We have considered those cases' and we conclude that each domestic relations case must be decided on the basis of the facts unique to it and that great weight must be given to the decisions of the trier. See Laird v. Laird, 203 Cal.App.2d 806, 21 Cal.Rptr. 924; Howard v. Howard, 314 Ky. 685, 236 S.W.2d 932; Thompson v. Thompson, 222 Or. 505, 353 P.2d 241; Frank v. Frank, 18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199. The trial court is guided in the exercise of its discretion by the listing in 46-52 of the factors to be considered in awarding alimony, and the finding indicates that duration was duly considered by the court. The duration of a marriage is but one factor, and to hold that it is determinative would attach to that single factor a significance not intended by the legislature.

This is why we affirm the trial court, without laundering the linen of the litigants by recitation of facts revealed in the record that would lead to no other conclusion than that which we reach here. See Frank v. Frank, 18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199; Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966); Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967); Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 (1967). CROCKETT, C.J., and TUCKETT, CALLISTER and ELLETT, JJ., concur.

situations where the court was confronted with the impossible task of attempting to cut one blanket to cover two beds and satisfy both parties when the truth of the matter is that they cannot afford a divorce, but must have one anyway. It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments if this court should assume the prerogative and accept the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting to make a just and equitable allocation of the property and income of the parties in regard to alimony and support money, as the trial judge appears to have done here. It is due to this fact, taken into consideration with the nature of the trial judge's authority and duty, and his advantaged position, that in such matters he is allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion which will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse, a circumstance which we have not found here. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967); Frank v. Frank, 18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199 (1966); Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). This is also true of attorney fees which it is likewise the trial court's prerogative to fix.