Fowler v. Underwood

7 Citing cases

  1. Dawson v. Jennette

    278 N.C. 438 (N.C. 1971)   Cited 14 times

    With reference to the right of way as between two vehicle approaching and entering an intersection, the law of this State makes no distinction between a "T" intersection and one at which the two highways cross each other completely. G.S. 20-38 defines certain words and phrases as used in the Motor Vehicle Act of 1937, G.S. ch. 20, Art. 3, which article includes G.S. 20-155 and G.S. 20-158. It defines "intersection" as follows: "The area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of two or more highways which join one another at any angle, whether or not one such highway crosses the other." The word "intersection" as used in the Public Laws of 1913, ch. 107, which regulated the speed of motor vehicles traversing an intersection was held by this Court to apply to a "T" intersection in Manly v. Abernathy, 167 N.C. 220, 83 S.E. 343, which was followed in Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, 137 S.E. 155. In the comparatively recent case of Brady v. Beverage Co., 242 N.C. 32, 86 S.E.2d 901, there was a collision at a "T" intersection at which no stop sign had been erected.

  2. Thomas v. Motor Lines

    52 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1949)   Cited 43 times

    This testimony was ample to warrant the conclusion that Dorman was negligent at the time and place in controversy in that he proceeded onto the highway and into the path of the approaching Plymouth coupe with the tractor and trailer when he knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have known that he could not cross in front of the Plymouth in safety. Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E.2d 337; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, 137 S.E. 155; 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, section 306. It has been noted that the only witness at the trial claiming any personal knowledge as to when, how or why the tractor-trailer combination came to a standstill on the paved portion of the highway was the defendant Dorman, who attributed the event solely to the unexplained stopping of the engine of the tractor.

  3. State v. Satterfield

    198 N.C. 682 (N.C. 1930)   Cited 48 times

    Clark's Crim. Law, 155; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 83 Am. Dec., 705. We are not concerned with the question of negligent default in a civil action, as in Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402, but with the constituent elements of involuntary manslaughter. In their application to the defendant's negligent act these elements call for a construction of C. S., 2621 (63); for in determining whether the death of Mrs. Johnson was proximately caused by the defendant's disobedience of the law we must ascertain the evils the statute is designed to prevent.

  4. Stevens v. Rostan

    145 S.E. 555 (N.C. 1928)   Cited 7 times

    Dreher v. Devine, 192 N.C. 325, is not controlling under the facts in the present case. As to proximate cause, see DeLaney v. Henderson, 192 N.C. at p. 651; Radford v. Young, 194 N.C. 747. As to sudden danger or emergency, see Riggs v. Mfg. Co., 190 N.C. at p. 260; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442. Plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to Motor Vehicle Uniform Act, Public Laws of N.C. 1927, ch. 148, where the "Rules of the Road" are set forth.

  5. Goss v. Williams

    196 N.C. 213 (N.C. 1928)   Cited 44 times
    In Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169, this instruction was given approval: "You are instructed that the mere fact that a child runs in front of a moving motor vehicle so suddenly that the driver had no notice of danger, does not necessarily relieve a defendant from liability.

    Public Laws 1927, ch. 148, sec. 1 (p), defines "Intersection" as follows: "The area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of two or more highways which join one another at an angle, whether or not one such highway crosses the other." Manly v. Abernathy, 167 N.C. 220; Mount Olive v. R. R., 188 N.C. 332; Davis v. Long, 189 N.C. 129; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402. Webster's Dictionary defines the word "Intersect" as having as one of its meaning that of "to cut into," etc.; "to cut into another," etc., and the word "Intersection" as meaning geometrically, "the point or line in which one line or surface cuts into another."

  6. Hinton v. R. R

    90 S.E. 756 (N.C. 1916)   Cited 18 times
    In Hinton v. R. R., 172 N.C. 587, 90 S.E. 756, it is said: "It is well understood that a person in the presence of an emergency is not usually held to the same deliberation or circumspect care as in ordinary conditions."

    No error. Cited: Strider v. Lewey, 176 N.C. 449 (1p); Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N.C. 667 (1c); S. v. Stallings, 189 N.C. 105, 106 (2c); DeLaney v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N.C. 651 (1c); Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 403 (3c); Pope v. R. R., 195 N.C. 70 (3c); Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 562 (3c); Harper v. Construction Co., 200 N.C. 49 (3c); Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 499 (3c); Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 419 3d; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 400 (3c).

  7. Manly v. Abernathy

    167 N.C. 220 (N.C. 1914)   Cited 19 times
    In Manly v. Abernethy, 167 N.C. 220, 83 S.E. 343, at page 344, the court uses the following language: "We are clearly of the opinion that the Legislature intended to use the word in the sense of joining or touching, or coming in contact with, or entering into, and did not intend that the word 'intersect' should be so restricted in its meaning as not to protect pedestrians and other persons using a public street at a point or space where another street comes into it, although it does not cross it.

    New trial. Cited: Board of Agriculture v. Drainage District, 177 N.C. 224 (1c); Guano Co. v. Walston, 187 N.C. 672 (1c); Spitzer v. Comrs. of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 33 (1c); Mt. Olive v. R. R., 188 N.C. 334 2d; S. v. Stallings, 189 N.C. 105 (2c); Davis v. Long, 189 N.C. 135 (2cc); Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 403 (2c); Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 220 (2c); Roach v. Durham, 204 N.C. 590 (1c).