First is a federal case involving a situation parallel to the instant case, that is, a case in which the conduct at issue occurred prior to the effective date of the amended version of Rule 11 but the motion for sanctions was filed after the effective date of the amendment. In Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291 (M.D. Fla. 1994), the federal district court declared that to apply amended Rule 11 retroactively, the application of the amended rule must be "just and practicable." The federal court concluded that retroactive application of the amendment would not be "just and practicable" under the circumstances of the case.

Assuming without deciding that this case was "pending" on the effective date of the amended rule, we find that application of the amendments here would not be "just and practicable" for purposes of the Supreme Court's order. See Silva, 19 F.3d at 727; see also Johnson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 18 F.3d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1994) (mentioning amendment but applying earlier version without further discussion); Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 292-93 (M.D.Fla. 1994) (would not be "just and practicable" to apply new rule to long-pending litigation). Both at the time Land filed his complaint and when the Fund moved for sanctions, the old Rule 11 was in effect, and both parties presumably were operating under the standards and procedures propounded in that rule.

While Devlin's pro se Motion is due liberal construction, this Court cannot make Devlin's arguments for him. See Ward v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (“[T]his Court cannot make Plaintiff's arguments for him.”).

adverse actions taken against her with regard to her teaching position are due to be dismissed. Defendant does not raise any argument that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to show that she was a qualified individual with regard to the alternative jobs she desired, however, [Doc. 16-1 at 12-13; Doc. 19 at 5-6], thus waiving any argument it might have raised on that issue.See Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 Fed. Appx. 825, 827 n.3 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006) (per curiam) (finding that movant waived an issue by failing to elaborate on his argument or provide a citation to authority regarding the argument); GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (A court does not have "license to serve as de facto counsel for a party."); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that issue was waived, even though party's brief listed the issue in the statement of issues, because party provided no argument on the merits of the claim); Ward v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (court refuses to supply argument for party). Moreover, Plaintiff contends that she sufficiently alleged that she could perform the essential functions of the media-specialist, social-emotional-learning-specialist, and international-baccalaureate-specialist positions.

Defendants are, of course, represented by counsel, and in any event, the Court may not make arguments on their behalf or act as their de facto counsel. See Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 Fed. Appx. 274, 276 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2008) (noting that a court is not to act as counsel even for a pro se party); GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (A court does not have "license to serve as de facto counsel for a party."); Ward v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (court refuses to supply argument for party). Additionally, where a party simply raises an issue without providing any supporting argument or authority, that issue is not properly before the Court.

Cf., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Inst. of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326, 1331 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] passing reference to an issue in a brief [is] insufficient to properly raise that issue."); cf. Rocker Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prod. N.V., No. CIV.A. 00-5965 (JCL), 2005 WL 1365465, at *16 (D.N.J. June 7, 2005) (holding that where "Defendants devote nothing more than a passing reference to the notion that these alleged damages are somehow insufficient, the Court is not inclined to dismiss the conspiracy claim at this juncture"); see also United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived."). The Court cannot make arguments for a pro se party, see Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994), and it certainly will not do so for a represented party such as Defendant. Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 1986) ("It is not the obligation of this court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel.")

Therefore, the issue is not properly before the Court. See Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 Fed. Appx. 825, 827 n.3 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006) (per curiam) (finding that the plaintiff waived an issue by failing to elaborate on the argument or provide a citation to authority regarding the argument); Ward v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (court refuses to supply argument for party). For all of these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not shown reversible error with regard to the ALJ's consideration of any of the challenged medical opinions. [See Doc. 12 at 9].

Br.") ¶¶ 3, 5)]. Although courts liberally construe filings by pro se litigants, see Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), the Court cannot supply arguments for the parties. Ward v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D.Fla. 1994); see also Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Despite liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, the court will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues."). With this in mind, however, the Court must make "reasonable allowances so that a prose plaintiff does not forfeit rights by virtue of his lack of legal training."

The Court cannot rely on Plaintiff's unexplained and conclusory allegation that he knows more PS Forms 50 exist. See Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 293 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (refusing to grant sanctions because plaintiff had not provided "specific notice of reasons sufficient for [the Court] to consider imposing sanctions; conclusory statements are not enough"); Beltran v. Brentwood North Healthcare Center, LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (indicating that "the court would not be inclined to award such sanctions based on plaintiffs' conclusory assertions"). Finally, the same problems arise from Plaintiff's statements that he does not believe the PS Forms 50 provided to him and he does not trust the information from the Atlanta district USPS.

E.g. Brandt v. Schal Assocs. Inc., 121 F.R.D. 368, 389-90 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (refusing to consider expert affidavits submitted on Rule 11 motion because compliance with Rule 11 is question for the court and opinion of an attorney carries no evidentiary weight). But see Ware v. United States, 154 F.R.D. 291, 292 (M.D.Fla. 1994) (referring to expert report by Rule 11 expert, Vairo, but rejecting its conclusions). The entirety of Joseph's report, and Paragraphs 11 to 13 of Vairo's report, will be stricken as they contain impermissible legal conclusions.