We reverse the circuit court's rulings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A full recitation of the facts is articulated in our two prior appeals, Barker v. Frank, 327 Ark. 589, 939 S.W.2d 837 (1997) ( Barker I), and Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000) ( Barker II). In Barker I, appellants were Roger Barker, Patty McDonald, and Malcolm McDonald, three taxpayers who owned real property in Saline County and resided in the Fountain Lake School District ("Fountain Lake"), which includes portions of Saline County and Garland County.
With respect to the question of what is "uniform," it is unclear whether reducing each millage by an equal number of mills in a district having more than one millage would meet this requirement given that it would necessarily disproportionately affect one portion of a district. If such a reduction in a district having different millages would not qualify as "uniform," it is difficult to determine how to proceed because the law provides no formula to ensure that the rollback will be uniform. Although I can and will propose a mathematical formula that I believe would result in a "uniform" rollback in a multi-millage district, only the legislature or the Assessment Coordination Department can determine the method of calculating rollbacks in such a district. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 582-83, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000). This concept of a "uniform" rollback of taxes should not be confused with the concept of a "uniform rate of tax" mandated for maintenance and operation of the schools pursuant to Amendment 74.
See also, Nelson v. Berry Petroleum Co., 242 Ark. 273, 413 S.W.2d 46 (1967); Schuman v. Ouachita County, 218 Ark. 46, 234 S.W.2d 42 (1950). Moreover, this court has recently stated that an illegal-exaction suit is a class suit as a matter of law. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000); Carson v. Weiss, 333 Ark. 561, 972 S.W.2d 933 (1998). Thus, the suit in Gulf Rice and the suit in the present case are both class suits under article 16, section 13, of the Arkansas Constitution based on the same alleged illegal levy.
That case is still pending before the trial court as an action for an alleged illegal exaction. [1, 2] With regard to the underlying action for an illegal exaction, we note that taxpayers who are the victims of an illegal exaction form a class as a matter of law under Article 16, Section 13, of the Arkansas Constitution. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000). An illegal-exaction claim is by its nature in the form of a class action. Hamilton v. Villines, 323 Ark. 492, 915 S.W.2d 271 (1996).
[33] In construing our state constitution, we give words their plain, ordinary, and common meaning. See Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000); Hoyle v. Faucher, 334 Ark. 529, 975 S.W.2d 843 (1998). The wording of Amendment 74 makes it abundantly clear that each school district is responsible for assessing a uniform rate of 25 mills for maintenance-and-operation purposes.
Id. at 136. In an illegal-exaction case, our common law makes such a suit a class action as a matter of law. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000) (citing Carson v. Weiss, 333 Ark. 561, 972 S.W.2d 933 (1998)). The class is comprised of all taxpayers within the taxing unit.
Ark. Const. Art. 16, § 13. Our common law makes an illegal-exaction suit under Article 16, Section 13, of the Arkansas Constitution a class action as a matter of law. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000); City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982). An illegal-exaction claim is by its nature in the form of a class action. Hamilton v. Villines, 323 Ark. 492, 915 S.W.2d 271 (1996).
See also, Knowlton, supra; Kervin, supra. In Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 582, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000), this court stated: As we interpret a provision of the Arkansas Constitution, we have said that when the language of a provision is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its obvious and common meaning, and neither rules of construction nor rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain meaning of a constitutional provision.
Clearly, a school district is a "taxing unit" for purposes of this provision. Cf. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000) (school district was clearly a "taxing unit" for purposes of Amendment 59 even though its territory spanned two or more counties). The enabling legislation for Amendment 78, passed as Act 1197 of 2001 and now codified at A.C.A. §§ 14-168-301 to 322 (Supp. 2001), specifically defines the term "taxing unit" as including school districts.
Clearly, a school district is a "taxing unit" for purposes of this provision. Cf. Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000) (school district was clearly a "taxing unit" for purposes of Amendment 59 even though its territory spanned two or more counties). The enabling legislation for Amendment 78, passed as Act 1197 of 2001 and now codified at A.C.A. §§ 14-168-301 to 322 (Supp.