Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe

10 Citing cases

  1. Ayers v. Landow

    666 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453-56, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1879-81, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982). The mailing requirement was added in 1984; its timing suggests that it was enacted in response to the Greene decision. Frank Emmet Real. Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134, 136 n. 5 (D.C. 1989). The words of § 45-1406, literally construed, are wholly consistent with the apparent constitutional imperative; if you post, then you must mail, or the posting will not comport with due process.

  2. S. Hills Ltd. P'ship v. Anderson

    179 A.3d 297 (D.C. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    In Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe (" Monroe "), this court made clear that, in order to prove that a tenant "cannot be found ," the landlord must make a " ‘diligent and conscientious effort’ ... to either find the defendant to effect personal service or to leave a copy of the summons with a person ‘residing on or in possession of the premises.’ " 562 A.2d 134, 136 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Westmoreland v. Weaver Bros. , 295 A.2d 506, 509 n.12 (D.C. 1972) ) (emphasis added). Consistent with that obligation in this regard, we have also stated that "posting is the least favored form of service and [should be] used only where attempts at personal or substituted service have failed."

  3. Edelhoff v. Shakespeare Theatre

    884 A.2d 643 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    Id. In our view, this appeal is controlled by Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1989) (hereinafter Monroe). In that case, the court was called upon to construe § 16-1502, and the question presented was very similar to the issue in this case.

  4. Reshard v. Stevenson

    270 A.3d 274 (D.C. 2022)   Cited 3 times
    Vacating and remanding a denial of motion to vacate default judgment when the trial court's "reasons capture some of the factors a trial court must consider in evaluating a Rule 60(b) motion, [but] they do not adequately assure us that the trial court considered all the factors relevant to its exercise of discretion"

    Id. ; see also Carrasco , 988 A.2d at 476. In support of this point, the trial court cited Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe , 562 A.2d 134, 134 (D.C. 1989), and Hernandez v. Banks , 84 A.3d 543, 558 (D.C. 2014). These cases affirm decisions vacating defaults against tenants on grounds of improper service, see Frank Emmet Real Estate , 562 A.2d at 134 (default judgment); Hernandez , 84 A.3d at 558 (default), but they do not suggest that defective service is the only basis on which a since-evicted tenant can obtain relief. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case we have some concern about giving too much weight to the fact that Ms. Reshard has been evicted and the resulting prejudice to Ms. Stevenson.

  5. Carrasco v. Walsh

    988 A.2d 471 (D.C. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that tenant was entitled to evidentiary hearing on issue material to tenant's Rule 60(b) motion where tenant's factual contention was not inherently incredible

    See D.C. Code § 16-1502 (2001).See Edelhoff v. Shakespeare Theatre at the Folger Library, Inc., 884 A.2d 643, 645-46 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134, 136 (D.C. 1989)). Rule 60(b)(6) permits the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment "upon such terms as are just" for "any other reason justifying relief."

  6. Jones v. Hersh

    845 A.2d 541 (D.C. 2004)   Cited 15 times
    Acknowledging that service by posting and mail is “disfavored” because it is known to be “less reliable” than other methods

    Posting is a disfavored method of providing notice because it is less reliable, generally speaking, than other appropriate methods and hence may raise serious due process concerns. See Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134, 136 (D.C. 1989). "Thus, although the statute does not expressly so require, it is a prerequisite to posting that a `diligent and conscientious effort' be made by the process server to either find the defendant to effect personal service or to leave a copy of the summons with a person `residing on or in possession of the premises.'" Id. See also Parker, 451 A.2d at 65 ("[T]he judicially construed requirement of diligence was designed to prevent the commencement of actions for possession where . . . further efforts on the part of the process server could have avoided utilization of the least preferred method of effecting service of process.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

  7. Pelkey v. Endowment for Community Leadership

    841 A.2d 757 (D.C. 2004)   Cited 3 times
    In Pelkey, the only case analyzing whether a person was a commercial or residential tenant for TOPA purposes, this court took as a given that the plaintiff's use of "an office for his consulting business" was not residential occupancy under TOPA.

    Therefore, we agree with the motions court that Mr. Pelkey's reason for defaulting was insufficient to bar ECL's claim for possession. Relying on Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1989), Mr. Pelkey argues that "the landlord [here] was well aware of the fact that the tenant often left the District for extended periods, and knew that the tenant was in California." (Br. for App. at 29).

  8. Malone v. Robinson

    614 A.2d 33 (D.C. 1992)   Cited 24 times

    In this regard, we have followed a similar approach in the related context of notice by service of process. See Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1989) (recognizing "significant constitutional overtones" in construing statute permitting posting). Had the notice of expiring redemption period not been returned, the District's mailing of that notice would have comported with the Council's regulation and been constitutionally adequate, since service by mail is reasonably calculated to give notice in most circumstances.

  9. Ressa Family v. Dorfman

    193 Misc. 2d 315 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2002)

    . (See, Mennonite Bd. of Missions v Adams, 462 US 791, 796 n 3 [1983]; Greene v Lindsey, 456 US 444, 455 [1982]; Frank Emmet Real Estate Inc. v Monroe, 562 A2d 134, 136 [DC App 1989].) With the passage of time, and the disappearance of its original basis, the rule of McDonald was misstated. As in a game of "telephone," it became garbled and broadened.

  10. Ressa Family, LLC v. Dorfman

    193 Misc. 2d 315 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2002)

    Service of process is thus now permitted — against residents and non-residents alike — by any method reasonably calculated to give a defendant actual notice of the proceeding. See, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796 fn. 3 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982); Frank Emmet Real Estate v. Monroe, 562 A.D.2d 134, 136 (D.C.Ct.App. 1989). With the passage of time, and the disappearance of its original basis, the rule of McDonald was misstated.