The plain language of the statute thus places the needs of the spouse seeking maintenance on equal footing with the spouse paying maintenance. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 75 Wn.2d 36, 38-42, 448 P.2d 926 (1968); Fowler v. Fowler, 71 Wn.2d 540, 543, 429 P.2d 881 (1967); Stacy v. Stacy, 68 Wn.2d 573, 575-77, 414 P.2d 791 (1966). A maintenance reduction that allows Wells to meet all of his financial and medical needs, but forces Helland to choose whether or not to buy food or to pay rent and medical expenses, does not adequately reflect the careful balancing mandated by RCW 26.09.090(f) and the "just" result that post-dissolution resource allocation is supposed to achieve.

Loomis v. Loomis, 47 Wn.2d 468, 288 P.2d 235 (1955). Courts considered a number of factors in deciding whether or not to award alimony and in what amount. Foremost among the factors to be considered by the court were the necessities and financial abilities of the parties, the need of the parties' children to be cared for, the age, earning capacity, health, education, restricted earning capacity, if any, and the prior financial contribution of each party. Kelso v. Kelso, 75 Wn.2d 24, 448 P.2d 499 (1968); Fowler v. Fowler, 71 Wn.2d 540, 429 P.2d 881 (1967); Mose v. Mose, 4 Wn. App. 204, 480 P.2d 517 (1971). When this state replaced its divorce laws with the dissolution of marriage act, what had previously been called "alimony" came to be called "maintenance" and the criteria for awarding it were set forth in RCW 26.09.090. Essentially these remain the same as under prior case law except that the factor of fault has now been excluded.

Alimony is not awarded in Washington, absent a showing of need. See Fowler v. Fowler, 71 Wn.2d 540, 429 P.2d 881 (1967). Defendant also claims that the trial court should have determined the value of certain property as of the time of trial, rather than as of the time the parties separated.