Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-218
12-24-2020
Alex FRANCOIS, Petitioner, v. Mario GARCIA, et al., Respondents.
Curtis Francis Doebbler, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Service, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.
Curtis Francis Doebbler, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Service, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Diana Saldaña, United States District Judge
Pending is Petitioner Alex Francois's ("Petitioner") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Hearing (Dkt. 2). Petitioner is an immigration detainee currently being held in custody at Webb County Detention Center in Laredo, Texas by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). (Dkt. 1 at 4.) Petitioner claims that his current conditions of confinement place him at a severe risk of contracting COVID-19, which is likely to cause severe illness or death because of his medical conditions—tachycardia, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and schizophrenia. (Id. at 1–2.) Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that Respondents have violated Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified in part in 29 U.S.C. § 794 ), and customary international law. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner further argues that the Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Id. at 5.) Because the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's claims under § 2241, Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) should be dismissed, and his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Hearing (Dkt. 2) should be denied as moot.
Respondents include William Barr—the United States Attorney General, Chad Wolf—the Acting Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, Jose Correa—the Field Office Director for the San Antonio Field Office of ICE, Mario Garcia—the Warden of Webb County Detention Center, Tony Pham—the Acting Director of ICE, and ICE. (Dkt. 1 at 1.)
Petitioner appears to also indicate that he seeks a ruling from the Court to prevent his deportation to Haiti, his country of citizenship. (See Dkt. 1 at 15–16, 25.) While it is unclear if Petitioner actually seeks a ruling from this Court to suspend his removal from the United States, the Court notes that it does not have the authority to provide such relief. Title 8, United States Code, Section 1252 provides that the "sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal" is to file a petition for review with "an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). This Court is not "an appropriate court of appeals" from which Petitioner may seek relief from an order of removal. See Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enf't , 426 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2005).
Petitioner also filed an unopposed Motion for Leave to Seal Exhibits A-D and S-X (Dkt. 3). The Court grants the request to seal the aforementioned exhibits to protect Petitioner's private medical information.
Legal Standard
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241 provides a district court with jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus where a petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) ; see Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 687, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). However, habeas is not a panacea for all imprisonment-related claims. Rather, "habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention." Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1976). "Its sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody, and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose." Id. at 935–36.
To clarify, under federal law, incarcerated individuals have two distinct avenues through which they may seek relief related to their imprisonment: (1) a petition for habeas corpus; or (2) a civil rights action. Muhammad v. Close , 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004). Whether an incarceration-related claim is properly brought through either avenue "depends on the nature of the claim and the type of relief requested." Poree v. Collins , 866 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2017). The "instructive principle" is that challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought under habeas, while challenges to the conditions of confinement are properly brought through a civil rights action. Id. ; see also Muhammad , 540 U.S. at 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ). Although the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly foreclosed the use of habeas petitions to challenge a detainee's conditions of confinement, the "instructive principle" mandates that some claims are properly brought through a habeas suit, but not a civil rights action, and vice versa. See Poree , 866 F.3d at 244 ; see also Melot v. Bergami , 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a prisoner's claim was "not cognizable under § 2241" because it "involve[d] his conditions of confinement).
And while the Court further recognizes the Fifth Circuit's admission that the line between these two vehicles for relief can sometimes be "blurry," the circuit court has also provided two holdings which clarify the distinction. See Carson v. Johnson , 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the distinction between habeas petitions and civil rights actions can be "blurry"). First, where a detainee challenges a condition of confinement that also "affects the timing of his release from custody," the Fifth Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule to determine which avenue of relief the challenge should be brought under. Id. Namely, "[i]f a favorable determination would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release, the proper vehicle is a [civil rights action]." Id. (internal quotations and substitutions omitted). Second, the Fifth Circuit has also held that a civil rights action is the appropriate vehicle for a challenge to "the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of confinement." Cook v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep't , 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Spina v. Aaron , 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) ).
Discussion
A. Petitioner's Claims are Conditions of Confinement Claims
Although Petitioner raises three separate claims for relief, all three claims are properly viewed as claims regarding Petitioner's conditions of confinement. (See Dkt. 1 at 43–46.) First, Petitioner's Due Process claim centers on the "extended, pervasive conditions, policies and practices at the Webb County Detention Center." (Id. at 27.) In fact, Petitioner indicates that his Due Process claim may be described as "grounded in unconstitutional conditions of confinement." (See id. ) The Court need go no further than this admission to find that Petitioner's Due Process claims are claims regarding his conditions of confinement.
Second, Petitioner's Rehabilitation Act claims are similarly grounded in his conditions of confinement. Petitioner argues that Respondents have failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner's disabilities by "failing to ameliorate the conditions that prevent [him] from employing the only known means of protecting himself from infection ..." (Dkt. 1 at 33.) Petitioner buttresses this claim by noting Respondents’ failure to provide him with "personal protective equipment and products, sanitary conditions, and the ability to maintain hygienic practices that would allow [Petitioner] to safely reside with other detainees." (Id. at 32–33.) Petitioner's claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act are therefore plainly based on the alleged inadequate conditions of his confinement.
Third, Petitioner raises an international law claim that also revolves around Petitioner's conditions of confinement. Petitioner's international law claim asserts that international obligations require that the United States "ensure the life and health of detainees under the jurisdiction of the United States government." (Dkt. 1 at 34.) In defining the right to life, Petitioner argues that the United States has an international obligation not to detain migrants in detention centers in which they cannot protect themselves from COVID-19, implicating Petitioner's alleged conditions of confinement. (See id. at 37.) Similarly, Petitioner defines the right to health as one requiring a government to ensure that a detainee receives both adequate medical care and protection from the contraction of deadly diseases. (Id. at 40.) These purported international obligations are premised on Respondents’ failure to provide Petitioner with adequate conditions of confinement as required by international law. Thus, Petitioner's international law claims are also properly viewed as related to Petitioner's conditions of confinement.
B. Conditions of Confinement Claims Are Not Cognizable Under Habeas
Because Petitioner's claims are all related to his conditions of confinement and not to the fact or duration of his confinement, his petition (Dkt. 1) is not cognizable under the Court's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas jurisdiction. Petitioner's claims regarding Respondent's failure to provide him proper protection against COVID-19 are all attacks against "the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of confinement." Cook , 37 F.3d at 168. However, Petitioner offers two primary arguments as to why the Court nonetheless has jurisdiction, and the Court addresses them here.
1. There is no binding Fifth Circuit precedent regarding conditions of confinement claims and habeas jurisdiction based on COVID-19.
Petitioner argues that the Fifth Circuit "has now provided a clear indication that habeas is the appropriate legal vehicle to challenge one's detention based on COVID-19." (Dkt. 3 at 9.) This statement stems from the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Cheek v. Warden of Federal Medical Center , 835 Fed. Appx. 737, (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2020). The Court is not persuaded that an unpublished and non-binding opinion from the Fifth Circuit offers any "clear indication" on this issue. In fact, Cheek offered little by way of analysis and did not discuss how, if at all, finding subject matter jurisdiction over conditions of confinement claims raised in habeas comported with this circuit's controlling precedent. See id. at 739–40. The Court therefore declines to hold that Petitioner's request for release is "properly brought as an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 because a favorable ruling ... would accelerate his release." See id. 2. Petitioner does not challenge the "fact" of his confinement.
Cheek also refrained from mentioning the many district courts within this circuit that have concluded that they lack subject matter jurisdiction over conditions of confinement claims raised in habeas. See, e.g., Nel v. Cole , 2020 WL 6535787, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2020) (dismissing a § 2241 petition for want of subject matter jurisdiction because the petition challenged conditions of confinement); Brown v. McConnell , 2020 WL 6051690, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 24, 2020) (same); Moore v. Lacy , 2020 WL 5797708, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2020) (same); Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (same); Beswick v. Barr , 2020 WL 3520312, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 29, 2020) (same); Sacal-Micha v. Longoria (Sacal-Micha II ), 2020 WL 1815691, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (same).
The Court also notes that the decision in Cheek seems to be in contravention of an earlier, but published, Fifth Circuit opinion from this year, Melot v. Bergami , 970 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2020). The petitioners in both Cheek and Melot sought removal from prison custody to home confinement. Id. at 599 ; Cheek , 835 Fed. Appx. at 739–40 . However, the Melot court determined that the "change in confinement from a prison facility to home detention" involved the petitioner's conditions of confinement, which meant his claim was not cognizable under § 2241. Melot , 970 F.3d at 599 (considering, but declining to find, that placement in home confinement constituted "release" for habeas purposes). To the extent the petitioner in Cheek requested "release," Melot seems to indicate that his claim should not have been viewed as release for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction in the first instance. See Cheek , 835 Fed. Appx. at 739–40.
Additionally, Petitioner argues that because he is "unambiguously challenging the very fact of his detention as unconstitutional and contrary to law and seeks [ ] release," he properly brings his claims under habeas. (Dkt. 2 at 9.) The Court rejects this proposition for three reasons. First, Petitioner does not challenge the "fact" of his confinement. Habeas is meant to restore liberty to those individuals whom the Government lacked the authority to imprison or detain in the first instance. See Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 779, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) ("We do consider it uncontroversial, however, that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law." (citation omitted)). Petitioner does not challenge ICE's authority to detain him (i.e., he does not challenge the relevant law he is being held pursuant to). Rather, Petitioner claims that the conditions of his confinement now violate various constitutional, statutory, and international rights. If a challenge to the "fact" of detention merely required that a detainee claim some circumstance of their detention was unconstitutional or illegal, any condition of confinement claim would be cognizable under habeas.
To be clear, the Court is not alone in making this distinction. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cook v. Hanberry , 596 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) is instructive. The Hanberry court concluded that even if a petitioner's allegations of mistreatment amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the petitioner would still not be entitled to release from prison through a habeas petition. Hanberry , 596 F.2d at 660. If an Eighth Amendment violation does not constitute the "fact" of detention, properly challengeable under habeas, then Petitioner's claims are likewise jurisdictionally barred. See Lineberry v. United States , 380 F.App'x. 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a prisoner's cruel and unusual punishment claim, even if proven true, was not cognizable as a habeas petition); Spencer v. Bragg , 310 F.App'x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that petitioner's claims of exposure to asbestos, lack of proper medical treatment, retaliation, and loss of legal notes were not cognizable as a habeas petition).
Second, Petitioner's argument that release is the only possible remedy to the allegedly improper conditions of his confinement does not confer jurisdiction. Petitioner appears to draw this contention from the Supreme Court's statement in Preiser that when a prisoner "is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). The Court first notes that because Petitioner is not challenging "the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment," Preiser is unavailing regardless.
In addition, simply requesting release from confinement is not enough to make Petitioner's claims cognizable under habeas. It is true that the Fifth Circuit has adopted a "bright-line rule" that a civil rights action is appropriate where a favorable determination would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release. Carson , 112 F.3d at 820–21. However, this does not mean that simply requesting release in a petition is sufficient to establish habeas jurisdiction. See Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454, 460 (N.D. Tex. 2020) ("A demand for release does not convert a conditions-of-confinement claim into a proper habeas request."). Rather, when deciding issues of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly found that a petitioner is required to at least provide the legal authority under which he or she may be entitled to release. See Lineberry , 380 F.App'x at 453 (finding no jurisdiction under § 2241 because the petitioner "ha[d] not provided any authority for his argument that he is entitled to be released" because of an alleged Eighth Amendment violation where the petitioner requested immediate release); Spencer , 310 F.App'x at 679 (concluding that the petitioner's request for accelerated release did not sound in habeas because "he has not shown a legal basis for obtaining accelerated release"). The legal authority for release is clear in cases where the confinement itself is illegal—the confinement should not have occurred in the first instance. The same cannot be said when only a condition of confinement is at issue, no matter the relief requested.
The Court also uses this opportunity to address a related argument forwarded by the district court in Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf , 455 F.Supp.3d 330 (S.D. Tex. 2020), a decision that Petitioner cites. (See Dkt. 2 at 10.) The Vazquez Barrera court concluded that a detainee is, in fact, challenging the "fact or duration" of detention if the detainee "seek[s] immediate release from detention because there are no conditions of confinement that are sufficient to prevent" his or her injury. Vazquez Barrera , 455 F.Supp.3d at 336. The Vazquez Barrera court therefore appears to state that a conditions of confinement claim transforms into an attack on the "fact or duration" of detention when release is the only remedy to those conditions. The Court respectfully disagrees.
The Vazquez Barrera court cites no authority for the assertion that the alleged availability (or unavailability) of a specific remedy changes the nature of the claim itself. However, the court cites numerous cases, including the Supreme Court's decision in Preiser , for its statement that habeas is the correct statutory vehicle where an individual "is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release." Vazquez Barrera , 455 F.Supp.3d at 336 (citing Preiser , 411 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827 ). At the very least, this statement requires that a court engage two separate inquiries to determine habeas jurisdiction: (1) whether the "fact or duration" of confinement is challenged; and (2) what relief is requested. The court in Vazquez Barrera collapses the distinction between these two inquiries, which is a step the Court is not inclined to take absent clear authority to do so.
Third, and finally, in Melot v. Bergami , a published opinion from August of 2020, the Fifth Circuit upheld the distinction between a habeas and civil rights suit. 970 F.3d at 599. The prisoner in Melot , through a § 2241 petition, challenged the Bureau of Prison's denial of his request to be released to home confinement pursuant to the First Step Act's pilot program for eligible elderly offenders. Id. at 597. The Fifth Circuit determined that the prisoner's suit had been improperly brought through habeas because his "claim involve[d] his conditions of confinement and is more properly brought as a [civil rights] action." Id. at 599. While this at least makes clear that conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable under habeas, the Court is also informed by the Fifth Circuit's broad definition of "conditions of confinement" as inclusive of "a change in confinement from a prison facility to home detention." See id. Although it recognized that "an argument [could] be made" that the pilot program allowed for "release," the Melot court validated the distinction between "conditions of confinement" and "fact or duration of confinement." Id. Given that the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to hand-wave the distinction through a clever framing of the relief requested in that instance, the Court is also unwilling to do so here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Alex Francois’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction, and his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Hearing (Dkt. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEAL Exhibits A through D and S through X of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) pursuant to Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Seal Exhibits A-D and S-X (Dkt. 3).
Petitioner notes that the aforementioned exhibits correspond to Attachments 1 through 3 and 18 through 24 in the Electronic Court Filing System. (Dkt. 3 at 3.)
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IT IS SO ORDERED.