Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2363-12T2
06-11-2014
PATRICK FRANCIS, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Patrick Francis, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Leone and Manahan.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Patrick Francis, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from a prison disciplinary proceeding. Appellant, Patrick Francis (Francis), is an inmate currently incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison (NJSP) in Trenton. Francis appeals a Department of Corrections (DOC) decision of December 5, 2012, wherein disciplinary sanctions were imposed. After administrative proceedings were conducted, it was determined that Francis committed prohibited act *.004, fighting with another person, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
On September 21, 2012 at approximately 8:20 p.m., Senior Corrections Officer L. Thomas (Thomas) was on duty in Housing Unit 4A at NJSP. At that time, he observed Francis and another inmate exchanging punches. Thomas notified his partner, Officer Walter King (King), who responded to the scene. King observed Francis straddling the other inmate and striking the inmate in the face area with his fists. On being ordered to stop their fighting, the two inmates complied. Thereafter, Francis was charged with committing prohibited act *.004.
On September 22, 2012, after an investigation was conducted, Francis was served with the charge. The charge was referred to a hearing officer for further action. The first scheduled hearing was postponed. The hearing took place on September 26, 2012. At the hearing, Francis, with the assistance of counsel substitute, entered a not guilty plea to the charge.
Prior to the hearing, Francis was provided with a written statement of the charge against him and the reports of the correction officers who witnessed the fight. At the hearing, Francis was provided with the opportunity to call witnesses and to present evidence in his defense. At the conclusion of the hearing, Francis was found guilty of the *.004 charge.
On September 28, 2012, Francis administratively appealed the decision of the hearing officer. On December 5, 2012, Assistant Superintendent Suzanne Lawrence upheld the guilty finding and the imposition of sanctions.
On appeal, appellant argues:
POINT I
THE APPELLANT SUBMIT [sic] THAT THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO UPHOLD THE SANCTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER WAS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE HEARING [sic] TO NOT LESSEN OR SUSPEND THE SANCTIONS BASED ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS THE APPELLANT WAS ATTACKED BY A SPECIAL NEEDS INMATE.
We disagree. Although Francis does not allege a denial of due process in this appeal, we nonetheless are satisfied that the disciplinary hearing complied with all procedural due process requirements. We are also satisfied that the finding of guilt was supported by substantial credible evidence.
Francis received notice of the charge against him twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. The hearing was conducted by an impartial hearing officer from the DOC's central staff office (Office). The Office conducts hearings of alleged infractions. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12, Francis was afforded the assistance of counsel substitute. Francis was permitted to defend the charges after his plea of not guilty. During the course of the hearing Francis provided a statement in which he denied fighting with the other inmate. There was a request for leniency by the counsel substitute.
Preceding the hearing, Francis was afforded the opportunity to obtain statements from witnesses but declined. At the hearing, Francis was afforded the opportunity to confront witnesses which he also declined. Francis and his counsel substitute were provided with the adjudication report and the evidence considered by the hearing officer. His counsel substitute signed the report on behalf of Francis for the purpose of noting that the report accurately reflected the proceedings at the adjudication hearing.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999); Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We will not upset the determination of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; that it lacked fair support in the evidence; or that it violated legislative policies. See In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). Further, decisions of administrative agencies carry with them a strong presumption of reasonableness. City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539, certif. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). We may not vacate an agency's determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. See generally De Vitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J. Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 337 (1985). In addition,
[I]t is not our function to substitute our independent judgment for that of an administrative body . . . where there may exist a mere difference of opinion concerning the evidential persuasiveness of the relevant proofs. As a reviewing court, we will not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, draw inferences and conclusions from the evidence, or resolve conflicts therein.
[Ibid. (citations omitted).]
We hold that the administrative adjudication comported with procedural due process. See Avant v. Clifford 67 N.J. 496, 521-22 (1975); McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995).
We also hold that there was substantial credible evidence of appellant's guilt. The finding of guilt was based upon the "eye-witness" reports of Thomas and King. Francis did not refute these reports. Instead, he simply claimed that no fight had occurred.
In his administrative appeal after the hearing, Francis submitted a statement he procured from the inmate with whom he was fighting. In the statement the other inmate claims that he "attacked" Francis and that Francis was only defending himself.
Although an inmate may raise self-defense at a disciplinary hearing, "the inmate claiming self-defense shall be responsible for presenting supporting evidence" to establish six specified conditions. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f). Here, Francis neither claimed self-defense nor presented supporting evidence at the hearing as required. Given the nature and circumstances how this statement was obtained, the timing of this statement, and that Francis did not assert a self-defense claim at the hearing, it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the Assistant Superintendent to give this statement no weight.
We have considered the other argument raised by Francis and conclude that it is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION