( Earl v. Dutour, 181 Cal. 58, 60 [ 183 P. 438, 6 A.L.R. 1163].)" In Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 682 [ 71 A. 529], the court in effect held that only lots on the same side of the street could be reasonably termed as adjoining properties. In the instant case respondents point out that it should be noted that the restrictions provide for a thirty-foot setback from the front property line.
Speaking for this court in Smith v. Myers, supra, Judge Urner said: "A suit for an injunction which seeks to accomplish all the purposes of a decree for specific performance is subject to the principles which apply to an application for the latter remedy, and it is a settled rule that specific enforcement of an agreement will not be decreed when, as in this case, the injury to the defendant would be far greater than the benefit which the plaintiff might derive from that result. McDowell v. Biddison, 120 Md. 127, 87 A. 752; Phoenix Pad Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 543, 96 A. 762; Linthicum v. W., B. A. Elec. R. Co., 124 Md. 272. 92 A. 917; Whalen v. B. O.R.R. Co., 108 Md. 23, 69 A. 390; Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 688, 71 A. 529." See Hurwitz v. Buck, 147 Md. 566, 128 A. 750.
Again, in Linthicum v. Wash., B. A. Electric R. Co., 124 Md. 263, the plaintiff was refused specific performance of a covenant to construct railway crossings for the benefit of the plaintiff's land in precisely the manner required by the covenant, which would have entailed an expenditure by the defendant of an amount equal to, if not more than, the value of the plaintiff's land, which was about fifteen thousand dollars. And see Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 682, 688; McDowell v. Biddison, 120 Md. 118. The Liggett Company did acquire a lease from the Eisenberg estate for 103 W. Lexington Street, and the subsisting terms in that property of M. Samuels Company and of John T. Selby, for the purpose of combining that property with the premises here involved, and paid therefor eighteen thousand and five hundred dollars and committed themselves to the obligations of the lease, but there is no reason to assume that, at the time of these transactions, the value of what they obtained was not indicated by the price they paid, even if the contrary could be considered in the determination of the rights of the parties under another separate and distinct, although contemporaneous and associated, transaction.
"A suit for an injunction which seeks to accomplish all the purposes of a decree for specific performance is subject to the principles which apply to an application for the latter remedy and it is a settled rule that specific enforcement of an agreement will not be decreed when, as in this case, the injury to the defendant would be far greater than the benefit which the plaintiff might derive from that result. McDowell v. Biddison, 120 Md. 127; Phoenix Pad Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 543; Linthicum v. W., B. A. Elec. R. Co., 124 Md. 272; Whalen v. B. O.R.R. Co., 108 Md. 23; Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 688."
A suit for an injunction which seeks to accomplish all the purposes of a decree for specific performance is subject to the principles which apply to an application for the latter remedy, and it is a settled rule that specific enforcement of an agreement will not be decreed when, as in this case, the injury to the defendant would be far greater than the benefit which the plaintiff might derive from that result. McDowell v. Biddison, 120 Md. 127; Phoenix Pad Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 543; Linthicum v. W.B. A. Elec. R. Co., 124 Md. 272; Whalen v. B. O.R.R. Co., 108 Md. 23; Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 688. The decision that the plaintiff is not entitled to a mandatory injunction for the removal of the building naturally leads to the further conclusion that its owners ought not to be denied the right to repair and remodel it in order that it may be preserved and used for its appropriate objects.
— It affirmatively appeared from the evidence that the erection of the fence and structures enjoined by the court was by authority and with the express consent and permission of the city of Austin and in compliance with law. Taylor v. Dunn, 80 Tex. 652; Fralinger v. Cook, 71 A. 529; Marini v. Graham, 7 P. 442. The construction of the fence and sheds referred to in the pleadings and in the evidence was reasonably necessary in the prosecution of the work of said defendant and was reasonably necessary for the protection of defendant from encroachment by the public and to protect the public from injury from the lawful carrying on of defendant's work.