Opinion
No. 2020-06675 Index No. 601119/19
05-31-2023
Carlo Francois, respondent, v. Carolina Baez-Mieses, appellant, et al., defendants.
Martyn, Martyn, Smith & Murray, Mineola, NY (Marie E. Holbrook of counsel), for appellant.
Martyn, Martyn, Smith & Murray, Mineola, NY (Marie E. Holbrook of counsel), for appellant.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., LARA J. GENOVESI, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Carolina Baez-Mieses appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (John Michael Galasso, J.), entered August 26, 2020. The order denied that defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Carolina Baez-Mieses for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her is granted.
On October 8, 2016, the parties were involved in a multivehicle accident. The plaintiff's vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Latoya McKane and owned by the defendant Audrey McKane. This collision caused the plaintiff's vehicle to cross into the opposite lane of traffic at an intersection and strike a vehicle operated by the defendant Carolina Baez-Mieses. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. Baez-Mieses moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her, arguing that she was not responsible for the happening of the accident. In an order entered August 26, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the motion, and Baez-Mieses appeals.
"A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident" (Aponte v Vani, 155 A.D.3d 929, 930 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ferguson v City of New York, 209 A.D.3d 981). "'A driver is not required to anticipate that a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction will cross over into oncoming traffic'" (Lee v Ratz, 19 A.D.3d 552, 552, quoting Eichenwald v Chaudhry, 17 A.D.3d 403, 404; see Browne v Logan Bus Co., Inc., 156 A.D.3d 856, 857; Mandel v Benn, 67 A.D.3d 746, 747). "'Indeed, such a scenario presents an emergency situation, and the actions of the driver presented with [such a] situation must be judged in that context'" (Lee v Ratz, 19 A.D.3d at 552-553, quoting Dormena v Wallace, 282 A.D.2d 425, 427; see Wemyss v Ruszczyk, 126 A.D.3d 888, 889; Vargas v Akbar, 123 A.D.3d 1017, 1019).
Here, Baez-Mieses established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that she was presented with an emergency situation not of her own making when the plaintiff's vehicle crossed into her lane of traffic, and that she acted reasonably under the circumstances (see Vargas v Akbar, 123 A.D.3d at 1019; Gajjar v Shah, 31 A.D.3d 377, 378; Lee v Ratz, 19 A.D.3d at 552-553). Although the parties' deposition testimony submitted by Baez-Mieses in support of her motion conflicted as to whether she was stopped at a red light or traveling through the intersection with a green light at the time that her vehicle was struck by the plaintiff's vehicle, the conflicting versions did not create a triable issue of fact. Under either scenario, Baez-Mieses established that the collision occurred almost immediately after she first observed the plaintiff's vehicle, leaving her with no opportunity to avoid the collision (see Quinones v Altman, 116 A.D.3d 686, 687; Jones v Geoghan, 61 A.D.3d 638, 639). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Baez-Mieses's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
DUFFY, J.P., GENOVESI, DOWLING and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.