Opinion
H050600
01-26-2024
FOWLER PACKING COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV00673.
BROMBERG, J.
This case arises out of an attempt by a group of homeowners in Santa Cruz to erect a gate across the entrance to a private driveway, which would bar public access to a state beach. Plaintiffs obtained an exemption from the requirement of a coastal development permit under the California Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 30600 et seq.) as well as development and building permits from Santa Cruz County (County), which has established a local coastal plan and been delegated the development review authority of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) in the area covered by the program. (Pub. Resources Code, § 305019, subd. (a).) When the Commission learned of Plaintiffs' gate, it advised the County that a coastal development permit was required and notified Plaintiffs that both the gate at the entrance to the driveway and a bluff-top fence at the end of the driveway violated the California Coastal Act. After negotiations failed, Plaintiffs removed the entrance gate and sued the Commission and the County.
Plaintiffs are: (1) Fowler Packing Company; (2) William P. and Linda Sullivan, Trustees of the Sullivan Family Revocable Living Trust; (3) Mark A. and Suzanne J. Cauwels, Trustees of the Mark and Suzanne Cauwels Family Trust; (4) Mark A. and Suzanne J. Chapman and Carol S. Chapman, Trustees of the 2000 Norman L. Chapman & Carol S. Chapman Revocable Trust; and (5) Dawna Sutton, Trustee of the Sutton Family Revocable Trust.
Plaintiffs asserted two quiet title claims seeking to establish their ownership of the private driveway against claims of public access to Twin Lakes State Beach through the driveway. They also sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission and the County to allow them to re-install the entrance gate and to allow the bluff-top fence. In August 2020, the trial court issued an order granting Plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief and allowing Plaintiffs to reinstall the entrance gate (but not addressing the bluff-top fence). Two years later, in September 2022, after Plaintiffs had served unnamed members of the public by publication and dismissed the Commission from the quiet title claims, the trial court granted a default judgment on those claims.
The Commission now appeals both the mandamus order and the default judgment. Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the Commission lacks standing to appeal the default judgment and that the appeal from the mandamus order is untimely. We conclude that the Commission has standing to appeal the default judgment and that the service by publication on the quiet title claims was defective because it failed to include the address of the private driveway at issue in violation of an express statutory requirement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 763.020,) We also conclude that the Commission's appeal from the mandamus order should be dismissed, but not because it was untimely. Instead, we find that the mandamus order is not an appealable final judgment because it did not address the bluff-top fence and thus failed to resolve all the relief sought by Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, we dismiss the Commission's appeal from the mandamus order for lack of appellate jurisdiction and vacate the quiet title judgment.
I. Background
A. The Private Driveway
Plaintiffs are the legal or equitable owners of five properties in Santa Cruz located on Geoffroy Drive on a bluff above Twin Lakes State Beach. The properties are accessed through a shared, private driveway over which each Plaintiff has an easement. In 2016, Plaintiffs formed the Geoffroy Homeowners' Association to maintain a gate at the entrance of the driveway.
B. The Entrance Gate
In October 2014, Plaintiffs applied for a development permit to construct a gate and fence at the entrance to their private driveway. The County granted the development permit in January 2016. The following month Plaintiff applied for a building permit, which the County granted in April 2016. Plaintiffs then installed a gate at a cost of $175,000.
Plaintiffs did not apply for a coastal development permit, and no coastal development exemption was recorded at the time. However, in January 2018, a county official stated that the County had determined that the gate project qualified for an exemption, and in June 2018 an exemption was recorded on the County's computer system. There were no challenges to the exemption determination, and the County did not ask for the Commission's opinion on the determination, as the Santa Cruz County Code allows. (See Santa Cruz County Code, § 13.20.080, subd. (B).)
C. The Commission's Involvement
The Commission did not become aware of the Geoffroy Drive entrance gate until November 2017 when a staff member of a county supervisor inquired about the gate and whether the Commission had reviewed the application for it. Commission staff determined that the Commission had not and asked the County about the gate. As a result of these inquiries, in January 2018, County staff decided that they may have erred in granting an exemption from the coastal development permit requirement.
In April 2018, Commission staff advised the County that the Geoffroy Drive entrance gate required a coastal development permit. Commission staff also informed the County that there was an unpermitted fence on the bluff at the opposite end of the driveway. Asserting that both the unpermitted entrance gate and the unpermitted bluff-top fence violate the California Coastal Act, Commission staff advised the County that, absent coastal development permits, both should be removed. The Commission offered to coordinate with the County concerning the violations and advised the County that, if it did not take action, the Commission might do so. The County subsequently asked the Commission to take the lead on enforcement.
In May 2018, Commission staff sent Plaintiffs a letter containing a "notice of violation." The letter stated that the Geoffroy Drive entrance gate had created a private gated community at the expense of historic public access to Twin Lakes State Beach and that the gate needed a coastal development permit. The letter also informed Plaintiffs that the bluff-top fence at the opposite end of the driveway was unpermitted. These unpermitted developments, the letter continued, violate the California Coastal Act, subjecting Plaintiffs to daily accruing civil penalties. Finally, the letter informed Plaintiffs that the violations could be resolved by removing the gate or by obtaining an "after-the-fact" coastal development permit.
Over the next three months, Plaintiffs' counsel and Commission staff exchanged letters, with Plaintiffs objecting that they had obtained an exemption from the County and that the Commission's intervention two years after the County granted permits was untimely. In July 2018, Plaintiffs informed the Commission that they would apply for a coastal development permit under protest in order to avoid the threatened penalties. In August, however, Plaintiffs reversed course. They decided to remove the entrance gate, and in February 2019 they sued the Commission, the County and all persons claiming an interest in the private driveway.
D. The Proceedings Below
1. The Pleadings
In their complaint, Plaintiffs brought three claims. The first two claims were to quiet title over their shared driveway. The first quiet title claim was against unnamed members of the public claiming an interest in the driveway as well as the Commission. In the second quiet title claim, which was only against unnamed members of the public, Plaintiffs alleged that any public prescriptive rights had been abandoned and lost.
The final claim in the complaint was for a writ of mandamus against the Commission and the County. Plaintiffs alleged that they had sought a development permit for a gate at the entrance of their private driveway from the County and that the County had properly determined that the gate was exempt from the coastal development permit requirement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Commission had not timely challenged the County's exemption determination, but nonetheless demanded two years later that the County retract the development permit for the entrance gate, demanded that, absent coastal development permits, Plaintiffs remove both the entrance gate and the fence on the "bluff[]top" at the opposite end of the driveway from the gate, and threatened to impose civil penalties if Plaintiffs did not comply with these demands. Alleging that the Commission's actions were arbitrary and capricious, Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission and the County "(a) [to] allow Plaintiffs to re-install the permitted entrance gate to the private drive and EASEMENT area; (b) to allow Plaintiffs to leave the fence improvements that were originally installed prior to the Coastal Act along the Bluff slope described above; and (c) [to] cease and desist its threats of civil administrative penalties for said alleged violation of public access."
After the trial court overruled demurrers to the mandamus claim, the Commission and the County filed answers, and Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Commission from their first quiet title claim, ostensibly because the Commission claimed no interest in their private driveway.
2. Service by Publication on Unnamed Members of the Public
After filing the complaint, Plaintiffs applied for leave to serve it by publication upon unnamed members of the public with an interest in the private driveway, which the trial court granted. Plaintiffs then placed a notice in the Santa Cruz Sentinel Newspaper for four successive weeks. After providing the case number, the notice stated (in all capital letters) that it was directed at "all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to plaintiffs' title or any cloud on plaintiffs' title thereto." (Capitalization omitted.) The notice also identified Plaintiffs and informed the unnamed defendants that they were required to respond within 30 days. The notice did not mention the address of the private driveway or otherwise identify the property beyond noting that it is "described in the complaint." (Capitalization omitted.)
3. The Mandamus Order
In August 2020, the trial court issued an order granting Plaintiffs' mandamus claim. The court found that the claim was ripe for consideration because the Commission had initiated an enforcement action and Plaintiffs had no administrative remedy available to contest the Commission's authority to challenge the County's exemption determination. On the merits, the court found that the exemption determination complied with the County's local coastal plan and that the Commission had no authority to challenge the determination because "the gate and fence were permitted under the County's [local coastal plan] authority" and because the County's exemption determination was "not . . . open to challenges by the Commission many years later."
The trial court then granted the Plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief allowing the gate at the entrance of the private driveway to be reinstalled: "Petitioners' First Cause of Action for a Writ of Mandamus directing the County and the Coastal Commission to (1) withdraw demands for the retraction of their Development Permit; (2) withdraw demands for another CDP [coastal development permit] for the gate and improvements; and (3) withdraw any threat of civil administrative penalties under [Public] Resources Code § 30821 in the event that Plaintiffs do not remove the gate and fence to allow public access to the beach is HEREBY GRANTED."
The mandamus order makes no mention of the bluff-top fence.
4. The Default Judgment
A little over two years later, the trial court entered a default judgment on the quiet title claims. In September 2019, based on the service by publication on unnamed members of the public with an interest in the private driveway, and the failure of any to respond, the trial court entered a default against the members of the public. In March 2020, after dismissing the Commission from the first quiet title claim, Plaintiffs requested a default judgment on the quiet title claims. The Commission objected, and the trial court denied the request without prejudice. In September 2022, Plaintiffs renewed their request, and the Commission once against opposed. This time, however, the trial court entered a default judgment on the quiet title claims.
5. The Notice of Appeal
On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs served a notice of entry of the default judgment. That same day, Plaintiff also served a notice of entry of the mandamus order. The Commission filed a notice of appeal from both the judgment and the order on November 23, 2022.
The Commission elected to use a clerk's transcript, and in response Plaintiffs failed to designate any documents for inclusion in the clerk's transcript. As a consequence, we disregard the declaration attached to Plaintiffs' brief purporting to be a respondent's appendix, which, in any event, appears to improperly contain documents not part of the trial court record. (See, e.g., Mize v. Mentor Worldwide LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 850, 855, fn. 4.)
II. Discussion
A. The Default Judgment
The Commission argues that the quiet title judgment should be vacated because the unnamed members of the public sued by Plaintiffs were not properly served, and the trial court failed to hold a hearing before entering default judgment. In response, Plaintiffs offer little defense of the default judgment, arguing instead that the Commission lacks standing to appeal it. We disagree and conclude that the judgment should be vacated because service was defective.
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
Under section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure (section 902), "[a]ny party aggrieved" by a judgment may appeal it. This requirement "is twofold-one must be both a party of record to the action and aggrieved to have standing to appeal." (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1342.) Plaintiffs contend that the Commission fails to satisfy either requirement and thus lacks standing to appeal the default judgment. We disagree.
The Commission is a party of record. Although Plaintiffs dismissed the Commission from the first quiet title claim, the Commission remained a party to this case because it was a defendant on the mandamus claim. Even more important, the Commission filed briefs opposing default judgment on the quiet title claims. A nonparty may become a party of record for purposes of appeal by intervening and filing a motion to vacate or otherwise opposing judgment. (See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736 (Carleson) ["one who is legally 'aggrieved' by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment"]; see also In re Marriage of Burwell (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [nonparty may become a party of record by moving to set aside a decree]; Stonegate Homeowners Assn. v. Staben (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 740, 745, fn. 1 [moving for new trial]; Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343 (Shaw) [moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict]; In re Sloan's Estate (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 283, 292 (Sloan's Estate) [to become entitled to appeal, a nonparty must "move to vacate or otherwise formally oppose the judgment appealed from below"].) There is no reason to treat differently a defendant that is already party to a proceeding and files briefs opposing a judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission is a party of record with respect to the default judgment because it was a party to the case and opposed the judgment.
We also conclude that the Commission is aggrieved by the default judgment. A party is considered" 'aggrieved'" by a judgment if its "rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment." (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.) To satisfy this requirement, the injured interest "must be 'recognized by law.'" (Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 115.) In addition, the injury to this interest "must be immediate and substantial, and not nominal or remote." (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948 (L.Y.L.).) For example, a party is aggrieved by a judgment that expressly enjoins the party or is binding upon the party as a matter of res judicata. (Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295; see id. at p. 296 [" 'A person who would be bound by the doctrine of res judicata, whether or not a party of record, is . . . [entitled] to appeal.' "]; Leoke v. San Bernadino County (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 772-773 [county entitled to appeal order prohibiting it from assessing back taxes].) Similarly, an individual is aggrieved by a judgment if he or she has a direct interest in a property that is adversely affected by the judgment (see, e.g., Butterfield v. Behlo Corp. (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 483, 485 [purchaser of property]; Sloan's Estate, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at p. 291 [trust remainderman]), or if the individual must indemnify the judgment debtor (20th Century Ins. Co. v. Chong (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1277; Shaw, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343). Finally, even if a party's legal rights are not affected, it may be aggrieved by a judgment that has a direct practical impact on a cognizable interest of the party. (See L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 948 [finding father injuriously affected by denial of one sibling's rights over another sibling because, as a practical matter, recognition of those rights would have given the father parental rights over the other sibling]; Aries Development Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 534, 541 [property owners near a proposed development injuriously affected by judgment exempting developer from permit requirement].) However, a party is not aggrieved by a judgment if the judgment's impact on the party's interests is only speculative or hypothetical. (See In re Cody R. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 381, 390 ["Speculation about a hypothetical situation is not sufficient to support standing."].)
Under this standard, the Commission is aggrieved. The Commission has a legally recognized interest in ensuring coastal access for the public: One of the California Coastal Act's stated goals is to "[m]aximize public access to and along the coast" (Pub. Resources Code, § 30001.5, subd. (c)), and the Commission is entrusted with primary responsibility for implementing the Act. (Id., § 30330.) The quiet title judgment injuriously affects the Commission's interest in ensuring public access by ruling that the public has no right to access Twin Lakes States Beach through Plaintiffs' private driveway. In addition, this adverse impact is immediate, not speculative or hypothetical. Indeed, based on the quiet title judgment, Plaintiffs' counsel already has threatened to seek contempt sanctions against the Commission for continuing to consider whether the public has access rights. As a consequence, the Commission has been injuriously affected by the default judgment, which makes it an aggrieved party with standing to sue under section 902.
This conclusion serves the underlying purpose of section 902's standing requirement." 'The purpose of a standing requirement is to ensure that the courts will decide only actual controversies between parties with sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor.'" (In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 842.) The Commission has a sufficient interest in public access to
Twin Lakes State Beach through Plaintiffs' private driveway to ensure that there is an actual controversy that will be pursued vigorously. Indeed, there does not appear to be any other party with a sufficient interest in those access rights to pursue them.
We reach this conclusion with some hesitation because we have found no precedent applying section 902 to a government agency defending rights of the public that the agency is entrusted with protecting. In construing section 902, however, the Supreme Court has stated that "standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its favor." (See In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) Accordingly, the absence of precedent barring standing in this situation weighs in favor of finding standing here. We therefore conclude that the Commission is a "party aggrieved" by the default judgment with standing to appeal it.
2. Merits
The Commission argues that the default judgment should be reversed because the service of process, which was by publication, was defective and because the trial court failed to hold a hearing, as required by statute, before entering default judgment. We need only consider the first argument, which Plaintiffs do not contest. Reviewing de novo whether the service here was adequate (Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 (Calvert)), we conclude that it was not and the default judgment is void.
Plaintiffs do not address the merits of the default judgment in the argument section of their brief. There is some discussion of the judgment in Plaintiffs' "Summary of Argument" (boldface & capitalization omitted), and the summary contains a citation apparently related to the need for hearings on default judgments. However, there is no argument about the requirements for service by publication.
Because service by publication" 'rarely results in actual notice,'" it may be used "only as a last resort." (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, fn. 5.) In addition, when service by publication is authorized, "the requirements for service of summons by publication must be strictly complied with." (County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 443, 450; see also Calvert, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 963 [" 'If there is any situation in which strict compliance can reasonably be required, it is that of service by publication.' "]; Katz v. Campbell Union High School Dist. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1034 ["strict compliance is usually required when it is served by publication"]; Olivera v. Olivera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 41 (Olivera) ["When substituted or constructive service is attempted, strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the statutes is required."]; Eagle v. Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Keener (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 246, 250-251 ["When jurisdiction is obtained by a prescribed form of constructive notice, . . . there must be strict compliance with the mode prescribed in the statute."].)
Far from strictly complying with the requirements for service by publication in a quiet title action, the service in this case failed to comply with an express requirement for such service. Code Civil Procedure, section 763.020 provides that, when service by publication is used in a quiet title action, the publication must "particularly" describe the property in question and give its street address or common designation: "In addition to particularly describing the property, the publication shall describe the property by giving its street address, if any, or other common designation, if any." (Code Civ. Proc., § 763.020, subd. (c).) The publication in this case does not satisfy these requirements. The publication does not "particularly" describe Plaintiffs' private driveway, nor does it give any street address or common designation for the driveway. Indeed, the only reference to the driveway is in the identification of the defendants, which is in all capital letters and refers to the "property described in the complaint" (capitalization omitted): "ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE, LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT ADVERSE TO PLAINTIFF'S TITLE OR ANY CLOUD ON PLAINTIFFS' TITLE THERETO." This oblique reference to the property is insufficient.
Because service on members of the public was defective, the default judgment issued based on that service is void. (Calvert, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 964; Olivera, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 43.)
B. The Mandamus Order
In addition to moving to dismiss the Commission's appeal from the default judgment for lack of standing, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the Commission's appeal from the mandamus order as untimely. We dismiss this portion of the Commission's appeal for a different reason: The mandamus order did not address all the mandamus relief requested by Plaintiffs and therefore is not a final, appealable judgment.
Because we deny Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal from the quiet title judgment and dismiss the appeal from the mandamus order on grounds not raised by Plaintiffs, we deny Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss. In their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs requested sanctions on the grounds that the Commission's appeal was frivolous. Because the Commission's appeal was not frivolous, and in fact succeeded with respect to the quiet title judgment, we deny the request for sanctions.
"As a general [matter], a litigant may appeal an adverse ruling only after the trial court renders a final judgment." (Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1112.) An order or decree may be a final, appealable judgment even if it is not labeled a judgment:" '[I]t may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except for the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the first decree, that decree is final.'" (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698.) But" 'where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.'" (Ibid.) Thus, when a judgment or order grants a claim but does not provide all the relief sought, it is not a final judgment. (See, e.g., Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 218, 223 (Baker) [judgment finding liability and awarding compensatory damages but not punitive damages is not final]; Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 (Yeboah) [judgment leaving issues of past and future payments for later determination not final].)
Plaintiffs' mandamus claim had two components. The first component concerned the Geoffroy Drive entrance gate: Plaintiffs alleged that the Commission improperly demanded that the County retract the permit for the entrance gate and that Plaintiffs apply for a coastal development permit for it. The second component concerned the bluff-top fence at the opposite end of the driveway: Plaintiffs claimed that the Commission improperly asserted public access rights through the "fenced bluff-top and slope to and from Twin Lakes States Beach." Accordingly, in their mandamus claim, Plaintiffs sought a writ directing the Commission to do two things: (1) "[to] allow Plaintiffs to reinstall the permitted entrance gate to the private drive" and (2) "to allow Plaintiffs to leave the fence improvements that were originally installed prior to the Coastal Act along the Bluff slope."
In the mandamus order, the trial court addressed the entrance gate, but not the bluff-top fence. It found that the County determined that the entrance gate "was exempt from the CDP [coastal development permit] requirement" and that "the Commission no longer has authority to challenge the County's exemption determination." Plaintiffs, however, did not argue that the Commission's challenge to the bluff-top fence was improper because of the exemption determination. Instead, after asserting that the exemption determination precluded the Commission from imposing additional conditions on the permits issued for the entrance gate, Plaintiffs argued that the Commission was "time barred from enforcement of any (alleged and unresolved) violation related to the fence and gate that has long existed atop the northeastern bluff between the private drive and Twin Lakes State Beach." The mandamus order did not address this argument and, indeed, made no mention of the bluff-top fence (or, indeed, the bluff).
The mandamus order did reference a fence, but those references were to the fence associated with the entrance gate. For example, the first paragraph of the order referred to the "exemption determination on [Plaintiffs'] application for a Development Permit to install a gate and fence on their easement." As Plaintiffs did not apply for a permit for the bluff-top fence, the "fence" referenced in this passage necessarily was the fence connected to the entrance gate in their application for an "Over Height Fence/Gate Certification." Elsewhere, the mandamus order referred to an "application" for "installation of a gate and fence across the easement," the "February 2016" installation of "the fence and gate at a cost of $175,000," "the gate and fence . . . permitted and deemed exempt from a CDP [coastal development permit]," the demand to "remove the gate/fence," and "the gate and fence . . . permitted und the County's LCP [local coastal plan] authority." As no application was submitted for the bluff-top fence, that fence was installed long before 2016, and no permit was issued for it, we interpret these passages to refer to the fence associated with the entrance gate.
The mandamus order did note Plaintiffs' request for a writ directing the Commission to withdraw any threat of penalties if the "gate and fence" were not removed without mentioning any application, permit or exemption. However, in light of the many previous references to the "gate and fence," we understand this passage to refer to the fence at the entrance gate. If the order had meant to refer to the bluff-top fence for the first time, it presumably would have said so more clearly and most likely would have referred to two fences, not one.
In supplemental briefing requested by the court, Plaintiffs did not identify any passage in the mandamus order ruling on their request for relief relating to the bluff-top fence. Instead, they pointed to the order's description of the relief sought in the complaint, highlighting references to "improvements" and removing a fence "to allow public access" in the description. (Boldface and underlining omitted.) There is, however, no mention of the bluff-top fence in that description. Nor can any ruling concerning the bluff-top fence be inferred from the reference to improvements. The complaint referred to "improvements" with respect to both the entrance gate and the bluff-top fence; indeed, all but one of the references to improvements concerned the entrance gate.
The mandamus order's references to public access do not help Plaintiffs either. Plaintiffs contend that these references implicate the bluff-top fence because the Commission sought public access to the beach through that fence. There is, however, nothing in the mandamus order supporting this contention. While the order refers at several points to "remov[ing] the gate and fence to allow public access" to the beach, as previously noted, nothing in the order suggests that fence to be removed is the bluff-top fence. If anything, the wording of the mandamus order suggest that it was not referencing the bluff-top fence. The complaint requested a writ of mandate directing the Commission and the County "to withdraw their threat of civil administrative penalties under Public Resources Code Section 30821 should Plaintiffs not remove the gate and bluff fence to allow public access to and from Twin Lakes State Beach." (Italics added.) However, in paraphrasing this request, the mandamus order omitted any mention of the bluff: It stated that Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate directing the Commission "to withdraw a threat of civil administrative penalties under [Public] Resources Code §30821 in the event that Plaintiffs do not remove the gate and fence to allow public access to the beach."
At oral argument, Plaintiffs also asserted that, in granting a coastal development permit exemption, the County implicitly found no right to public access through the bluff-top fence. Plaintiffs, however, made this assertion only obliquely in their briefing below, and they have not pointed to anything suggesting that the trial court agreed with this assertion.
As a consequence, we conclude that the mandamus order did not address Plaintiffs' request for an order directing the Commission "to allow Plaintiffs to leave the fence improvements that were originally installed prior to the Coastal Act along the Bluff slope." Therefore, the mandamus order failed to resolve all the relief sought by Plaintiffs in the mandamus claim and does not qualify as a final judgment. Because there is no final judgment on the mandamus claim, the Commission's appeal concerning that claim must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Baker, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 227; Yeboah, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.) And as we are dismissing the appeal from the mandamus order for lack of final judgment, we do not reach Plaintiffs' argument that the Commission's appeal was untimely or the Commission's arguments concerning the merits of the mandamus order.
III. Disposition
The Commission's appeal from the order granting the mandamus claim is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the order failed to address Plaintiffs' request for relief concerning the bluff-top fence. We therefore remand the mandamus claim for resolution of that request. In addition, the default judgment is reversed, and the quiet title claims remanded for further proceedings, because the service by publication upon the unnamed defendants was defective. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: DANNER, ACTING P.J. ADAMS, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.