With reference to the right of way as between two vehicle approaching and entering an intersection, the law of this State makes no distinction between a "T" intersection and one at which the two highways cross each other completely. G.S. 20-38 defines certain words and phrases as used in the Motor Vehicle Act of 1937, G.S. ch. 20, Art. 3, which article includes G.S. 20-155 and G.S. 20-158. It defines "intersection" as follows: "The area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of two or more highways which join one another at any angle, whether or not one such highway crosses the other." The word "intersection" as used in the Public Laws of 1913, ch. 107, which regulated the speed of motor vehicles traversing an intersection was held by this Court to apply to a "T" intersection in Manly v. Abernathy, 167 N.C. 220, 83 S.E. 343, which was followed in Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, 137 S.E. 155. In the comparatively recent case of Brady v. Beverage Co., 242 N.C. 32, 86 S.E.2d 901, there was a collision at a "T" intersection at which no stop sign had been erected.
This testimony was ample to warrant the conclusion that Dorman was negligent at the time and place in controversy in that he proceeded onto the highway and into the path of the approaching Plymouth coupe with the tractor and trailer when he knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have known that he could not cross in front of the Plymouth in safety. Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E.2d 337; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, 137 S.E. 155; 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, section 306. It has been noted that the only witness at the trial claiming any personal knowledge as to when, how or why the tractor-trailer combination came to a standstill on the paved portion of the highway was the defendant Dorman, who attributed the event solely to the unexplained stopping of the engine of the tractor.
Clark's Crim. Law, 155; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 83 Am. Dec., 705. We are not concerned with the question of negligent default in a civil action, as in Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, but with the constituent elements of involuntary manslaughter. In their application to the defendant's negligent act these elements call for a construction of C. S., 2621 (63); for in determining whether the death of Mrs. Johnson was proximately caused by the defendant's disobedience of the law we must ascertain the evils the statute is designed to prevent.
Dreher v. Devine, 192 N.C. 325, is not controlling under the facts in the present case. As to proximate cause, see DeLaney v. Henderson, 192 N.C. at p. 651; Radford v. Young, 194 N.C. 747. As to sudden danger or emergency, see Riggs v. Mfg. Co., 190 N.C. at p. 260; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442. Plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to Motor Vehicle Uniform Act, Public Laws of N.C. 1927, ch. 148, where the "Rules of the Road" are set forth.
Public Laws 1927, ch. 148, sec. 1 (p), defines "Intersection" as follows: "The area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of two or more highways which join one another at an angle, whether or not one such highway crosses the other." Manly v. Abernathy, 167 N.C. 220; Mount Olive v. R. R., 188 N.C. 332; Davis v. Long, 189 N.C. 129; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402. Webster's Dictionary defines the word "Intersect" as having as one of its meaning that of "to cut into," etc.; "to cut into another," etc., and the word "Intersection" as meaning geometrically, "the point or line in which one line or surface cuts into another."
No error. Cited: Strider v. Lewey, 176 N.C. 449 (1p); Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N.C. 667 (1c); S. v. Stallings, 189 N.C. 105, 106 (2c); DeLaney v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N.C. 651 (1c); Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 403 (3c); Pope v. R. R., 195 N.C. 70 (3c); Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 562 (3c); Harper v. Construction Co., 200 N.C. 49 (3c); Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 499 (3c); Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 419 3d; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 400 (3c).
New trial. Cited: Board of Agriculture v. Drainage District, 177 N.C. 224 (1c); Guano Co. v. Walston, 187 N.C. 672 (1c); Spitzer v. Comrs. of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 33 (1c); Mt. Olive v. R. R., 188 N.C. 334 2d; S. v. Stallings, 189 N.C. 105 (2c); Davis v. Long, 189 N.C. 135 (2cc); Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 403 (2c); Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 220 (2c); Roach v. Durham, 204 N.C. 590 (1c).