Opinion
F062611 Super. Ct. No. 515752 Super. Ct. No. 515753 Super. Ct. No. 515754
10-04-2011
FRANK J., SR., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS COUNTY, Respondent; STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
Marsha F. Levine for Petitioner. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Kane, J., and Franson, J.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.
Marsha F. Levine for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Frank J., Sr. (father) appealed following a May 2011 juvenile court 12-month status review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)) regarding his three dependent children, then 8-year-old Joshua, 6-year-old Frank, and 3-year-old Alexander.Father challenged a finding that he received reasonable reunification services between the 6- and 12-month status review hearings as well as an order continuing supervised, once-a-month visits between him and the children. On motion of father's appellate counsel, this court deemed the appeal to be a cause for mandamus relief in order to expedite review before the juvenile court's next status review hearing, October 11, 2011. Having conducted our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable services finding and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by continuing its once-a-month visitation order.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
In June 2010, respondent Superior Court of Stanislaus County, sitting as a juvenile court, exercised its dependency jurisdiction over the children (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g)) and removed them from parental custody. Their mother had a history of methamphetamine abuse, treatment and relapse, along with mental health problems. In addition, she had a history of relationships involving domestic violence and failure to protect her children from that violence. For his part, father was incarcerated as of June 2010 and could not arrange for the children's care. Authorities arrested him earlier in 2010, for inflicting injury to a child and child cruelty. As a result, he was returned to state prison on a parole violation. In addition, father was convicted in 2005 of felony cohabitant abuse in which mother was the victim. He had misdemeanor convictions as well for domestic violence in 1998, 2003 and 2004.
His alleged victims were a young boy and girl.
At the June 2010 combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) recommended that the court order father, while incarcerated, to participate in any available domestic violence counseling/education programs, parenting program, and drug treatment/education program. It also recommended written contact with the children in lieu of visits while father was incarcerated.
Father stated his expected release date was in late December 2010. He also claimed he completed a domestic violence program and substance abuse counseling prior to his incarceration. His attorney offered to obtain verification for the next hearing that father completed these programs. The attorney also advised the court that father would be paroled to San Joaquin County and would like his services upon release in San Joaquin, rather than Stanislaus County. Father's attorney also agreed to written contact between father and the children while he was incarcerated, but requested that, if father were released early, he receive a minimum of twice-monthly visits.
In the June 2010 hearing, the juvenile court granted reunification services for both parents. It approved the agency's case plan for father and directed that he participate in such counseling as was available to him while incarcerated, with the proviso that if he were released early he would receive the visitation his counsel requested. The court made no finding or order regarding father's claim that he had previously completed a domestic violence program or his attorney's offer to obtain verification. The court concluded the hearing by setting a six-month status review for early December 2010.
Mother ultimately waived reunification efforts between herself and the children. Therefore, we will not summarize her reunification services or efforts.
First Six Months of Reunification Services
Father remained incarcerated throughout the first six months of reunification efforts. Agency social worker Christine Shahbazian wrote father three times and each time attached a copy of his case plan. At best, AA and NA were available to him in prison, but he did not participate. He did send letters to the children, some of which were considered inappropriate, as he made promises about how things would be when he was released and asked the children for information about their mother.
Meanwhile, the children had been moved to a new placement in Fresno County. The children adjusted well to this change.
Six-Month Review Hearing and Orders
At the six-month review hearing in early December 2010, the court ordered that upon father's prison release, there be once-a-month supervised visits between him and the children. It also found the agency provided father reasonable services to overcome the problems which led to the children's removal. It further ordered father to participate in such programs as approved by the agency.
The agency's case plan for him upon release required him to participate in a domestic violence assessment and follow all recommendations, complete a parenting program, participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations, and submit to random drug testing. Although a report from the children's Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also recommended that the children be referred to counseling to "address effects of domestic violence," the court made no such order.
The court concluded its six-month review by setting a progress review hearing for early February 2011 and a 12-month review hearing in May 2011. Father did not appeal following the six-month review.
Second Six Months of Reunification Services
Father was released on parole to San Joaquin County in late December 2010. According to his parole terms, he could not travel more than 50 miles from his residence without parole approval or have any contact with the mother. He also could not have contact with any minor without parole approval.
Father communicated with social worker Shahbazian on January 3, 2011. The following day she spoke with father's parole officer and told him exactly what father needed in terms of services. The parole officer then referred father to adult parole operations for a program for anger management/domestic violence, parenting, substance abuse, and life skills. Shahbazian received a copy of the referral and parole conditions, which were countersigned by the parole agent and father. She was satisfied with the referral since it mirrored father's case plan requirements.
Father started attending the program on January 6, 2011. In the first phase of the program, he was required to attend seven days a week.
Shahbazian also arranged father's first visit with the children for January 5, 2011. At that time, the children were on an extended visit over winter break with their mother in Stanislaus County. This was the first physical contact he had had with the children in approximately a year and a half. The social worker also supervised the visit, which occurred in the agency's offices and appeared to be a positive experience for the children.
After the first visit, father told Shahbazian he wanted his family, including the mother, to be together again. Warned that this was a bad idea given the previous abuse and his parole terms, father insisted the mother could contact the parole officer and have the order lifted. Shahbazian spoke again with the parole officer who reiterated father could have no contact with the mother. Father at this time also minimized his abusive conduct towards other children, which resulted in his parole revocation.
Shahbazian also mailed father a letter with a copy of the case plan following the January visit. In the letter, Shahbazian advised father that he would need to provide her and the court with proof of his progress with services. She also had a discussion with him about the plan's components.
Meanwhile, the CASA reported that the children had not expressed a desire to have visitation with father.
At the February 2011 progress review hearing, Shahbazian advised the juvenile court that father was participating in his parole requirements. However, he did have a positive test for morphine. The court warned father about the consequences of additional positive tests. The court also directed that father's visits continue to be supervised and occur once a month as well as continued its case plan for father. Neither father nor his attorney raised any complaint about his case plan, Shahbazian's efforts, or the court's visitation order.
It was also at this hearing that the mother waived further reunification services.
Father's next visit with the children occurred in the end of February. Because the January visit had been uneventful, Shahbazian authorized a visit for father and the children at a park near the children's foster home in Fresno County. The agency provided father with transportation from San Joaquin County to the visit and the agency's driver supervised the visit from his van. The foster mother was also at the park and in a position to observe the visit.
During the February visit, the middle child, Frank, told father he was not the child's dad and that he (the child) was going to be adopted. This upset father who said he wanted the children to come live with him. When Frank became upset in response, father reportedly said "so you're going to have that kind of an attitude." Father also became very upset when he saw that the eldest child, Joshua, had a football bearing his first name and the foster family's last name. Angry about what he had experienced at the visit, father called Shahbazian after the visit and complained. According to father, the mother was telling the children they would be adopted. He also asked why the mother received twice-a-month visits with the children while he received only one. The social worker tried to reframe father's issues in a way that was not accusatory, but could help him see the situation from the children's perspective.
The foster mother also called Shahbazian after the February visit. The two older children reportedly told her as she transported them to the park that they did not want to see father. She watched the visit from nearby and could hear what was said.
After these conversations, Shahbazian asked that the children attend counseling to assist them in understanding that reunification with their father was a goal. She could not directly refer the children because they lived outside of Stanislaus County. She needed authorization for the counseling through a third party for the referral and that involved waiting on the phone for an hour and a half. She had to do this more than once because the first counselor did not work out. The children eventually began counseling in April.
Shahbazian also supervised the subsequent monthly visits. A March 23, 2011, visit occurred at a Merced fast-food restaurant due to bad weather. The middle child, Frank, did not sit at the table with father for the majority of the visit. Father playfully teased the boys during the visit, but some of his teasing could be construed as put downs. The youngest child, Alexander, who sat on father's lap for a while, tried to get off father's lap and appeared upset. Father repeatedly put his hand over Alexander's face while continuing to hold the child on his lap. Eventually, Alexander hit father who sternly told the child it was not OK to hit. This type of interaction between Alexander and father occurred repeatedly. By contrast, towards the end of the visit, father interacted with the other children in a positive manner, as he encouraged and praised them in one of their activities.
On the same day, the oldest child, Joshua, told Shahbazian he did not wish to visit father. Asked if it was because of the previous visit at the park, Joshua said no, adding "[b]ecause [the foster parents] are my family now." The middle child, Frank, told the social worker he would maybe play football "or something but not visit."
Two weeks later, in early April, father petitioned (§ 388) for at least weekly visits and to have the children moved to a foster home closer to him. The court granted father a hearing but only as to his visitation request. The court ruled father's request to change the children's placement did not promote the children's best interests.
Shahbazian had an hour-long conversation with father on April 12 about his request to have the children moved and discussed how that request demonstrated his lack of insight or caring for the children's well being. Rather, father continued to put himself first.
The same day, Shahbazian contacted father's parole program case manager, Angela DuHart, and was informed he continued to be compliant with the program. The social worker also requested that DuHart provide a print out of father's attendance. In return, Shahbazian received a client activity summary of the service activities provided to father and how frequently he attended. One of the activities listed in the summary was anger management. There was no domestic violence program listed on the summary.
Shahbazian contacted father's parenting teacher and left a message with the liaison for the domestic violence/anger management program, requesting information regarding father's progress. Shahbazian never received any information in response. The social worker also contacted father's parole agent who reported father was drug testing clean once a month and was working toward phase two of the parole program.
In her report for the upcoming 12-month review hearing, Shahbazian expressed her belief that father might need intensive individual counseling to address his personal issues that prevent him from thinking of others as individuals with thoughts, feelings and needs. For example, father had expressed a hope that the mother could not visit with the children when she was in custody because he did not get to have visits when he was incarcerated. Shahbazian added a clinical evaluation of father might be beneficial to assess him for his specific needs to make positive life changes and to tailor services to meet those needs. Shahbazian also recommended that visitation remain once a month with social worker discretion to increase the visits based on father's progress with individual counseling.
12-Month Review and Section 388 Hearing
A contested five-day review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) and hearing on father's visitation request commenced on May 9 and concluded on May 25, 2011. The court heard testimony from several witnesses including both parents, Shahbazian, father's parole program case manager DuHart, and the foster parents.
Rather than summarize all the testimony heard, we will highlight the evidence regarding reunification services and visitation.
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Father
Father testified that after the March visit, Shahbazian suggested to him that he needed some counseling and the children needed counseling. He thought group or family counseling would be good but otherwise he disagreed because he was "already doing a lot of things." Shahbazian purportedly replied that maybe something like family counseling should be done but she did not "tell [father] where to go or anything like that."
Father also testified he had a visit on April 28. In his view, it was "probably one of the best ones." The youngest child, Alexander, was enthusiastic to see him. The older children seemed less enthusiastic. All of them interacted well and played games during the visit.
On cross-examination, father admitted that in 2003 he was twice convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence and once again in 2004. The children's mother was the victim in each of these incidents. The oldest child, Joshua, was also less than two years old during this time frame. The mother was "very possibl[y]" pregnant with Frank at the time of father's 2004 offense. Then, in July 2005, father was convicted of a felony and went to prison after breaking the mother's nose. He claimed Joshua was outside playing and Frank was in his crib when he (father) broke the mother's nose. Apparently, in June 2005, father also fractured one of the mother's cheek bones.
Father agreed Joshua and Frank saw him kick, punch, and choke their mother as well as pull her hair. He admitted there was a "strong possibility" that the two boys had been traumatized by witnessing the physical abuse he had perpetrated. Father and the mother separated, to some degree, in the summer of 2006.
Then, on January 1, 2007, father was arrested and his probation revoked in April 2007 because he had not attended and completed a domestic violence class, which had been required as a previous condition of probation. As a result, he was incarcerated until early January 2008. He had no contact with the children during that period. He believed between January 2008 and August 2009 he saw the children twice a month.
In August 2009, father also completed a 52-week course, which dealt with issues of anger and violence against children and women. He was arrested yet again in February 2010 due to violent conduct and child endangerment.
Father knew that his current case plan required him to participate in a domestic violence assessment and follow all recommendations. Also, to the best of his knowledge, he had not participated in such an assessment. He recalled having a conversation with Shahbazian about domestic violence as part of his case plan, but he claimed she told him to produce a completion certificate, apparently for the program he completed in 2009.
According to father, Shahbazian never told him that the domestic violence course in 2009 did not count. He also thought the anger management program he was participating in through parole was a domestic violence program of some sort.
Father further testified that he "never had anybody physically go over my case plan with me." On the other hand, Shahbazian repeatedly sent him a copy of his case plan. Father acknowledged he was asked, apparently by Shahbazian, if he had received a copy of his case plan and whether he had any questions. Other than asking Shahbazian about increasing his visits, his own question about the case plan was to whom he should send the certificate of completion for the domestic violence program. He insisted the social worker never told him that his certificate of completion would not be sufficient.
Father acknowledged that Shahbazian told him he needed to be more sympathetic to what the children were experiencing. He believed he had been extremely sympathetic. He also disagreed with the social worker's description of his February visit with the children. Father also denied asking in his section 388 petition that the children be removed from their current placement. He only wanted them to be moved closer. He still believed it would ultimately be beneficial for the children to be moved to a different foster care placement closer to him, despite the evidence that they were doing well and enjoying normalcy for the first time in their lives in their current placement.
DuHart
DuHart testified that she was father's "behavior change coordinator" at the program to which the parole officer had referred father. Father signed releases permitting her to provide information to his social worker. DuHart had contact with the social worker by phone and e-mail. Although DuHart was asked to provide documentation of father's progress, she only provided the client activity summary which was "just numbers." All she believed she was obligated to give was the client activity summary so that it was all she sent to Shahbazian. DuHart neither provided all available information to Shahbazian nor told the social worker that she (DuHart) was not sending all available information.
When Shahbazian asked for e-mails, names or phone numbers of father's instructors, DuHart simply did not respond. In particular, she did not tell Shahbazian that if father signed more detailed releases that she (DuHart) would release more information.
Questioned about the client activity summary she provided Shahbazian, DuHart confirmed it did not mention a domestic violence class. Her program did offer a domestic violence class and it would be addressed in phase two of treatment. Father was currently in phase three but had not completed a domestic violence class. It was not offered to father because he said he already completed a domestic violence class. DuHart acknowledged she did not verify that, and it was her error because she should have information about it on file. She also testified it was up to father's parole agent whether father was exempt from taking a domestic violence class in her program. However, she was not sure that father's parole officer had ever made such a decision. Asked if she was aware father was on parole for a domestic violence offense, she answered, "His referral says 'PC 273.'" When informed it was "Penal Code 273.5, domestic violence," DuHart responded, "Now I know what that means."
DuHart also acknowledged the parole officer's referral included "anger management/domestic violence" as recommended services or needs. Her program's domestic violence class was certified, while the anger management class was more about managing anger and coping with situations.
Shahbazian
Shahbazian testified it had been her belief that father's parole program included a domestic violence class as well as anger management. The very first time she learned otherwise was during the hearing through DuHart's and possibly father's testimony.
After she received the activity summary report from DuHart in April, Shahbazian spoke with father telling him she needed a progress report for his anger management and domestic violence class. She also explained that she was having problems getting information from father's parole program. Father told her that the activity summary report was what the program provided him. It seemed to the social worker that father was not able to get her any more information. He did not explain to her that he actually was not participating in a domestic violence course.
Sometime earlier in February or March 2011, father said he was assigned to an anger management course. However, she told father he had to do a domestic violence course. She did not give him a referral to another domestic violence program because father had already been referred by his parole officer. She believed the conflict was with father and his apparent choice not to do domestic violence counseling through the parole program. He claimed he already did domestic violence and she could not force him to attend. In her view, if father would say he needed it, the parole program would have provided the domestic violence class. Shahbazian was still of the opinion that domestic violence remained a "huge issue" for father because, based on her contacts with him, he remained in a state of denial.
Mother
The children's mother testified about the physical abuse she suffered at the hands of father during their five-year relationship. She and father were using methamphetamine during this period. Father was also drinking. It was when he was "coming down" from the methamphetamine or had been drinking that he abused her.
The physical abuse occurred at least three to four times a week, except for those periods when father was incarcerated. Joshua and Frank were witnesses to the abuse. They had seen father punch her in the face more than once. Joshua was also present when father broke her nose. Joshua was two or three years old at the time and cried.
The mother also testified about father's visits with the children between 2008 and 2009 after the couple separated and before these dependency proceedings commenced. The mother and father had a visitation arrangement, but father was inconsistent in his visits. Also, when Joshua and Frank returned from visits with father, they would cry and tell her they did not want "to go back." Then, between August 2009 and February 2010, father never saw the children.
Offers of Proof
On the final day of the contested hearing, father's attorney made an offer of proof, accepted by the other parties and the court, that father would testify he contacted the parole program, apparently sometime recently and signed individual releases for each of his instructors/counselors. He also started the domestic violence class the preceding day.
The agency's counsel also made an undisputed offer of proof that Shahbazian would testify she contacted DuHart at the conclusion of their last day in court. Shahbazian was informed DuHart could not provide information and would have to work through DuHart's supervisor. When Shahbazian contacted the supervisor for reports on father's progress, the social worker was informed that despite father's signed releases, subpoenas would have to be served in order to obtain the information the social worker requested.
Foster Parents
Finally, the court heard from each of the children's foster parents. According to the foster father, when the children are told they have to see father, they "immediately start to close off." They act differently around school and home and appear afraid. The middle child twice experienced enuresis before or after a visit. Recently, the eldest child cried stating he was afraid he was going to have to live with father. The foster father tries to encourage the children when they have a visit with father. The foster father also encourages the children to love their father. Nevertheless, the foster father could not say that it was getting easier for the children to visit their father. They visited because they were told to, but after the visits, they complained they did not want to do that again.
The foster mother told the court that when she tells the children they are going to visit father, all she hears in response is "'Do we have to go?'" Frank "hits the back of the seat [in the car], or throws something." The day before the children had a recent visit with father, they again asked, "do [we] have to go?" During the visit, the children did seem to enjoy playing with father. The foster mother believed visits were better when they occurred outside at the park. Nevertheless, at bedtime, they asked if they "have to go again."
The foster mother also testified that the children had seen a therapist three or four times. The first time the children had separate appointments. Thereafter, they saw the therapist together.
Following closing arguments, the juvenile court denied father's request for increased visits. The court could not find there were changed circumstances or that increased visits would be in the children's best interests. The court noted there had been significant periods of time when father had been absent from the children's lives. The majority of those times were periods of incarceration. As a result, father had very minimal visits with the children. When father was "in the picture," there were very violent episodes. The court believed the mother's testimony that the domestic violence occurred on a weekly basis and the frequent visions of violence administered by father on the mother, whom the children loved very much, did not leave them unscathed. The court wanted to hear from both the children's therapist and father's therapist once he began counseling. The court wanted a progress report in two months' time.
The court also expressed concern that father did not start domestic violence counseling when he should have, especially given that the violation which sent father back to prison most recently was for violence upon two children. The court also found that reasonable services had been provided to father. The court believed the agency complied with the case plan. In particular, the court found Shahbazian had worked very hard and exercised due diligence to obtain information regarding compliance with the case plan. The court further found that the parole program had "not been cooperative whatsoever." The program's policy of not providing information or providing very limited information precluded the agency from assessing father's progress. It was not the agency's fault.
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonable Reunification Services
Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable reunification services finding. He criticizes Shahbazian at length for, in his view, delegating nearly every responsibility and doing little or nothing on his behalf. Father specifically complains Shahbazian: never personally reviewed his case plan with him; allowed his parole officer to make all the referrals; learned in April 2011 that he was not attending a domestic violence class, but did nothing to remedy the situation; made no effort to follow up on his statement that he completed a domestic violence program in 2009; waited until March or April to contact the parole program; delayed further in seeking information regarding his progress; did not pursue the necessary releases for information from the parole program; did not act on his request for more frequent visits; deferred all authority over visits to the foster parents and the agency's driver; allowed the foster parents to arrange for the children's counseling; and did not refer father for a clinical assessment to see what other services he needed or to individual counseling she thought he needed.
To support his many criticisms, father relies largely on his own testimony as well as a very narrow reading of the record, ignoring in the process all the conflicting evidence that was before the juvenile court. However, our appellate authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the decision, if possible. We do not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) In this regard, issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trier of fact alone. (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860.)
Father also loses sight of the law when it comes to assessing the reasonableness of services provided. In reviewing whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's reasonable services finding (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545), we are mindful that often more services could have been offered and the services provided were imperfect. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) However, the standard is not whether the best services were provided but whether the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances. (Ibid.) Given the circumstances of this case and for the following reasons, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable services finding.
As summarized above, this case was awash in conflicting evidence. Also, the juvenile court made obvious credibility determinations in its factual findings. First and foremost, the juvenile court did not believe father's testimony about the domestic violence element of his case plan or his insistence that Shahbazian never told him that his certificate of completion for the 2009 program would not suffice. Also, the fact that the social worker did not personally go over father's case plan is a red herring, given the numerous times she sent a copy of the plan to him and asked if he had any questions about it. Notably, father never claimed he did not understand the case plan. Further, the fact that father's parole officer made the referral for father's services did not mean Shahbazian unreasonably delegated her responsibility as the reunification social worker. Father's argument ignores the obvious. Father was paroled under certain conditions in terms of where he could go, restrictions on who he could contact, and what he would have to accomplish while on parole. As arranged, the parole officer's referral mirrored father's case plan in the dependency matter. We see nothing unreasonable in the collaborative effort between the parole officer and Shahbazian.
In addition, father ignores the juvenile court's findings that Shahbazian exercised due diligence to obtain information regarding his compliance with the case plan, but the parole program was totally uncooperative. It was not the agency's fault. The record certainly supports the court's findings in this regard.
Regarding his visitation complaints, we consider them to be equally meritless. There was no evidence that Shahbazian improperly delegated her responsibilities regarding father's visits. Father conveniently glosses over the evidence that due to his parole conditions restricting him largely to San Joaquin County, his lack of personal transportation, and the children's placement in Fresno County, visits were a challenge to arrange. Shahbazian supervised each visit, save the February visit. Because the agency provided father with a driver so that he could attend visits and the January visit appeared to be uneventful, Shahbazian's decision to have the driver stay and supervise the February visit appears reasonable. The fact that the February visit did not go well cannot be blamed on the driver or Shahbazian. We also question father's claim that Shahbazian deferred to the foster parents when it came to visits. Someone had to transport the children, whether it be in Fresno, Merced, Stanislaus, or San Joaquin Counties so they could visit with father. The foster mother provided the transportation and the fact that she remained in the vicinity during the visits was hardly unreasonable under the circumstances.
Furthermore, the fact that the social worker did not authorize more frequent visits as father wanted does not mean she provided unreasonable services. The court had ordered once-a-month visits without granting the social worker discretion to expand the visits. Also, the social worker discovered from the February and March visits that there were problems, which needed to be addressed before she could recommend longer or more frequent visits. In addition, she took steps to address those issues.
Shahbazian made what arrangements she could, given that the children lived out of county, for them to have counseling. It did take time for the counseling to begin, but that additional time appears reasonable under the circumstances. Although Shahbazian had not received a report yet from the children's counselor, the court could find that was also reasonable given further testimony by Shahbazian that it is during the appointments in the early stages that a counselor builds rapport with the patient.
Shahbazian also counseled father about his lack of insight and recommended that he attend individual counseling. She could have made a referral had he agreed. However, at the time father was not interested in individual counseling. He wanted group or family counseling, which Shahbazian believed was premature. So instead, she included her recommendations for individual counseling and a possible clinical assessment in her 12-month review report. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in how she handled the situation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we reiterate there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable services finding.
II. Continued Order for Once-a-Month Visits
Father also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by continuing its order for once-a-month visits. In his view, the visits since his release from prison had gone well and presented no problems. Also, he claims there was no evidence that increasing visits was contrary to the children's interests.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. No doubt visitation is a vital component of any reunification plan. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489.) However, the juvenile court properly found there was no evidence increased visits would be in the children's best interests. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)
Father had been absent, by virtue of his own actions, for a significant portion of the children's lives. To make matters worse, the two older children had witnessed father's physical abuse of their mother whom they loved. In addition, father exhibited very little insight into the children's feelings and attitudes towards him and not all the visits went well, as father claims. Further, the juvenile court wisely exercised its discretion in requesting therapeutic input once father began counseling, as well as input from the children's counselor, and setting an interim review on the issue.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is denied. The opinion is final forthwith as to this court.