Opinion
NO. 01-19-00350-CV
04-13-2021
JEREMIAH JUNIUS FRANCIS, Appellant v. DONEISHA CHEREE DAVIS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 245th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2004-19331
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jeremiah Junius Francis appeals the trial court's enforcement order, which found him in contempt and committed him to the county jail for failing to pay child support and medical support. He also appeals the denial of his request for de novo rehearing of the enforcement order. Specifically, Francis challenges (1) the proof supporting the contempt order; (2) the trial court's jurisdiction; (3) violations of his constitutional rights; and (4) other issues. We dismiss the challenge to the contempt order for want of jurisdiction and affirm in all other aspects.
Background
The lengthy proceedings underlying this appeal began in April 2004, when the Office of the Attorney General filed an original petition in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) on behalf of appellee Doneisha Cheree Davis. The trial court signed an agreed order finding that Francis was the father of a minor child with Davis. The order appointed the parties as joint managing conservators, with Davis having the exclusive right to determine the child's primary residence. The order required Francis to pay child and medical support to Davis. The order also required Francis to pay retroactive child support, and it withheld his income for support.
Davis did not file a brief on appeal. Moreover, the record on appeal consists only of a clerk's record.
Over the next decade, the court entered several modification and enforcement orders due to Francis's nonpayment. In April 2008, the court found Francis in contempt for not paying child and medical support. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.001(b) (authorizing court to enforce any provision of temporary or final order by contempt). The court committed Francis to the county jail for 180 days, but suspended commitment and placed him on community supervision for 120 months or until he paid the child support arrearage. See id. § 157.211 (authorizing court to suspend commitment and place respondent on community supervision). In 2011, the court revoked Francis's community supervision for violations of its terms. See id. §§ 157.214, 157.215(a), 157.216. The court released Francis from commitment in March 2012.
In September 2014, the court signed a non-agreed child support review order. Francis, represented by counsel, filed a petition to modify the support order in 2016. He argued that the prior order was "not based on a mediated or collaborative law settlement agreement." He also argued that the parties' circumstances had materially and substantially changed since the prior order, such that the retroactive and ongoing support payments should be decreased.
The record on appeal does not indicate whether the trial court ruled on Francis's petition to modify the support order.
In 2018, the Attorney General filed a motion for enforcement of child and medical support, asserting that Francis was more than $22,000 behind on payments. The Attorney General asked the court to hold Francis in contempt and enter judgment on the arrears. A copy of the motion for enforcement and notice of the hearing on it was served on Francis by personal service. See id. § 157.062(c). The court signed an order directing Francis to appear and to show cause. See id. § 157.061(a) (requiring court to set hearing on motion for enforcement requesting contempt and to order respondent to personally appear and respond to motion). Acting pro se, Francis filed an answer with a general denial. He also alleged that the judgment was void, and that it violated his constitutional and statutory rights.
Francis's answer does not specify the judgment or order that he contends was void. The Attorney General's motion for enforcement referenced the trial court's September 3, 2014 amended child support review order.
Francis also filed a document entitled "Demand to Vacate [and] Demand of Proof of Authority/Jurisdiction to Deprive Property without Due Process [and] Demand Judicial Review." In this document, he claimed that several of his constitutional rights were violated.
The court ultimately reset the enforcement hearing for March 28, 2019. Following the hearing before the associate judge, the court signed a commitment order enforcing child and medical support. The court found that Francis was more than $26,000 behind in child and medical support. The court held him in contempt and ordered him committed to the county jail for 180 days.
On April 1, 2019, Francis sought a de novo rehearing of the trial court's March 28, 2019 enforcement order. See id. § 201.015(a)-(c) (authorizing party to request de novo hearing before referring court and requiring request to "specify the issues that will be presented to the referring court"). The record on appeal does not include an order on Francis's request for de novo rehearing. However, the trial court's docket sheet indicates that the court held a hearing on April 24, 2019, with both parties and the Attorney General's Office present. See id. § 201.015(f). The docket sheet states,
Respondent has failed to follow the requirement set out in Tex. Fam. Code § 201.015(b) in that he has failed to "specify the issues that will be presented to the referring court," as the issues listed on his request for de novo hearing are inapplicable to the evidence received and rendition rendered by the IV-D associate judge. Respondent's argument effectively is that he is exempted from the laws of the State, but that his constitutional rights are being infringed. Request for rehearing denied.
On May 3, 2019, Francis filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the "final judgment" of April 24, 2019. This appeal followed.
Analysis
I. Contempt Order
Francis challenges the trial court's enforcement order, which found him in contempt of court and committed him to jail for 180 days. We dismiss this challenge for lack of jurisdiction.
It is well settled that "[d]ecisions in contempt proceedings cannot be reviewed on direct appeal because contempt orders are not appealable, even when appealed along with a judgment that is appealable, as here." Cline v. Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)); see Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 54-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); In re J.D.G., No. 01-19-00476-CV, 2020 WL 3393538, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (per curiam). "A contempt judgment is reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved)." Cline, 557 S.W.3d at 812; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 55; In re J.D.G., 2020 WL 3393538, at *2.
Because Francis brought his contempt-based complaints to this Court on direct appeal rather than by original proceeding, we dismiss that portion of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Cline, 557 S.W.3d at 812; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 55.
II. Challenge to the Trial Court's Jurisdiction
Francis lists the following issue on appeal: "Whether the District Court correctly determined that [Francis] failed to [state] triable issues of fact regarding [Davis's] Child Support Order with the Child Support Enforcement Agency."
This argument could be a reference to the trial court's April 24 docket entry denying Francis's motion for de novo rehearing. If so, Francis has waived this argument by failing to identify any record support or legal authority explaining why the court's reasoning was erroneous. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellate briefs to "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record" on appeal). Nor does Francis cite the record on appeal to support his factual assertions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g) ("The statement [of facts in a brief on appeal] must be supported by record references."). "A brief that does not contain citations to appropriate authorities and to the record for a given issue waives that issue." Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (citing Abdelnour v. Mid Nat'l Holdings, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.), and San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
Instead, Francis appears to argue that the trial court never had jurisdiction to hear the child-support case against him in the first place. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy to render a binding judgment. Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010) (citing CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996)); see Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.").
Francis has not demonstrated any jurisdictional defect. The only case that Francis cites regarding jurisdiction is Mason v. Bradley. See generally 789 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill. 1992). That Illinois case considered Illinois's Title IV-D child support program, not Texas's program. Id. at 274-75. Moreover, the child's mother sued Illinois's Title IV-D agency officials after she requested the agency's help in obtaining child support and the agency was unsuccessful. Id. at 274. The court determined that the mother lacked standing to sue the state agency officials because Title IV-D did not create a private right of action allowing her to sue the agency. Id. at 277. Mason has no relevance to this case, as neither Francis nor Davis has sued the Texas agency officials.
Proceedings relating to establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support obligations are often called "Title IV-D cases." Title IV-D refers to subchapter IV, Part D of the federal Social Security Act, which "creates a child-support-enforcement program" for participating states, including Texas, to administer the plan. See Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. C.W.H., 531 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tex. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654, and TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.034). The Texas Legislature has designated the Office of Attorney General as Texas's Title IV-D agency. See id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 231.001, 231.0011(a)).
Francis also grounds his argument in a single sentence from the Attorney General's original SAPCR petition which stated, "No Court has continuing jurisdiction of this suit or of the child the subject of this suit." But that sentence simply informed the court that, at the time of that filing, no court had yet obtained "continuing jurisdiction of this suit or of the child the subject of this suit." See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.008(b)(1)(A) (requiring such notification).
By contrast, the trial court acquired "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matters provided for by this title [concerning SAPCRs] in connection with a child on the rendition of a final order," and it retains jurisdiction over the parties and matters. See id. §§ 155.001(a), 155.002. The court could exercise its jurisdiction to modify and enforce orders, including orders of conservatorship and child support. See id. § 155.002. Therefore, the Family Code authorized jurisdiction over the SAPCR and subsequent modification and enforcement proceedings.
We overrule Francis's jurisdictional issue.
III. Constitutional Issues
Francis also argues that his constitutional rights—which he generally defines to include due process, involuntary servitude, separation of powers, and alienation of children—were violated, and that he did not waive those rights.
As stated above, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellate briefs to support factual assertions with record references and to "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record" on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), (i). "[A] brief that does not contain citations to appropriate authorities and to the record for a given issue waives that issue." Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 545.
Francis does not cite the record on appeal to support his constitutional claims. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g). And although he cited some case law, he does not apply the legal principles from those cases to the facts of his case.See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Consequently, his briefing of his constitutional issues does not meet the minimum required to present an issue for appellate review. Because Francis did not adequately brief his constitutional issues, he has waived error. See Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 545.
Nor do the cases appear to support his general arguments. For example, Francis quotes two United States Supreme Court opinions, but neither case includes the language Francis attributes to them. See generally Clearfield Tr. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Fed. Hous. Admin., Region No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940). His remaining cases are inapposite and do not support his contentions that Texas's child support system violates the separation of powers doctrine; that Texas child support orders are not court orders; or that the child support order was void as a fraud upon the district court. --------
We overrule Francis's constitutional issues.
IV. Remaining Issues
Francis makes several other arguments throughout his brief, including arguments that any agreement for him to pay child support to the Attorney General was invalid. He also makes arguments regarding fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact. However, Francis did not cite the record on appeal or any legal authority to support these arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), (i); Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 545. Accordingly, his briefing of these issues does not meet the minimum requirements for appellate review of the issue. We conclude that he has waived his remaining issues.
We overrule Francis's remaining issues.
Conclusion
We dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portions of the appeal challenging the contempt order. We affirm in all other aspects.
April L. Farris
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Farris.