Opinion
Case No. 3:05CV64(CFD).
July 27, 2006
RULING AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Stanford Francis, an inmate currently confined at the Northern Correctional Center in Somers, Connecticut, brings this civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The plaintiff alleges that on September 14, 2001, Waterbury Police Officers arrested him and seized $3,832.00 from him. On August 23, 2002, the State of Connecticut nolled his criminal case with the stipulation that the money seized by the Waterbury Police Officers be returned to the rightful owner.
The plaintiff claims he is the rightful owner of the funds and that he requested the funds from an Assistant State's Attorney in the Asset Forfeiture Bureau. She informed the plaintiff that the Waterbury Police Department had his money and that he could authorize someone to collect it from that Department. The plaintiff's mother went to collect the money from the Waterbury Police Department, but only received $425.00. The balance remained with the State's Attorney's Office.
On December 19, 2002, a Superior Court Judge ordered the State's Attorney's Office to return the remaining funds to the Waterbury Police Department. The plaintiff eventually learned that the State's Attorney's Office Asset Forfeiture Bureau had turned over the remaining funds to the State of Connecticut's General Fund because plaintiff's mother could not prove those funds were rightfully hers. The plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities for money damages. For the reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed.
I. Standard of Review
The plaintiff has met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. When the court grants in forma pauperis status, section 1915 requires the court to conduct an initial screening of the complaint to ensure that the case goes forward only if it meets certain requirements. "[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) — (iii).
An action is "frivolous" when either: (1) "the `factual contentions are clearly baseless,' such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;" or (2) "the claim is `based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.'" Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). A claim is based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory" when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint. See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The court construes pro se complaints liberally.See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, "when an in forma pauperis plaintiff raises a cognizable claim, his complaint may not be dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) even if the complaint fails to `flesh out all the required details.'" Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (quoting Benitez, 907 F.2d at 1295). The court exercises caution in dismissing a case under section 1915(e) because a claim that the court perceives as likely to be unsuccessful is not necessarily frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989).
A district court must also dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 19159(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted");Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . which redesignated § 1915(d) as § 1915(e) provided that dismissal for failure to state a claim is mandatory"). In reviewing the complaint, the court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint" and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cruz, 202 F.3d at 596 (citing King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999)). Dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is only appropriate if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id. at 597 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In addition, "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim," the court should permit "a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis" to file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999).
A district court is also required to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) of official capacity claims in § 1983 action because "the Eleventh Amendment immunizes state officials sued for damages in their official capacity").
II. Discussion
In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. First, he must allege facts demonstrating that the defendants are persons acting under color of state law. Second, he must allege facts demonstrating that he has been deprived of a constitutionally or federally protected right. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982); Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986).
The plaintiff names the "State's Attorney Office" and the "Office of the Chief State's Attorney Asset Forfeiture Bureau" as defendants in the caption of the complaint. It is well-settled that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, (1989) (state and state agencies not persons within meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 725 F. Supp. 780, 783-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (state and state agencies are not persons under § 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 945 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). Because there is no arguable legal basis for a section 1983 action against a state or state agency, all claims against the Office of the State's Attorney and the Asset Forfeiture Bureau are dismissed. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Even if the plaintiff had named the individuals who worked in the State's Attorney's Office and Forfeiture Bureau, any claims for monetary damages against those individuals in their official capacities would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (The Eleventh Amendment immunity which protects the state from suits for monetary relief also protects state officials sued for damages in their official capacity). The caption of the complaint here states "Official Capacity" as to all defendants. In addition, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to enforce a stipulation entered by the judge in his state criminal matter regarding the funds he seeks to recover, his proper course of action is to file a motion in the state criminal matter. This court has no authority to enforce a stipulation entered in a state criminal matter.
The plaintiff also names the Waterbury Police Department as a defendant. A municipal police department is not subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal police department is not a municipality. Rather, it is a sub-unit or agency of the municipal government through which the municipality fulfills its policing function. See Cowras v. Hard Copy, Case No. 3:95cv99(AHN), slip op. at 25 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1997). Because a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity, it is not subject to suit under § 1983. See Id.
Other courts addressing this issue concur that a municipal police department is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and, thus, not subject to suit. See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's dismissal of claims against county sheriff's department because, under state law, sheriff's department lacked capacity to be sued); Peterson v. Easton Police Dep't Criminal Investigations Divs., No. Civ.A. 99-4153, 1999 WL 718551, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626-27 (D. Md. 1999) (citing cases for the proposition that municipal departments, including the police department, are not a person within the meaning of section 1983). Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the plaintiff's claims against the Waterbury Police Department. The complaint is dismissed as to any claims against the Waterbury Police Department. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
III. Conclusion
The claims against the defendants are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.