Francis v. Maersk Line, Limited

Full title: JAMES E. FRANCIS, Plaintiff, v. MAERSK LINE, LIMITED, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

Date published: Nov 8, 2004

Case No. C03-2898C (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004)

Opinion

Case No. C03-2898C.

November 8, 2004

ORDER

JOHN COUGHENOUR, Chief Judge, District

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter has come before the Court on Plaintiff's motions to re-open the judgment in this case, to enlarge the time for amendment of pleadings, and for leave to name the United States as the proper party defendant (Dkt. Nos. 61, 65, 67). Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to file excess pages. (Dkt. No. 83.) This motion is GRANTED.

Previously, the United States was permitted to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of defending its interests in Defendant Maersk Line's motion for summary judgment. As the subject matter of the instant motions also involves the United States, the Court will consider the brief filed by the United States. (Dkt. No. 73.)

Having carefully considered the papers filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff's motions, the Court has determined that oral argument shall not be necessary. The Court finds and rules as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a seaman, originally brought this claim against his employer, Defendant Maersk Lines, Limited ("Maersk"), for personal injuries and for maintenance, cure and unearned wages pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, and general maritime law. However, on July 9, 2004, the Court issued an order finding that the Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920 ("SAA"), 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 741-752, precluded Plaintiff's suit against Defendant Maersk. Judgment for Defendant, to this effect, was entered on July 14, 2004. That same day, just before judgment had been entered, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to amend his complaint to name the United States as a defendant, this deadline having passed on July 9. Since judgment has been entered in this case, Plaintiff also filed two motions seeking relief from the judgment so that his motion to amend could be considered.

III. ANALYSIS

Before the Court may consider Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to re-open the judgment already entered in this case. See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9^th Cir. 2001) (discussing a court's consideration of a motion to amend after dismissal of the complaint and entry of judgment) (citing Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9^th Cir. 1996)).

A. Relief from judgment

Plaintiff appears to have filed motions under both Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60 out of an abundance of caution. As the relief requested under both motions is the same, the Court shall treat them as one motion. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the hurdle faced by a party seeking to re-open judgment is a high one. Weeks, 246 F.3d at 1236. Plaintiff asks not only that the Court re-open or suspend the judgment in order to consider his motion to amend, but also that the Court reconsider its order granting Defendant Maersk's motion for summary judgment. "Judgment is not properly reopened `absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the law.'" Id. (citing 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9^th Cir. 1999)). Here, Plaintiff argues that the Court committed a manifest legal error in concluding that Defendant Maersk could not be sued because of the SAA. In addition, Plaintiff claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Maersk crewmembers were required to receive the anthrax and smallpox vaccinations. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that amendment or alteration of the judgment is appropriate because of the unique circumstances of this case, including the state of Plaintiff's health and the nature of the legal issues involved.

Plaintiff complains that "[t]he Court's decision first reasons that the U.S. may be found liable for its independent negligence regarding the vaccinations and then expands this into a rule of exclusive responsibility for any act of its contractor that relates thereto." (Pl.'s 59(e) Mot. at 4-5.) Plaintiff's characterization of the Court's analysis fails to recognize that the Court found Defendant Maersk to be an agent of the United States, not a mere contractor. Moreover, the Court's order, far from propounding a new rule, performed a highly fact-specific analysis. In accordance with 46 U.S.C. App. § 742, the Court first determined whether an action could be maintained against a private party time charterer in the position occupied by the United States. This determination required a finding that the time charterer was an owner pro hac vice or that the time charterer was actively negligent. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 63 F.3d 820, 822 (9^th Cir. 1995) (stating the general principle that a time charterer cannot be sued except where the time charterer "had enough control of the vessel to render it the owner pro hac vice" or was "actively negligent") (citations omitted). While the Court found that there was no evidence that the United States was an owner pro hac vice, it did find that there may have been independent negligence. Therefore, § 742 bestowed upon Plaintiff a right to file suit against the United States for negligence and for maintenance and cure. See Mahramas v. Am. Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169 (2^nd Cir. 1973) (stating that "in determining whether or not a person is a proper party plaintiff or defendant, the Jones Act and maintenance and cure cases may be read interchangeably).

Having found that an action could be maintained against the United States, the Court proceeded to apply 46 U.S.C. App. § 745, providing that "where a remedy is provided by this chapter it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." Here, because Plaintiff may maintain an action against the United States, he may not maintain an action by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United States. Plaintiff contends both that Defendant Maersk is not properly considered an agent of the United States and that the claims he seeks to maintain against Defendant Maersk are of a different subject matter.

Plaintiff argues that the Court's order "effectively created a new definition of agency not supported by the law." However, the Court applied the definition of agency used by the Ninth Circuit in Dearborn v. Mar Ship Operations. 113 F.3d 995, 997 (9^th Cir. 1997) (explaining that in the context of a private entity under contract with the United States to operate a public vessel, the definition of "agent" is more broad than elsewhere, and even includes entities that would be defined as "independent contractors" in other contexts). Using this special analysis, the Court concluded that Maersk was properly considered an agent of the United States.

The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's argument that it may often be unclear to an injured seaman whom he should sue. However, it is not the role of this Court to postulate a wide range of hypothetical situations, analyze them, and rule on a specific fact pattern based on its analysis of the hypotheticals. In any case, the hypothetical situation imagined by Plaintiff is so different from the case at bar that it poses a question for another court on another day. Here, the incident for which the United States could potentially be held liable for independent negligence involved government personnel executing on a government mandate. Even though Plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence to show that Defendant Maersk exercised some independence with respect to the administration of the vaccine, this effort is to no avail. The SAA expressly provides that "where a remedy is provided by this chapter it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." 46 U.S.C. App. § 745 (emphasis added). The evidence Plaintiff seeks to introduce does not change the Court's finding that the liability Plaintiff seeks to ascribe to Defendant Maersk is of the same subject matter as his potential claim against the United States.

Plaintiff also argues that his claims against Maersk for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure are of a different subject matter from the vaccination-related claims. Although Plaintiff is able to point to a few cases that support this argument, appellate courts who have considered this question have concluded that claims concerning failure to pay maintenance and cure are subject to the SAA's exclusivity clause. See O'Connell v. Interocean Mgmt. Corp., 90 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1996); Kasprik v. United States, 87 F.3d 462, 466 (11^th Cir. 1996), Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253, 1255, 1259 (4^th Cir. 1995). These courts reasoned that "[a]ny claim for failure to pay maintenance and cure, even one alleging the arbitrary and willful denial of such, is `by reason of the same subject matter' as the seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his injury." Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 466. The fact that some district courts have disagreed with this conclusion in no way points to a finding that this Court committed manifest error in agreeing with the holdings in O'Connell, Kasprik, or Manuel.

Despite the fact that the Court does not find that it committed manifest error in any of the ways suggested by Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are unusual circumstances governing this case that warrant the re-opening of judgment. As Plaintiff has made clear in his pleadings, he suffers from acute health problems allegedly caused by the anthrax vaccine he received. The Court also recognizes the potential time delays that may result if Plaintiff is forced to file a new cause of action. Finally, allowing Plaintiff to proceed in this action ensures that he and Defendant Maersk will be able to rely on the Court's holding with respect to Defendant Maersk's liability under the SAA.

Although the Court does not find that it committed legal error with respect to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Maersk for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure, the dispute between the parties has made clear that the law is far from settled on this topic. Due to the extraordinary factual circumstances of this case, and because the Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint to name the United States as a defendant (for reasons which will be explained below), it would best serve the interests of justice to allow the parties to litigate this issue fully before this Court.

B. Amendment of complaint

Plaintiff seeks to substitute the United States as the defendant in this action. Plaintiff deliberately chose not to add the United States as a defendant in April 2004 when he first learned of Defendant Maersk's intention to employ the SAA exclusivity clause as a defense because he feared that doing so would prolong the litigation and lead to an extension of the trial date. Plaintiff's health conditions dictated that he remain mindful of the time required to resolve the issues in this litigation. Now that the Court has found that the SAA precludes Plaintiff from recovering against Maersk on his negligence and maintenance and cure claims, Plaintiff has realized that he must sue the United States. The question before the Court is thus whether Plaintiff should be made to file a new cause of action.

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Maersk argues that this Court no longer has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for negligence and maintenance and cure because of the operation of the SAA's exclusivity clause. However, since the Court has vacated the judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim against Maersk for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure, the Court retains jurisdiction over Maersk. In addition, the Court construed Plaintiff's motions as including a motion for reconsideration of its finding that the SAA was applicable to this case. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to continue to exercise jurisdiction over this action.

Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may, for cause shown, enlarge the time in which specific actions must be taken if the "failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Here, Plaintiff did not move to add the United States as a party until after the deadline to add parties had passed and the Court had entered judgment. Until the Court issued its order of July 9, 2004, it was not clear that Plaintiff would have to bring his claims against the United States. Because of this uncertainty, and due to Plaintiff's precarious health condition, Plaintiff and his counsel had chosen to proceed only against Maersk, even after they became aware of Maersk's intention to employ the SAA as a defense. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that this was excusable neglect.

Leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit has directed district courts to consider the presence of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility, "with all inferences in favor of granting the motion [to amend]." Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999); Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff acted in good faith and that there was no undue delay. Indeed, Plaintiff moved to amend only two judicial days after the Court issued its order. With respect to the question of prejudice, courts are primarily concerned about whether the proposed amendment would prejudice the party to be added. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the United States has not expressed any concern that it would be prejudiced by Plaintiff's proposed amendment.¹ Indeed, disallowing the amendment would mean only that Plaintiff would have to file a new cause of action against the United States — either way, the United States would have to defend itself in an action by Plaintiff. Finally, futility is not an issue in this particular case.

1 Although the United States is not yet a party to this action, it has demonstrated a more than adequate ability to protect its interests when necessary.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, Plaintiff's motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is hereby GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) is GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion to file excess pages is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint and add the United States as a defendant is GRANTED. The judgment in this case shall be altered so that Plaintiff may pursue his claim for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure against Defendant Maersk. The United States shall be added as a defendant in this action.

Although Plaintiff may not proceed against Defendant Maersk for the remainder of his claims as currently asserted in his complaint, Maersk may be subject to liability for its own independent acts of negligence not subsumed under the umbrella of its agency relationship with the United States government. Defendant Maersk shall remain responsible for the continued payment of maintenance and cure benefits to Plaintiff unless it can show by motion that the United States government may be compelled to take responsibility for these payments at this time. Once the issue of liability has been resolved, Defendant Maersk may recover those amounts paid in excess of its proper liability from the appropriate party.

The parties are directed to appear before the Court for a status conference in this matter on December 14, 2004 at 9:00 a.m.

SO ORDERED.