Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC 302856, John B. Shook, Judge.
Litt, Estuar, Harrison & Kitson, Barrett S. Litt and Paul J. Estuar for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Francis T. Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, Rene L. Lucaric and Paul J. Coony, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Teresa Rocha, Edward S. Alameida, Jr., Steven Cambra, Jr., Terry Boehme, Sandi Menefee, C. A. Terhune and State of California.
Klinedinst, G. Dale Britton and Hartford O. Brown for Defendant and Respondent Volunteers of America of Los Angeles.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Penal Code sections 6220-6236 authorize certain prisoners who have been ordered, or who have agreed, to pay restitution to their victims to serve their sentences in “restitution centers” while working in private sector jobs outside the centers. The State of California collects their wages and is required to distribute the net wages, first to reimburse each prisoner for certain work-related expenses, and then to allocate the remaining amount equally to the cost of operating and maintaining the restitution center, the payment of the restitution order or agreement, and to the prisoner’s savings account.
Elveta Francis brought this class action on behalf of herself and all past and current restitution center inmates alleging that the defendants had not reimbursed their work-related expenses and had not accurately credited their wages to their restitution accounts.
The trial court denied Francis’s motion for class certification, and she filed a timely appeal. Because the order is based on improper criteria and is not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse and direct the trial court to grant the motion.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Francis was convicted of a crime, sentenced to a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $79,442.60 in restitution to her victims. The sentencing court and the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) found Francis eligible for the restitution centers program and she was housed for approximately two years at a work-release correctional facility for inmates who are gainfully employed in the private sector and who have been ordered, or have agreed, to pay restitution to their victims. (Pen. Code, §§ 6220-6236.) Pursuant to Penal Code section 6231, subdivision (a), the inmate’s employer pays her wages directly to the DCR. The Director of the DCR, acting under the authority of the Department of Finance, administers these monies through Inmate Trust Accounts. Penal Code section 6231, subdivision (b), provides that after reimbursing the inmate’s work-related expenses, one-third of the inmate’s wages must be transferred to the DCR for the operating and maintenance costs of the restitution center; one-third must be paid as restitution to the victims of the inmate’s crimes; and one third must be placed in a savings account for the inmate to be used for the inmate’s personal needs or to provide family support.
The complaint alleges that after Francis was released from the restitution center, the balance owing on her restitution account was $79,370.50, a decrease in her restitution obligation of only $72.10 even though the center’s records showed that approximately $6,300 had been deducted from her earnings toward that account. Francis also alleges that the DCR never reimbursed her work-related expenses and that the DCR refused to provide an accounting of her earnings and credits despite her repeated requests.
After Francis filed this lawsuit, and before the class certification hearing, the DCR gave her an accounting of her restitution payments and credited her restitution account with $ 6,323.80. She does not dispute the accuracy of that revision.
Francis brought this action against the State of California, the DCR, employees of the DCR and Volunteers of America, (VOA) a nongovernmental agency that operates the restitution centers in Los Angeles under contract with the DCR (collectively “the state”). She sues on her own behalf and on behalf of all restitution center inmates who have been ordered to pay restitution to their victims, alleging that the state failed to maintain accurate accounts of inmates’ earnings and restitution accounts, failed properly to credit their restitution accounts, and failed to reimburse them for their necessary work-related expenses. The complaint seeks, among other remedies, to enjoin the state to comply with Penal Code section 6231, an accounting of plaintiff’s and the class members’ trust and restitution funds, and an order crediting their restitution accounts with the correct amounts and reimbursing their work-related expenses. The Defendants answered the complaint with general denials.
Francis moved for certification of two classes, the Credit Class and the Reimbursement Class. She defines the Credit Class as: “Persons (1) who were chosen to serve their sentences in the [DCR] restitution center(s); (2) who, pursuant to sentence, worked at civilian jobs in the community for which the [DCR or VOA] was paid a portion of the inmates’ earnings; (3) who, under the terms of their sentences, were to have a portion of the earnings from their jobs credited by the [DCR] toward their court-ordered restitution obligation, and (4) for whom the [DCR] did not credit, or did not fully credit, the amount of wages earned by the inmate to pay restitution[.]” She defines the Reimbursement Class as: “Persons who were chosen to serve their sentences in a [DCR] restitution center; (2) who, pursuant to sentence, worked at civilian jobs in the community/private sector for which the [DCR or VOA] was paid a portion of the inmates’ earnings; (3) who, in the course of their employment, incurred employment related expenses and who were entitled to reimbursement under the state statutory scheme, and (4) who did not receive the reimbursement to which they were entitled[.]”
The trial court denied the motion as to both classes. With respect to each class the court ruled that common questions of fact and law do not predominate, Francis cannot adequately represent the interests of the class, the members of the purported class are not ascertainable, and there is currently an action in federal court “that mirrors most of the issues in this case.”
DISCUSSION
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
We review a trial court’s ruling on class certification for abuse of discretion. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.) The court abuses its discretion if its ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, it applies improper criteria or it makes erroneous legal assumptions. (Id. at pp. 326-327.) Accordingly, in an appeal from an order denying class certification, we do not apply the general rule that we look only at the trial court’s result, not its reasoning. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 436.) Instead, “an order based upon improper criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal ‘“even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.”’” (Id. at p. 436, citations omitted.)
II. COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
To qualify as a class, plaintiffs must have “a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved.” (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809.) The “community of interest” requirement embodies three elements: “(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. [Citation.]” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Questions of fact and law are “predominant” if the factual and legal issues “common to the class as a whole [are] sufficient in importance so that their adjudication on a class basis will benefit both the litigants and the court.” (Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 811.)
Although the trial court concluded that common questions of law and fact did not predominate it did not identify any issues of law that were not common to the classes. The court concluded that common questions of fact did not predominate because each class member would be required to present individual proof relating to the member’s employment dates, earnings, types and amounts of employment related expenses, and dates and amounts of the restitution order.
As we explain more fully below, we disagree. The court erred in focusing on the unique questions of fact involved in the accounting for each class member’s restitution payments and reimbursement claims rather than on the predominant common questions of fact involved in establishing liability. “Predominance is a comparative concept, and ‘the necessity for class member to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.’ [Citations.] Individual issues do not render class certification inappropriate so long as such issues may effectively be managed. [Citations.]” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334.)
A. The Credit Class.
The facts needed to establish liability are common to the class: whether the state has failed and continues to fail to (1) maintain accurate records of the restitution accounts of inmates of restitution centers and (2) credit accurately the restitution accounts of inmates of restitution centers with the wages earned by those inmates. As to the individual determinations that might be required, the issues are easily manageable. Indeed, the information necessary to determine whether the statute of limitations bars an individual’s claim and the proper restitution contribution due to each individual is contained in the records kept by the state. And, a simple statutory formula exists for computing the actual amount the DCR should have allocated to the inmates’ restitution accounts.
In deciding a case analogous to ours, the court in Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, cautioned that lack of commonality as to the amount of each individual claim alone cannot be the basis for denying class certification. In Rose plaintiffs brought a class action to require the city and the state Public Employees Retirement System to include certain fringe benefits in the salary base from which their pension allowances are computed. In reversing the trial court’s denial of class certification, the Court of Appeal concluded: “The one decisive issue pervading the litigation, whether the class members have been wrongfully deprived of pension benefits by an improper method of computation, will not be decided on the basis of facts peculiar to each class member, but, rather, on the basis of a single set of facts applicable to all class members. Thus, appellants’ action involves only one claim which turns on only one question of law common to all class members. Consolidation in a class action thereby creates substantial benefits for both the parties and the courts in that class action disposition averts the unnecessary risk of numerous and repetitive administrative and judicial proceedings with the attendant possibility of inconsistent adjudication.” (Id. at p. 933.)
Here, as in Rose, the overarching issue—whether the class members have been wrongfully deprived of an accurate accounting of the amount of their wages in their restitution accounts—will not be decided on facts peculiar to each class member, but, rather, on the basis of a single set of facts, applicable to all class members, showing how the DCR has accounted for their wages.
Like the trial court in Rose, the trial court in this case focused unduly on the individual factual issues relating to damages. In Rose, as in this case, the class members had different employment dates and different amounts of earnings. These factual differences, however, did not preclude class certification in Rose because “[w]hile the amount of individual claims may vary from member to member, the introduction of that variable into the equation in no way alters our decision. The law unequivocally provides that each class member may establish damages independently without threatening the integrity of the class action.” (Rose v. City of Hayward, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 934.) Likewise, the factual differences in this case do not threaten the integrity of a class action.
B. The Reimbursement Class.
The trial court erred in denying certification to the Reimbursement Class because, as with the Credit Class, it focused on the factual questions regarding each class member’s claim for reimbursement of work-related expenses rather than on the common questions of law and fact.
The Reimbursement Class is defined in pertinent part as those “who, in the course of their employment, incurred employment related expenses and who were entitled to reimbursement under the state statutory scheme, and . . . who did not receive the reimbursement to which they were entitled[.]” Plaintiff’s expert testified without contradiction that the members of the Reimbursement Class can be determined from the state’s records.
To the extent that the complaint seeks injunctive relief for inmates to whom the state currently denies reimbursement for work-related expenses common questions of fact and law not only predominate but are identical. The common questions of law are whether the state is violating the provisions of Penal Code section 6231, subdivision (b), and, if so, whether the class is entitled to injunctive relief. The common question of fact is whether the state is refusing to reimburse inmates for their work-related expenses. The existence of questions of fact regarding damages on individual claims, such as the amount of the expense, whether it was work related, and whether it was incurred within the applicable statute of limitations do not warrant the denial of class certification when, as here, common questions predominate and the uncommon issues can be easily managed
Lowry v. Obledo (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 14 is instructive. In Lowry, working recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children brought a class action challenging a state welfare regulation which set off their wages against their welfare payments without allowing them a deduction from their wages for their reasonable child care expenses. The action sought injunctive and declaratory relief to invalidate the regulation and a recalculation of the aid payments to each member of the class after allowing the child care deduction. The trial court certified the class for purposes of prospective relief only and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the class certification order and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to certify the class for recomputation of past benefits. (Id. at p. 27.) The court held that the individualized recalculations which would have to be made for each class member did not preclude class relief. Distinguishing City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 (a case relied on by the state in the present appeal), the court explained that in that case our Supreme Court found an insufficient community of interest because each member of the class would have to “make a highly individualized showing of fact in order to establish their right of recovery against the defendant.” (Lowry v. Obledo, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) By contrast, the Lowry court stated, “a common question of fact exists for the plaintiff class in this case. That question is whether or not the recipients were denied benefits solely because of the invalid regulation. Moreover, . . . a class does not suffer from an insufficient community of interest simply because its members will have to make a factual showing to determine the amount of their damages.” (Ibid., italics in original, citation omitted.)
Similarly, in the case before us, a common question of fact exists as to whether the members of the class were denied reimbursement for their work-related expenses. Assuming the answer to that question is yes, determining the amount of each member’s recovery would be fairly easy. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that members of the class who are entitled to reimbursements have already provided the DCR with their requests for reimbursement accompanied with supporting receipts and that the DCR is in possession of those documents. The state does not dispute this assertion. Under these circumstances, the job of evaluating the claims would be reasonably simple. In any case, even if more than a review of those records is necessary, the court, with the assistance of counsel if desired, could devise an efficient method for presentation of individual claims by, for example, the grouping of claims or use of a common format. Our Supreme Court has stated that trial courts “should be flexible and innovative in designing class procedures that [are] ‘fair to the litigants and expedient in serving the judicial process.’” (Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1088, citation omitted.) The state claims that certain participants did not incur work-related expenses for transportation or meals. Be that as it may, a motion to certify a class is not a vehicle for trying the case. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 438.)
III. ASCERTAINABILITY.
The trial court concluded that the class was not ascertainable on the same basis that it concluded common questions of law and fact did not predominate. The court erred on the issue of ascertainability for the same reasons it erred on commonality. (See discussion in Part II, above.) In addition, the state claims that the class is not ascertainable because it will be difficult to locate persons who are no longer in custody. First, the court did not rely on this ground, so we need not consider it. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 436.) Second, the record does not support this factual assertion. As Francis points out, state records either contain current addresses for former inmates or have information which would aid in easily locating them.
IV. ADEQUACY OF CLASS REPRESENTATION.
The trial court concluded that Francis was not an adequate class representative. We disagree. Applying the correct criteria, the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion.
The only ground apparently relied upon by the court, and urged by the state, to support the claim of Francis’s inadequacy is that, after she filed the complaint, the DCR provided her with an accounting of her restitution payments and, no longer being in custody, she had no claims that could accrue in the future. In La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 871, however, our Supreme Court held that a class representative’s receipt of the benefits she sought from the defendant “does not mechanically render plaintiff unfit per se to continue to represent the class.” If the rule was otherwise, a defendant could derail a class action by simply “‘picking off’ prospective plaintiffs one-by-one through the provision of individual remedies.” (Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 582, 593.) Further, if we were to agree that release from prison per se disqualified a person from representing a class requesting relief from unlawful prison conditions we would be providing defendants with an incentive to prolong proceedings until the class representative is released from custody. Creating such an incentive would not serve the public good.
The determination whether a named plaintiff who is no longer subject to the defendant’s unlawful conduct is an adequate class representative instead depends on whether the relief provided to the plaintiff creates a conflict between her and the members of the class. (Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 596.) Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the relief provided to Francis created a conflict between her and the Credit Class, nor, of course between her and the Reimbursement Class.
Likewise, the evidence does not support a finding that she was disqualified for any other reason. To the contrary, the record shows that Francis is qualified to represent the class. Her declaration states that she understands that as the class representative she has a continuing duty to represent the interests of the class, an obligation to prosecute the action vigorously through her attorneys and a responsibility not to sacrifice the interests of the class for her own benefit in negotiating a settlement, compromise or dismissal of the action. Francis also declares that “so far as I am aware, I have no antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class.”
The record shows that “the tenacity with which plaintiff has thus far pursued this matter is indicative that she has those qualities necessary to fairly and adequately protect the interests of [the] class.” (Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 596.) Francis has filed five amended complaints in this action. She filed a motion for class certification accompanied by numerous exhibits including excerpts from the transcripts of her depositions of state employees and other persons most knowledgeable about the workings of the restitution trust fund and the reimbursement of work-related expenses. She also submitted a declaration acknowledging her responsibilities as class representative and the declaration of an expert witness explaining how he would obtain data from the DCR’s computers to identify class members and audit their restitution trust accounts. And, she has shown her determination to protect the interests of the class by prosecuting this appeal from the order denying class certification.
The qualifications of the named plaintiff’s counsel are also a factor in determining whether the plaintiff is an adequate class representative. (Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.) Here, the trial court noted counsel’s class action experience was “impressive” and “really almost overwhelming.”
We find no merit in defendants’ argument that Francis is an inadequate representative of either class because “[i]t would be unreasonable to expect [Francis] to litigate this action on behalf of two classes of plaintiffs—one of which she no longer has anything to do with—in order to recover, at most, a few hundred dollars.” To the contrary, many class representatives only have a small financial stake in the recovery. For example, the class representative in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, the leading California case on class actions, alleged he had been overcharged by the defendant in an amount less than $200. (Id. at pp. 702-703.) Not only was Daar’s small share of the recovery not disqualifying, the court pointed out that a class suit is particularly important when “there is a relatively small loss to each individual class member. In such a case separate actions would be economically unfeasible [and] absent a class suit, defendant will retain the benefits from its alleged wrongs.” (Id. at p. 715.)
V. BENEFIT OF MAINTAINING THIS SUIT AS A CLASS ACTION.
The trial court concluded that it was unnecessary to maintain this suit as a class action because Francis has a class action pending in federal court “that mirrors most of the issues in this case and the common questions that are here.” We disagree that the pendency of the federal action warranted denying the motion for class certification.
As we noted in Basurco v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 110, 121, one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether to certify a class action is “‘the nature and extent of any litigation by individual class members already in progress involving the same controversy.’” (Citation omitted.)
It is undisputed that Francis is the plaintiff in a federal class action arising from the same claims that are raised in this case and that the federal district court dismissed Francis’s federal law claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims and ordered the cause remanded to the state court. At the time of the hearing on certification, the federal case was pending in the Ninth Circuit, no date had been set for argument and, as of this date, no opinion has been issued. Further, it is far from certain that Francis will prevail and, as she explained to the trial court, even success on appeal will only result in remand to the district court for further proceedings including, presumably, a motion for class certification. At the time of the hearing on class certification this case was, and even now is, on track for a decision on the merits before the federal court action and once this case in concluded, as Francis concedes, the federal action would be moot.
The state, however, maintains that it is neither in the interests of justice nor to the benefit of members of the classes to allow this case to proceed as a class action because an aggrieved person may obtain relief for both a credit and reimbursement claim by filing an administrative grievance with the DCR or “a claim pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act” (and assumedly if that claim is denied by bringing an individual action in court). We need not discuss this assertion more than to note two shortcomings. The state’s solution to the class members’ grievances is not superior to a class action because it creates the very problem—multiplicity of actions—that class actions are intended to avoid. Furthermore, the trial court did not rely on this ground in denying certification.
DISPOSITION
The order denying class certification is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to grant the motion. Francis is awarded her costs on appeal.
We concur: VOGEL, Acting P. J., JACKSON, J.
(Judge of the L. A. S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)