Fourth National Bank c. v. Howell

4 Citing cases

  1. Church of the Nativity, Inc. v. Whitener

    547 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    [o]mitting the matter of notice, as against each other, competing deeds are effective only from and after being filed for record. . . . [I]n a contest between deeds upon a valuable consideration, from the same grantor, conveying the same property, such deeds, as against each other, where taken without notice, will take priority only from and after the date of lawful record or filing for record . . .Wadley Lumber Co. v. Lott, 130 Ga. 135, 141 (2) (60 S.E. 836) (1908); see also Fourth Nat. Bank of Columbus v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 876 (2) ( 90 S.E.2d 78) (1955). The trial court reasoned that Allstate's 1974 deed from the Diocese, which created the easement, took priority over the Church's contemporaneous deed because Allstate's deed was recorded first.

  2. Bell v. State

    234 Ga. App. 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    Under OCGA ยง 44-2-1, the sole purpose and effect of recordation of deeds is to afford third parties with constructive notice of the existence of the deed and the information contained within the deed. Bennett v. Southern Pine Co., 123 Ga. 618 ( 51 S.E. 654) (1905); City Wholesale Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151 ( 110 S.E.2d 561) (1959); Fourth Nat. Bank of Columbus v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868 ( 90 S.E.2d 78) (1955). Thus, when the district attorney sets forth in his complaint the legal description of the property and goes further to recite the recordation of the book and page of the deed in the superior court clerk's records, he admitted in judicio to having actual knowledge of the record title owners, i.e., the Bells, or lien owner, as well as date of acquisition, consideration, and conveyor as reflected in the cited deed.

  3. Reidling v. Holcomb

    225 Ga. App. 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 32 times
    In Reidling v. Holcomb, 225 Ga.App. 229, 483 S.E.2d 624 (1997), for example, the court rejected the negligence claim of a purchaser who started construction of a house on the wrong parcel of land.

    Insofar as priority between deeds or bills of sale to the same property from the same grantor are concerned, constructive notice as afforded by its proper recordation is sufficient. McElwaney v. McDiarmid, 131 Ga. 97 (3) ( 62 S.E. 20) [(1908)]." City Wholesale Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151, 154-155 ( 110 S.E.2d 561) (1959); see also Fourth Nat. Bank of Columbus v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868 ( 90 S.E.2d 78) (1955). "The purpose of the recording statute is to protect against the negligent.

  4. Carrollton Production c. Assn. v. Allen

    91 S.E.2d 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)

    The question concerning the clause "to secure present, past or future indebtedness" has been gone into fully by the Supreme Court in Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co., 166 Ga. 480 ( 143 S.E. 503). This principle has been followed continuously. See Zachry v. Industrial Loan c. Co., 182 Ga. 738 ( 186 S.E. 832); Manchester Motor Company v. Farmers Merchants Bank, 91 Ga. App. 811 ( 87 S.E.2d 342), and Fourth National Bank of Columbus v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868 ( 90 S.E.2d 78). The cases cited by counsel for the defendants are not applicable, under their respective facts. The court erred in failing to award the funds in the hands of the sheriff to the Carrollton Production Credit Association, the plaintiff here, since the funds in the hands of the sheriff, (exclusive of court costs) were not sufficient to pay the indebtedness of Watson to Carrollton Production Credit Association.