Opinion
No. 76-226
Decided December 15, 1976.
Actions — Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act — Title 42, Section 2000e et seq., U.S. Code — Jurisdiction — May not be conferred by parties — May be raised, when.
State courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction of an action brought pursuant to a claimed violation of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the United States.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Appellant instituted an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County against appellee, claiming that appellee unlawfully discriminated against her because of sex in calculating her credit under an employee pension plan. The following pertinent facts were stipulated by the parties:
"Number five. That plaintiff has received the right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; such letter was received, on or about, December 6, 1974.
"Number six. That the plaintiff, pursuant to this right to sue letter, may bring a Title 7 action complaint in this court."
The trial court entered judgment for appellee on the merits, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Celebrezze, McGrath, Iler Westley and Mr. James J. McGrath, for appellant.
Mr. John P. Palumbo, for appellee.
Appellant asserted a claim in the Court of Common Pleas based solely on a claimed violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, popularly known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Title 42, Section 2000e et seq., U.S. Code. As regards jurisdiction of a civil action by the person aggrieved, Title 42, Section 2000e-5(f)(3), U.S. Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Each United States District Court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this title. * * *"
It is thus clear from the federal Act giving rise to the claim herein that subject-matter jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the proper federal court.
Moreover, appellant was so informed by the "right to sue" letter referred to in stipulations Nos. 5 and 6, which read, as pertinent:
"Therefore, pursuant to Section 706(F) of Title VII, you may within 90 days of your receipt of this notice, institute a civil action in the United States District Court having jurisdiction over your case.
"Should you decide to commence judicial action, you must do so within 90 days of the receipt of this letter or you will lose your right to sue under Title VII."
Although lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was not asserted previously in this action, it may be raised, sua sponte, by the court at any stage in the proceedings. Civ. R. 12(H). The lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 122, 216 N.E.2d 379. The parties may not, by stipulation or agreement, confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court, where subject-matter jurisdiction is otherwise lacking.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is dismissed.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.
MCCORMAC, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for CELEBREZZE, J.