C.N.D. Cal., 275 F. 460; 33 C.J.S., Executions, § 139; 21 Am.Jur., Execution, § 600. Potomac Small Loan Co. v. Myles, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 609; Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 58 A. 969, 67 L.R.A. 969, 107 Am.St.Rep. 749, 2 Ann.Cas. 315. City of Coral Gables v. Hepkins, 107 Fla. 778, 144 So. 385.
Without detailing the circumstances we are satisfied that appellant has wholly failed to show any abuse of discretion in the ruling here involved. Peay v. Parks, D.C.Mun.App., 42 A.2d 250; Palmer Construction Co. v. Patouillet, D.C.Mun.App., 42 A.2d 273; Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871. Appellant contends that the telephone conversation between Wagshal and the representative of appellant company relating to the reconsignment was inadmissible.
We need not recite the familiar and well-established rule that the action of a trial judge on a motion for a new trial is not subject to appellate review unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871; Carpenter v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 251; Shlopak v. Davison, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 126. It is somewhat difficult to determine what value to give defendant's contentions on the motion for new trial.
We have held that "One cannot take his chance on a favorable verdict, reserving a right to impeach it if it happens to go the other way." Ecker v. Potts, 72 App.D.C. 174, 112 F.2d 581; Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Keesee, 72 App.D.C. 45, 111 F.2d 657; Franklin v. Chas. C. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 871; Shlopak v. Davison, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 126. Kintz v. Lenkin, 67 App.D.C. 116, 89 F.2d 860.
But we do not rest our decision on that ground. Franklin v. Schulman Co., D.C.Mun. App., 31 A.2d 871; Carpenter v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 251; District Hauling Construction Co. v. Argerakis, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 31. We rule that the trial judge was correct in refusing to disturb the verdict, based as it was on evidence which was conflicting and which did not lend itself to precise scientific determination.