Some courts have found that an alleged hearing impairment may constitute a "serious medical need" for purposes of satisfying the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Butler, 209 Fed.Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2006) (hearing-impaired plaintiff who was allegedly deprived of hearing aids may state claim for deliberate indifference); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp. 1019, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (failure to provide interpretive services and assistive devices for deaf and hearing-impaired inmates amounted to deliberate indifference); Fowler v. Dep't of Correction, No. 17-CV-00848, 2017 WL 3401252, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017). "Although medical deliberate indifference claims are most often asserted against medical personnel, non-medical personnel may also be held liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs where a plaintiff proves that 'prison personnel intentionally delayed access to medical care when the inmate was in extreme pain and has made his medical problem known to the attendant prison personnel.'"

Some courts have found that an alleged hearing impairment may constitute a "serious medical need" for purposes of satisfying the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Butler, 209 Fed.Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2006) (hearing-impaired plaintiff who was allegedly deprived of hearing aids may state claim for deliberate indifference); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp. 1019, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (failure to provide interpretive services and assistive devices for deaf and hearing-impaired inmates amounted to deliberate indifference); Fowler v. Dep't of Correction, No. 17-CV-00848, 2017 WL 3401252, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017). "Although medical deliberate indifference claims are most often asserted against medical personnel, non-medical personnel may also be held liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs where a plaintiff proves that 'prison personnel intentionally delayed access to medical care when the inmate was in extreme pain and has made his medical problem known to the attendant prison personnel.'"

O'dell'bey failure to explain how depriving him of the services of the prison law library impeded his attorney's preparation of his criminal case means that he has failed to state a claim for a denial of his right to access the courts. See Awad v. Semple, 2019 WL 1922294, at *2 (D. Conn. 2019); Fowler v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 3401252, at *7 (D. Conn. 2017).

Ashby v. Semple, No. 19-cv-01127 (CSH), 2019 WL 4738742, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2019) (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) and Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)). However, "conclusory, unsupported allegations [of gross negligence or the existence of a policy] are simply insufficient to establish liability of supervisory prison officials under § 1983." Fowler v. Dep't of Correction, No. 17-cv-848 (JAM), 2017 WL 3401252, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017) (dismissing the plaintiff's supervisory liability claim because it was "not supported by specific facts" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In a prior case involving Fowler's alleged mistreatment by DOC, I have ruled that Fowler's "hearing impairment makes him a qualified individual with a disability." Fowler v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 3401252, at *5 (D. Conn. 2017) (quoting Valanzuolo v. City of New Haven, 972 F. Supp. 2d 263, 273 (D. Conn. 2013)). Fowler alleges that he experienced discrimination because the DOC failed to adequately accommodate his hearing impairment by granting him access to the TTY phone during recreation period.

Consequently, I will dismiss his access to the courts claim. See Fowler v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 3401252, at *7 (D. Conn. 2017) (dismissing denial-of-right-of-access-to-courts claim for lack of sufficiently detailed description of underlying court case and how it was impeded by denial of access to prison law library books). Due Process

Fowler alleges that defendants denied him reasonable accommodations for his hearing disability, placed him in restrictive housing, denied him access to various prison amenities, and subjected him to harmful conditions of confinement. See Doc. #11; Fowler v. Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 3401252 (D. Conn. 2017). The DOC and the remaining individual defendants have now made an unopposed motion for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth below, I will grant defendants' motion.

Several district court decisions have held that Connecticut has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act whether for compensatory or injunctive relief. See Super, 2010 WL 3926887, *12; see also Fowler v. Department of Corr., No. 3:17-CV-00848 (JAM), 2017 WL 3401252, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017) (plaintiff may bring official capacity suit against state or its agent under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act). Moreover, the Connecticut Appellate Court, in Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn. App. 123, 131 n.8 (2006) acknowledged the district court's determination in this regard.

The allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Fowler v. Dep't of Correction, No. 3:17-cv-00848, 2017 WL 3401252, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017). 2.