Opinion
G052970
09-27-2017
STEVEN FOX et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COLLIER MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Philip D. Dapeer for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Theodore C. Beall for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00672520) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Frederick Paul Horn, Judge. Affirmed. Philip D. Dapeer for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Theodore C. Beall for Defendants and Respondents.
Steven Fox (Steven) and his son Jason Fox (Jason) appeal from the trial court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) in favor of Collier Management & Development Company, Inc. (CMDC), Sunrise Oaks Capital Fund, LLC (Sunrise), Allen M. Collier (Collier), and Dennis Heiner (Heiner). They argue there was no legal basis to have granted the motion and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give them leave to amend. We conclude their contentions on appeal lack merit and affirm the judgment.
Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
In the record, we noticed the name Steven is sometimes shortened to the name Steve. There is no dispute Steven Fox and Steve Fox are the same person. For the sake of clarity, we will refer consistently to this party as Steven.
FACTS
I. Prior Lawsuit & Judgment in Utah
CMDC obtained a judgment in Utah against Steven and Jason for a total of $1,353,555. CMDC sued Steven, Jason, and two other defendants alleging they failed to pay what was owed on an amended trust deed note (the Note). Our record contains the Utah court's "Order of Summary Judgment" that was filed on April 29, 2011. In this order, the court noted CMDC filed a MJOP premised on a lack of discovery responses. In addition, CMDC filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Steven did not file an opposition and Jason filed a procedurally deficient response.
The two other defendants are not parties to this appeal. They were Steven's former wife Marilyn Fox and Noble House Series C., LLC.
The Utah trial court stated Steven and Jason did not dispute they signed the Note, "individually guaranteeing performance" on the Note. In discovery responses, they admitted they did not pay the Note and they did not dispute the Note was in default. The Utah court determined CMDC was entitled to judgment against Steven and Jason "for the default for failure to pay the . . . . Note." The court determined the Note's principal amount was $750,000. It added interest, late fees, costs, and attorney fees, increasing the total amount of the judgment to $1,353,555. II. Domestication
Soon after the Utah court issued its decision, CMDC took advantage of the expeditious registration procedures available for enforcing sister state judgments in California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.) CMDC filed an application to register the Utah judgment in our Orange County Superior Court. The application listed CMDC as the sole judgment creditor and Steven as the debtor.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
On October 19, 2011, the court filed a "notice of entry of judgment on sister state judgment." (Capitalization omitted.) It stated the amount of the judgment against "Steve Fox" was now $1,516,376. III. Motion to Vacate (§ 1710 .40.)
In November 2011, Steven filed a motion to vacate the new California judgment. Steven's attorney, Philip D. Dapeer, filed a supporting declaration stating CMDC was not authorized to engage in California business, did not hold a California real estate broker's license, was not a state or federally chartered bank, and did not hold a California finance lender's license.
Steven also filed a supporting declaration stating he had a defense to the Utah action and CMDC failed to join indispensable parties, i.e., Sunrise. Steven stated CMDC and Sunrise shared office space and were owned by the same two principals (Collier and Heiner).
Steven's defense related to allegations of fraud. He asserted CMDC claimed to be the lender on the Note, but the Note "arose out of the purchase of a property in Idaho that was to be jointly developed by [Steven], Sunrise . . . and [CMDC]." Steven asserted CMDC never loaned him money, and the loan documents were prepared by an attorney who represented both CMDC and Sunrise in the transaction. He added the Note, which was the subject of the application for entry of a sister state judgment, "is the direct and primary obligation of Sunrise."
Steven alleged CMDC set up "a dummy foreclosure" of the Note to enable it and Sunrise to "acquire title to the Idaho property free and clear of any option claim. As part of the scheme, CMDC and Sunrise first tricked the original owners, an elderly couple, to subordinate their deed of trust. Next, CMDC and Sunrise granted to Steven an option to purchase the property. Then, CMDC and Sunrise secretly agreed Sunrise would default on the Note, allowing CMDC to conduct a foreclosure sale. Steven explained the foreclosure sale effectively destroyed his option rights. This "friendly foreclosure" permitted CMDC to "obtain a double recovery . . . by enforcing the [Note] that was never to become effective until the option was exercised."
Steven declared Jason represented him and his ex-wife in the Idaho real estate transaction. Steven and Jason appeared in propria persona in the Utah action. Steven explained the Utah court stayed CMDC's lawsuit against his ex-wife after she declared bankruptcy. (We note Steven did not supply documents to support these factual claims.) Steven stated he intended to file a new fraud action in California against CMDC, Sunrise, Collier, and Heiner.
In addition, Steven declared he "only recently learned of this fraud scheme" because the original property owners in Idaho sued his son, Jason, along with CMDC, Sunrise, Collier, and Heiner. Steven claimed Jason was dismissed from the lawsuit after the owners determined Jason was also a victim in the fraudulent transaction. He believed the owners settled the lawsuit for an unknown amount of money due to a confidentiality agreement. Collier and Heiner now own the property. (Once again, we note Steven did not supply documents to support these factual assertions about a Idaho lawsuit.)
CMDC filed an opposition to the motion to vacate. And in February 2012, Judge Steven L. Perk denied Steven's motion to vacate the judgment. The written notice of ruling stated Steven and CMDC "submitted on the tentative ruling denying [Steven's] motion to vacate [the] sister state judgment" and it became the court's final order. The written order included the following language from the tentative ruling: "[Steven] has not provided adequate grounds upon which to vacate the judgment. [(Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.40, subd. (a).)] The amount of the judgment has not been shown to be incorrect. Sister state judgments may be enforced even though the underlying action violates the enforcing state's public policy. [Citation.] Neither of the grounds raised by [Steven] to this Utah judgment are adequate to vacate a sister state judgment." The ruling was not appealed. IV. The Underlying Lawsuit
Steven and Jason filed a complaint against CMDC, Sunrise, Collier, Heiner, and Robert W. Hughes (hereafter collectively referred to CMDC). Our record contains a copy of the first amended complaint (FAC), filed February 10, 2015. The FAC alleged only one cause of action for equitable contribution. The FAC acknowledged domestication of the sister state judgment arising out of the Idaho real estate transaction was in CMDC's favor. It alleged facts suggesting the Idaho real estate transaction was fraudulent. It asserted CMDC and its alter egos were "the principal obligor under the promissory note that was made part of the option transaction entered into between" all the parties, and Steven and Jason, "at best, were secondarily liable for the unpaid balance of [the Note], as the note was alleged to be enforceable as against [Steven and Jason] by [CMDC] in the Utah action." Steven and Jason alleged CMDC had not paid the Note and under principles of equitable contribution, [Steven and Jason] were entitled to contribution from [CMDC] with respect to any payment obligation under the subject [Note]."
Simply stated, Steven and Jason asserted they were additional obligors with respect to the Utah judgment (now registered in California) with CMDC. They claimed equity demanded CMDC share in the liability imposed by the prior Utah judgment, without any apparent recognition that the judgment was entirely in CMDC's favor. Apparently, CMDC must pay itself on the Note first and then it must seek "secondary liability" from Steven and Jason.
We were not provided with a copy of the original complaint or law and motion documents leading up to the MJOP at issue in this case. However, CMDC's moving papers provided a general outline of the procedural history of the case. Specifically, CMDC discussed the court's prior ruling on a MJOP to the original complaint, which alleged two causes of action, (1) equitable relief from the judgment, and (2) contribution. CMDC recounted the reasons why the trial court granted the first MJOP, refusing to give Steven and Jason leave to amend the first cause of action but permitting them to amend the contribution claim.
According to CMDC, the trial court determined the equitable relief claim "was improper" because Steven had already lost his challenge to the Utah judgment in 2011, i.e., denying of the motion to set aside the judgment. Moreover, the trial court ruled Steven and Jason's complaint alleged the Utah judgment was fraudulent, not the California judgment.
CMDC reminded the court that in its prior MJOP ruling, it was determined Jason could not seek relief from the California judgment because it was only entered against Steven. CMDC maintained the trial court determined Jason was "no longer a party to the action."
CMDC discussed the reasons given by the trial court for allowing Steven to amend the second cause of action for contribution. The court ruled, "'It is not clear whether this relates to the Utah judgment or the Idaho property transaction alleged in the complaint.'" CMDC urged the court to grant the MJOP on the contribution claim for the same reasons it previously granted the MJOP.
Steven and Jason filed an opposition asserting the second MJOP was frivolous. They asserted, "Having lost two prior motions for summary judgment and a prior [MJOP], [CMDC] bring[s] this [MJOP] on essentially the same grounds that they raised in support [of their prior unsuccessful motions]." They argued CMDC's motion was an improper motion for reconsideration, violating section 1008. We were not provided with a copy of the two prior summary judgment motions and Steven and Jason do not discuss the nature of the issues raised or the basis for the court's ruling on them.
After considering written and oral argument, Judge Frederick P. Horn granted the MJOP to the FAC without leave to amend. In his minute order, Judge Horn briefly summarized the history of the case as follows: "[Steven's and Jason's] first cause of action contains a single cause of action for equitable contribution. It pertains to a real estate transaction that was the subject of an action brought by [CMDC] against [them] in Utah. [CMDC] was successful in bringing a motion for summary judgment against [them] in that action and judgment was entered against them in the Utah court on April 29, 2011. On October 29, 2011, [CMDC] had the Utah judgment domesticated in California through an application for entry of judgment on sister state judgment . . . . A motion to vacate the California judgment under [section] 1710.40 was denied on February 12, 2012."
Our record does not include a copy of the reporter's transcript of the hearing. CMDC noted in the respondent's brief no reporter was present at the hearing.
Next, Judge Horn described Steve and Jason's equitable contribution case against CMDC. "[The] original complaint contained two causes of action, a cause of action for equitable relief from the California judgment and a cause of action for equitable contribution. The [c]ourt previously granted a [MJOP] without leave to amend as to [the claim] for equitable relief from the California judgment on the basis that there were no facts alleged that showed that the California judgment was entered as the result of any fraud or wrongdoing. [¶] Although couched in terms of equitable contribution, the remaining cause of action in the [FAC] challenges the correctness or enforceability of the Utah judgment. [Steven and Jason] allege that the promissory note that was the subject of the Utah action was part of a scheme concocted by the defendants to acquire real property in Idaho that the parties were supposed to jointly develop through a 'friendly foreclosure.' [Citation.] They further allege that they were induced by fraud to 'enter into an option purchase agreement and a deed of trust which, by its terms, obligated [Steven and Jason] to become secondarily liable on the promissory note without regard to whether or not [they] exercised any option to purchase the subject property under the option agreement.' [Citation.] [Steven and Jason] allege that the option was specious because 'defendants were never in a position to be able to perform under the option agreement and never allowed plaintiffs to exercise the option.' [Citation.] [Steven and Jason] ask for 'contribution from defendants with respect to any payment obligation under the promissory note' [citation] or, alternatively, a determination 'that they have no indebtedness under the subject promissory note by virtue of the relationship between and among the defendants as herein alleged.' [Citations.]"
Judge Horn concluded, "These allegations are directly contrary to the findings of the Utah court in its order granting summary judgment against [Steven and Jason] in favor of [CMDC]. (See Exhibit A to . . . request for judicial notice.) The Utah court found that Jason . . . had not acted on his allegation that another party should be joined in the Utah action or that he may have had potential defenses or counterclaims, that [Steven and Jason] did not dispute that they signed the amended trust deed note individually guaranteeing performance of the amended trust deed note, that [Steven and Jason] admitted in discovery that they did not pay on the amended trust deed note, and that [Steven and Jason] did not dispute that the amended trust deed note was in default. (See Exhibit A to . . . request for judicial notice.) [¶] Thus, the allegations pertaining to the promissory note have been fully litigated in Utah and [Steven and Jason] have not presented any authority that this Court has the authority to vacate or otherwise modify the underlying Utah judgment." (Italics added.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"'[S]ection 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), . . . provides that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought by a defendant on the grounds that the court "has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint". . . . [¶] "The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." [Citation.]' [Citation.] '[J]udgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution.' [Citation.]" (Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218, 227 (Victorville).)
"'We review de novo a trial court's judgment on an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Citation.] "On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, the court assumes the truth of, and liberally construes, all properly pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. [Citation.] The court may also consider . . . matters subject to judicial notice." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Victorville, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.) II. Procedural Challenge
The first challenge on appeal is that the MJOP was "ambiguous as to the basis for relief sought." Steven and Jason assert the MJOP's notice indicated the motion was based on the following two grounds: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the cause of action alleged in the complaint; (2) the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it was barred by section 1710.40, subdivision (b). Steven and Jason assert a trial court cannot grant "different relief, or relief on different grounds, than stated in the notice of motion." They conclude the trial court's ruling must be based on something written in the very first paragraph of the notice of motion, and it cannot look to arguments buried in the attached memorandum of points and authorities or declarations. We noticed this exact same argument was raised in their opposition to the MJOP and has been cut and pasted into the opening brief without any changes.
This section provides a party has 30 days after a sister state judgment is ordered domesticated to make a motion to vacate the judgment "on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment." (§ 1710.40.)
Additionally, we note the opening brief's statement of facts (three pages long) contains only one record reference to page one of the appellants' appendix, violating California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Parties are required to "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); see Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990 ["The rule applies wherever a reference to a matter in the record appears in a brief"].) "We decline to consider those passages of the . . . brief that do not comply with this rule. [Citation.]" (Lee v. Rich (2017) 6 Cal.App.5th 270, 273 (Lee).)
We conclude the argument is premised on an incorrect statement of the law. There is no rigid rule limiting a trial court to only ruling on issues stated in the first paragraph of the notice. As we will explain, there are exceptions to this general rule. Steven and Jason do not discuss, or even acknowledge, the exceptions.
The Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268 (Kinda) case is instructive. Plaintiff argued the court erred in excluding evidence for grounds not stated in defendant's notice of its motion in limine. "A basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought (§ 1010; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a)), and courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion. [Citation.] For example, in People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, the appellate court rejected the argument that a surety's motion to vacate forfeiture of bail bond provided sufficient notice of a request for an extension of the statutory period following forfeiture, because the notice of motion to vacate made no reference to an extension being sought or the grounds for that relief." (Id. at p. 1277.)
The court in Kinda explained, "The purpose of the notice requirements 'is to cause the moving party to "sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court."' [Citation.] Sometimes this purpose is met notwithstanding deficient notice. For example, it may be sufficient that the supporting papers contain the grounds for the relief sought, even if the notice does not. [Citations.] It also may be sufficient if the omitted issue, or ground for relief, was raised without objection before the trial court. (Fredrickson v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 593, 598 ['accepting petitioner's claim that the notice of motion was insufficient, the grounds were raised without objection in the trial court at the hearing on the motion'].)" (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.)
The Kinda court acknowledged defendant's motion in limine referred to hearsay and authenticity as grounds for excluding evidence. "Although the trial court's inquiry extended beyond those grounds, plaintiffs never objected to the broadened scope, and they had ample opportunity to respond to the grounds raised by the trial court." (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.) The court determined there was no risk plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to provide relevant information in response to the trial court's "broadened inquiry." (Ibid.) The court distinguished the case from Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 376, where it was decided the "trial court erred in ignoring the grounds presented in the motion in limine and ruling on the ultimate issue of negligence without giving 'the parties an opportunity to address the facts required to assess' that ultimate issue." (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.) The Kinda court concluded, "[P]laintiffs had a fair opportunity to brief and present their evidence in response to the court's extensive inquiry." (Ibid.)
Thus, "An omission in the notice may be overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief sought. [Citations.] The purpose of these requirements is to cause the moving party to 'sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.' [Citation.]" (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.) Accordingly, to prevail on appeal and reverse the court's ruling in this case, Steven and Jason had the burden of first establishing what portion of the court's ruling went beyond the notice and supporting papers. In addition, they needed to establish they had no opportunity to provide relevant information relating to these new grounds. They utterly failed to address these two dispositive points. Moreover, because there is no reporter's transcript, we have no reason to suspect the court ruled on a matter without first providing Steven and Jason an adequate opportunity at the hearing to provide a response.
A trial court's ruling is presumed correct and the burden of demonstrating error rests squarely on the appellant. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631-632.) An appellant may not simply make the assertion that the trial court's ruling is erroneous and leave it to the appellate court to figure out why. Our scope of review is limited to issues that have been adequately raised and supported by reasoned argument and analysis. (Salas v. California Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074; Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.) We deem the issue waived. III. Challenge on the Merits
Next, Steven and Jason assert the trial court had no legal basis for granting the MJOP. Surprisingly, they do not mention Judge Horn's ruling. Instead, they provide us with arguments that are confusing and somewhat incoherent. We conclude Judge Horn's ruling was legally sound.
In his ruling, Judge Horn first made the factual determination the contribution claim challenged the "correctness or enforceability of the Utah judgment," which was based on a debt owed pursuant to a promissory note. Judge Horn next made the legal determination the allegations regarding the Note in the FAC "have been fully litigated in Utah" and he lacked authority to vacate or modify the underlying Utah judgment. In other words, Judge Horn determined the Utah judgment barred relitigation of the same issues. It is well settled a court may properly grant a MJOP based on res judicata/collateral estoppel. (See Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 187.)
"'Res judicata' describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. . . . Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action." (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, fn. omitted; see also § 1908, subd. (a)(2).)
Res judicata applies if (1) the judgment in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits, (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding, and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties in the prior proceeding. (In re Anthony H. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 495, 503.) As mention above, Steven and Jason do not comment on the legal merit of Judge Horn's ruling their contribution claim was barred by res judicata. They do not suggest what legal authority would give Judge Horn the right to ignore the Utah judgment and permit them to relitigate claims already decided in a prior judgment.
Rather than address the merits of the trial court's ruling, Steven and Jason discuss unsupported and irrelevant facts and cite inapplicable authority. They first discuss the gravamen of their FAC, without providing any supporting record references. For the reasons outlined in footnote 1, we decline to consider the portions of the brief that do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (Lee, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 273.) We also disregard Steven and Jason assertion, made without supporting record references, summarizing the contents of the underlying Utah judgment. (Ibid.)
Steven and Jason say it is "important to note" Sunrise did not apply to domesticate the Utah judgment in California and it was not a judgment creditor. They do not explain why this fact is important. Nor do they make clear the reason for their next topic of discussion, i.e., efforts in discovery to establish an alter ego relationship between CMDC, Sunrise, Collier, and Heiner. They discuss what they hope to prove if permitted to go to trial, paying no attention to the trial court's ruling these same matters all concern the ultimate issue of who was obligated to pay the Note, a matter finally resolved by the Utah judgment.
The next section of the opening brief discusses "erroneous assumptions" raised in CMDC's motion. However, we find this argument perplexing because they do not argue or provide record citations suggesting the trial court found any of these "assumptions" persuasive or relied upon them when ruling on the MJOP. As stated above, nowhere in Steven and Jason's appellate challenge do they actually discuss the legal merits of the trial court's reasons for granting the MJOP, i.e., res judicata and the lack of authority to modify or vacate the prior final judgment. We need not determine if the "assumptions" contained in the briefing were erroneous because we agree with the trial court's determination res judicata bars the action and warranted judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend.
As their final argument, Steven and Jason assert their action for equitable contribution is viable because it was "separate and apart" from liability on the underlying indebtedness due to the creditor. They do not provide a legal definition of equitable contribution or cite legal authority supporting their unique argument the contribution action is "separate" when the alleged co-obligor and judgment creditor are the same party. It is likely the omission is due to the large body of contrary legal authority holding duplicate "separate" and secondary actions like this one are barred by res judicata. To become a judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment, the underlying issues regarding the obligation to pay the debt owned were finally decided in that creditor's favor. It would be inequitable to allow a second "separate" action to relitigate whether the newly designated judgment creditor must contribute to the judgment.
As correctly determined by the trial court, the Utah judgment determined CMDC prevailed on its cause of action to collect on the Note arising from a transaction regarding Idaho real estate. The judgment determined Steven and Jason owed CMDC over $1 million. In their lawsuit, Steven and Jason allege CMDC is responsible for repaying all or part of the $1 million owed on the same Note arising from the same Idaho real estate transaction. The contribution claim is a poorly disguised attempt to attack the Utah judgment in favor of CMDC. To prevail on the contribution claim, Steven and Jason would have to litigate the ultimate legal issue of who is responsible for paying the Note (an issue already decided in the Utah court). IV. Effect of Domestication Proceedings
Steven and Jason find "nonsensical" CMDC's argument the domestication proceedings (making the Utah judgment a valid and enforceable California judgment) was a reason to bar their lawsuit under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Due to a lack of record citations, we are unsure exactly where in the record to find the argument Steven and Jason are discussing. Like their other contentions on appeal, their argument fails to include any record references and could be disregarded on that basis. (Lee, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 273.) In any event, the trial court properly did not rely on this legal theory when granting the MJOP. The doctrine of res judicata applied regardless of the domestication ruling.
Judge Horn concluded the allegations in the FAC "had been fully litigated in Utah" and there was no legal grounds for the trial court to vacate or modify the Utah judgment. "Under the United States Constitution, each state must give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state. (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1.) In California, the constitutional requirement is reflected in . . . section 1913, which provides that the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this state as in the state where it was made." (Tyus v. Tyus (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 789, 792.) "In response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted several statutory provisions that provide economical and expeditious registration procedures for enforcing sister state money judgments in California. [Citation.] A California judgment can be obtained simply by registering a sister state judgment with the superior court, thereby avoiding the necessity of bringing a completely independent action here. [Citations.] With certain exceptions, the new judgment has the same effect as an original California money judgment and 'may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.' (§ 1710.35.)" (Liquidator of Integrity Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 971, 975.)
Based on the above, we conclude domestication of the Utah judgment was a ministerial act performed by the court clerk (Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, 838), and it provided CMDC authority to use California's court system and remedies to enforce the judgment. The domestication ruling or proceedings had no relevance to the MJOP ruling. Res judicata applies to any sister state judgment regardless of whether it was domesticated. In this case, res judicata bared relitigation of the claims and issues decided by the Utah judgment. The fact the judgment was later registered in California is immaterial. V. Leave to Amend
Steven and Jason complain the court abused its discretion by refusing to give them leave to amend the complaint. They maintain the operative complaint had been amended twice, withstanding the "scrutiny" of a summary judgment motion. They recite the general rule MJOPs follow the same standards as demurrers, and leave should be "routinely granted." However, they do not mention what additional facts they would add to the complaint to cure the defects and establish res judicata was inapplicable. "Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law." (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)
Steven and Jason cite to two cases they say support an automatic opportunity for amendment. (MacIsaac v. Pozzo (1945) 26 Cal.2d 809, 815 (MacIsaac); Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 566 (Higgins.) We find the cases distinguishable. In MacIsaac, the appellate court held the trial court erred in granting, without leave to amend, plaintiffs' MJOP before trial. It concluded defects in defendants' cross-complaint and answer could have been cured by amendment but were not called to defendants' attention by demurrer or an earlier notice of MJOP. (MacIsaac, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 815-816.) Inherent in this ruling was the understanding the defect could be cured by the specific amendments discussed in the opinion. (Id. at pp. 813-815.) Such is not the case here. Steven and Jason do not propose how they would amend the pleadings to avoid the impact of the doctrine of res judicata.
Contrary to their assertion on appeal, the MacIsaac case does not hold that in the absence of a previous demurrer, the court is legally required to automatically give a party leave to amend when granting a MJOP. We conclude this argument highlights another reason to affirm the court's ruling. Steven and Jason's argument they should be allowed to amend because of "the absence" of a prior demurrer fails to take into account this appeal concerned a second MJOP. We find it telling that Steven and Jason do not mention in their analysis that CMDC previously prevailed on a MJOP and, for all intents and purposes, that ruling had the same legal effect as a prior demurrer. Thus, the trial court had essentially already given Steven and Jason one opportunity to amend their contribution claim. They do not suggest why they should be given a second chance.
In Higgins, supra, plaintiff sought leave to amend her complaint before trial and it involved only the "technical" correction of her mistaken attachment of escrow instructions to the complaint instead of attaching the underlying purchase agreement. (Higgins, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pp. 561, 565.) The court reviewed the trial court's ruling on plaintiff's motion to amend her pleading based on her mistake. It did not concern a plaintiff's efforts to amend following a demurrer, summary judgment, or MJOP. Nevertheless, Steven and Jason argue the Higgins case is directly applicable and holds that when a prior demurrer has been overruled, the parties have justifiably assumed the complaint was legally sufficient, and they should be given leave to amend. No such rule of law is announced in Higgins (or the MacIsaac case). Moreover, in this case the prior MJOP (having the same legal significance as a demurrer) was sustained with leave to amend. The parties were well aware of the fact there were significant legal deficiencies with the complaint.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Steven and Jason's argument the court's prior ruling denying CMDC's motion for summary judgment somehow limits the court's ability to later grant a MJOP. As a general rule, a MJOP "does not lie on grounds previously raised by demurrer unless there has been a 'material change in applicable case law or statute' since the demurrer was overruled. (§ 438[, subd.] (g)(1); see [citation.])" (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 7:305, p. 7(1)-86.) Steven and Jason cite to no case, and we found none, holding a prior summary judgment ruling precludes a later MJOP. Moreover, as mentioned above, in this case there was a prior MJOP (effectively a demurrer) that was granted with leave to amend. For all of the above reasons, we conclude the MJOP was properly granted without leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgement is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. FYBEL, J.