Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10cv115-WHA-SRW (WO).
October 20, 2010
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #53) filed by Defendants on August 20, 2010.
Although Rule 12(b) requires a 12(b) motion to be filed before filing an answer, the grounds for dismissal alleged by Defendants in their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion are not waived simply because they filed an answer. Rather, they can be asserted in either (1) a pleading; (2) a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c); or (3) at trial. (Rule 12(h)). Accordingly, the court will treat Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Plaintiff, FPC Financial, f.s.b. ("FPC"), filed a Complaint in this court on February 16, 2010, bringing claims for: (1) Suit on Agreement as to Defendant Gregory T. Layton (Count I); (2) Accounting as to all Defendants (Count II); (3) Conversion as to Defendant Gregory T. Layton; (Count III); (4) Unjust Enrichment and Money Had and Received as to Defendant Gregory T. Layton (Count IV); and (5) Appointment of a Receiver as to all Defendants (Count V). On February 22, 2010, this court appointed a receiver. Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on March 11, 2010. On August 20, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
For reasons to be discussed, the Motion to Dismiss is due to be DENIED.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). In analyzing the sufficiency of pleading, the court is guided by a two-prong approach: one, the court is not bound to accept conclusory statements of the elements of a cause of action and, two, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but instead the complaint must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.
III. FACTS
FPC owns and operates Farm Plan, a revolving line of credit program. Customers can use Farm Plan to purchase certain goods and services from merchants authorized by FPC and charge those goods and services to a Farm Plan account. Customers then repay the amounts charged through periodic payments.
Gregory T. Layton, Gregory D. Layton, Janice L. Layton, and Ginger Lien (collectively, "Defendants") raise peanuts and cotton in Houston County, Alabama, and Jackson County, Florida. Defendant Gregory T. Layton applied for a Farm Plan account and was approved by FPC. On March 23, 2009, as part of the Farm Plan agreement, Gregory T. Layton, along with the other Defendants, executed a Security Agreement, where they granted to FPC a security interest in "all present and future rights, title and interest, whether then existing or thereafter arising, of each Grantor, in and to all farm product as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (except livestock) and all proceeds." (Compl. ¶ 11.) To perfect FPC's security interest, FPC filed financing statements in Alabama and Florida.
From April 9, 2009 through August 20, 2009, Gregory T. Layton received 14 checks totaling $950,000 from Barber Fertilizer Company ("Barber"), a Georgia corporation and an approved Farm Plan merchant. Gregory T. Layton and Barber agreed that these checks would be charged to Gregory T. Layton's Farm Plan account. Also, Barber charged additional fees to Gregory T. Layton's Farm Plan account. The agreement between Gregory T. Layton and Barber contravened the terms of the Farm Plan, as the Farm Plan only allowed customers and merchants to charge goods and services, not cash advances to Farm Plan accounts.
FPC sent Gregory T. Layton monthly statements indicating these charges. Gregory T. Layton never protested these statements, despite the fact that pursuant to the Farm Plan's terms, Layton had 60 days to dispute any transactions appearing on a monthly statement.
Subsequently, Gregory T. Layton defaulted under the terms of the Farm Plan agreement. As a result, FPC sent letters to Defendants, "demanding, among other things, payment of all obligations, turn over [sic] all proceeds and an accounting for all Collateral and proceeds." (Compl. ¶ 34.) After Defendants failed to satisfy FPC's demands, FPC brought the instant action against Defendants.
On February 12, 2010, four days before filing the Complaint in this case, FPC sued Barber in the Middle District of Georgia. FPC Fin., f.s.b. v. Barber Fertilizer Co., No. 1:10cv28 (M.D. Ga.). In that case, FPC alleged that Barber breached its Farm Plan agreement with FPC by, among other acts, making cash advances to Gregory T. Layton, and as a result, Barber is liable to FPC for the full amount of the charges it made to Gregory T. Layton's Farm Plan Account, plus interest and finance charges. FPC also seeks to recover these charges against Gregory T. Layton in the instant case.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that this case should be dismissed or, in the alternative, stayed, because FPC is currently pursuing a separate action against Barber in the Middle District of Georgia for the same debt that FPC seeks to recover in this case, which would constitute an impermissible "double recover [sic]." (Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) In response, FPC concedes that it "cannot recover the full amount of the judgment more than once." (Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 16) (emphasis original). However, FPC argues that it may obtain a judgment against both Barber and the Defendants for the full amount of the judgment, and then elect to enforce the judgment against either or both Barber and the Defendants, so long as FPC does not recover more than the full amount of the judgment. The court agrees with FPC.
Courts bar double recoveries for a single injury. E.g. MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Corbin on Contracts § 1223, at 483 (("[I]t is accepted social policy that an injured party should not be given [two] remedies for a single injury.")). In contrast, a plaintiff may sue multiple defendants who cause a single injury, but may recover no more than the total amount of the injury. E.g. Shepherd v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 614 So. 2d 1048, 1050-52 (Ala. 1993) ("Where one has received an injury at the hands of two or more persons acting in concert, or acting independently of each other, if their acts united in causing a single injury, all of the wrongdoers are liable for damages occasioned by the injury.") (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Jones v. Russell, 89 So. 660, 662-63 (1921)); Shirley v. Lin, 548 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Ala. 1989) (holding that it was permissible for a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants for the same injury in a breach of contract action).
Defendants point to no authority suggesting that this rule does not apply in the instant case. In fact, they ignore that such a rule exists at all. FPC correctly notes that one argument Defendants could have made is distinguishable. That is, an Alabama statute prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting multiple actions (1) in state or federal courts in Alabama (2) "at the same time;" (3) "for the same cause;" and (4) "against the same party." Ala. Code § 6-5-440; Ex parte Myer, 595 So.2d 890, 892 (Ala. 1992). However, this case is distinguishable from that statute, most clearly because FPC's lawsuits against Defendants and Barber were brought in two different states, and involve different parties. Accordingly, Defendants's request to dismiss or stay these proceedings is due to be DENIED.
Defendants cite to no authority at all in their Motion to Dismiss or their Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss.
In the alternative, Defendants request that this court dismiss all Defendants except for Gregory T. Layton and release their portion of the funds held by the receiver in this case. Because Defendants provide no support for this request, it is due to be DENIED.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Done this 20th day of October, 2010.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365 1 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing: Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal: See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal: 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , 368 (11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. 486 U.S. 196, 201, , , (1988); , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).