Fowler v. Vineyard

82 Citing cases

  1. Global Ship Systems, LLC v. Riverhawk Group, LLC

    334 Ga. App. 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    (Emphasis supplied.) See Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 458(3), 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991). In this case, we conclude that Global Ship's third action is barred pursuant to the res judicata effect of OCGA § 9–11–41(a)(3).

  2. Chrison v. H H Interiors, Inc.

    232 Ga. App. 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 16 times
    In Chrison, there was no listing with the Secretary of State and the summons was left with a regional manager at the entity's place of business in Tennessee.

    Georgia's principle of res judicata, codified as OCGA § 9-12-40, provides that "[a] judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside." See also Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 455 ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991). The doctrine of full faith and credit renders the judgments and adjudications of courts of sister states of competent jurisdiction res judicata in this state unless the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or unless the judgment was procured by fraud.

  3. Doman v. Banderas

    231 Ga. App. 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that a claim based on defamatory letters about plaintiff's business was barred by res judicata when prior suit involved a claim for tortious interference with a business practice and plaintiff "without question" could have amended his complaint to include the defamation claim

    (Citations omitted.) Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 455-456 ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991). In the present case, it is undisputed that there was a prior action between Doman and Banderas which resulted in a judgment in favor of Doman by a court of competent jurisdiction.

  4. Majestic Homes v. Sierra Development

    211 Ga. App. 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 18 times

    3. Majestic further argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sierra because any claim Majestic had against Sierra would have merely been a permissive cross-claim in the prior action and because it voluntarily dismissed its claims against Sierra in the prior action. These arguments have been decided adversely to Majestic by our Supreme Court in Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454 ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991) and Citizens Exchange Bank c. v. Kirkland, 256 Ga. 71 ( 344 S.E.2d 409) (1986). Majestic's claim against Sierra asserted in this action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which provides that a judgment on the merits is conclusive as to all matters that were or could have been put in controversy between identical parties or their privies in another cause of action.

  5. Akin v. PAFEC Ltd.

    991 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1993)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that rulings on jury demand motions did not merge into order granting summary judgment

    A party seeking to invoke res judicata on the basis of a prior judgment must establish three prerequisites: (1) identity of parties, (2) identity of the causes of action, and (3) adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction in which the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issues. See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-42; Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 405 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1991); Norris v. Atlanta West Point R.R. Co., 254 Ga. 684, 333 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1985). The district court found all three elements satisfied with regard to each of the Akins' claims.

  6. Caldarelli Hejmanowski Page & Leer LLP v. Stadtmueller (In re Leucadia Grp.)

    BAP No. SC-20-1066-GFB (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2020)

    Under Georgia law, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice "operates as an adjudication upon the merits and bars the right to bring another action on the same claim." Fowler v. Vinyard, 405 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga. 1991) (citations omitted). An order dismissing a defendant with prejudice is not a judgment, but it does adjudicate the "non-liability of that defendant to the plaintiff."

  7. Bostick v. CMM Properties, Inc.

    297 Ga. 55 (Ga. 2015)   Cited 8 times
    In Bostick v. CMM Properties, 297 Ga. 55, 772 S.E.2d 671 (2015), the Georgia Supreme Court reversed Division 2 of our opinion in Bostick v. CMM Properties, 327 Ga.App. 137, 755 S.E.2d 895 (2014), in which we had affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellees CMM Properties, Inc., and others (collectively “the CMM parties”) on the ground of res judicata.

    Church of God v. Brinson, supra at 486, 696 S.E.2d 667, quoting Karan v. Auto–Owners Ins., supra at 546, 629 S.E.2d 260. It is axiomatic that the party against whom the doctrine of res judicata is raised as a bar to the subsequent suit must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first action. Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 456(1), 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991). Thus, at its core, res judicata contemplates an adversarial proceeding.

  8. Simon v. Gunby

    260 Ga. App. 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brinson v. First American Bank of Ga., 200 Ga. App. 552, 555(1) ( 409 S.E.2d 50) (1991); see Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 458(3)(b) ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991). Therefore, Gunby was required to bring all claims related to the February surgery in the first action, which she failed to do.

  9. Myers v. North Georgia Title Tax Free Exchange

    241 Ga. App. 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 6 times

    (Citations omitted.) Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 455 (1) ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991); Fedeli v. UAP/Ga. Ag. Chem., 237 Ga. App. 337 ( 514 S.E.2d 684) (1999). In this case, the doctrine does not apply because Myers did not have the opportunity to litigate whether North Georgia had title to the property in the prior magistrate court action.

  10. Sorrells Constr. v. Chandler Armentrout

    214 Ga. App. 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 29 times
    Explaining the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

    Claim preclusion will bar a plaintiff's action if the plaintiff has brought another action based on the same subject matter, the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the other action, the other action resulted in an adjudication on the merits, and the other action was against the same defendant or its privy. See Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454 (1) ( 405 S.E.2d 678) (1991); OCGA § 9-12-40. Plaintiff's claims against the City and CAR involve the same subject matter, and although plaintiff did not litigate its claims against the City, it had the opportunity to do so.