Absent fraud against the rights of his wife, he can dispose of the community funds as he sees fit. Vernon's Texas Ann. Civ. Stat., art. 4619, sec. 1; Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122; United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367; Herder v. Helvering, 106 Fed.(2d) 153; certiorari denied, 308 U.S. 617; rehearing denied, 308 U.S. 639; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S.W. (2d) 268; Ames v. Ames, 188 S.W. 689; Arbuckle v. Arbuckle, 214 S.W. (2d) 281; Estate of Mrs. Matney Dyer Lucey, 13 T.C. 1010, 1019; Charles I. Francis, 8 T.C. 822, 825-827, 829, 831. In Arbuckle v. Arbuckle, supra, the disposition of community property by the wife was held effective, but only because the evidence showed that the wife made disposition thereof as the husband's agent, with his full knowledge and consent.

Appellee does not question that these are the rules generally applicable to community property in Texas. In Charles I. Francis, 8 T.C. 822, we said, as to Texas community property, that the lack of a wife's consent to transfer ‘preserves her right to question it as in fraud of her interest if there is a gift.‘ It is held that the utmost good faith and frankness is required from the husband in dealing with the community estate, and that in case of a violation of the confidence and trust between the husband and wife as to community property a court of equity will afford relief. Weir v. King, 166 S.W.(2d) 187. He is in a restricted sense a trustee as to community property.