The existence of an implied agency is essentially a question of fact. Adams v. Herald Publishing Co., 82 Conn. 448, 451, 74 A. 755. The proof is generally found in the acts and conduct of the parties. Alfred Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448, 450, 114 A. 529. Actions of the defendant and Riddell clearly made it appear that Riddell had broad general authority to act in behalf of the defendant, especially in matters pertaining to the farm. A general agent for a disclosed or even partially disclosed principal subjects the principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct.
It is true that the plaintiffs could sue, as they did under their first claim for relief, on the promise, contained in the contract, to pay the purchase price of the system, as in cases such as Appleton v. Norwalk Library Corporation, 53 Conn. 4, 8, 22 A. 681; O'Neill-Adams Co. v. Eklund, 89 Conn. 232, 236, 93 A. 524; and United Machinery Co. v. Etzel, 89 Conn. 336, 341, 94 A. 356. But the suit is, nonetheless, a suit on the contract, including its provision that the system would remain personal property "as well after it [was] placed in the building as before." Consequently, cases such as Alfred Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448, 449, 114 A. 529, and Pothier v. Reid Air Spring Co., 103 Conn. 380, 387, 130 A. 383, relied upon by the trial court, and cases such as Sager v. Schmidt, 98 Conn. 736, 737, 120 A. 504, and Colonial Finance Co. v. Brodsky, 140 Conn. 391, 394, 100 A.2d 568, relied upon by the plaintiffs, are not controlling. Nor are the plaintiffs helped by the provision that in the event of a sale or other disposition of the realty by the defendant any then unpaid balance, less a credit of 1 per cent as a commission for the making of the sale, should forthwith become due and payable and should be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs within forty-eight hours, and that a failure to pay should "constitute an act of wrongful conversion by the [defendant] of property belonging to the [plaintiffs]."
But if the statement of the officers had been admitted, Beach was under no obligation to deny or admit the facts contained in the statement. If the circumstances be assumed to show that Beach heard and understood the statement and knew whether the facts embraced in the statement were true, it is certain that he was not in a situation which called for a reply and that the circumstances did not naturally call for a reply from him. Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, ante, 448, 114 A. 529; Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 235, 237; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1071. Beach was approached by Miss Kelly as the superintendent of police, and as such he was under no obligation to reply.
"The proof of the existence of an agency is generally found in the acts and conduct of the parties." Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448, 450, 114 A. 529 (1921); Cleaveland v. Gabriel, 149 Conn. 388, 394, 180 A.2d 749 (1962). The existence of an implied agency and whether a person is acting within the bounds of his authority as an agent are questions of fact.
As an agent of Susan Harland, Harris had actual and apparent authority to bind his principal. Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448, 450 (1921). The virtually identical case of Devita v. Sirico, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0448826S (March 13, 2002, Arnold, J.) ( 31 Conn.L.Rptr. 511), confirms these points.
Here, the record supports the conclusion that Horbal was the authorized agent of the building inspector. See, e.g., ROR, Item 1 (copy of notice sent to building official); Alfred Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448, 450 (1921). Therefore, the court concludes that Horbal's cease and desist order of June 10, 1998 was properly issued.
To dispose of defendant's cross complaint for damages and fourth special defense at the outset, it cannot be found from the evidence that the fire was caused by Ballister's negligence, whether or not he was plaintiff's agent, and whether the burden was on plaintiff to establish freedom from negligence or on the defendant to prove its existence. In passing, the court is of the opinion that Ballister was in fact the agent of plaintiff, under Alfred Fox Piano Co. v. Bennett, 96 Conn. 448; Burwell v. Neumann, 130 Conn. 117, and Restatement (Second), 1 Agency § 8, so that any negligence on the part of Ballister would be imputed to plaintiff. Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369.