The rules above mentioned are those announced by our own decisions. See, as to ambiguous contracts, Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 399, 402, 158 N.W. 401, 402; Crowe v. Merchants Life Casualty Co., 202 Iowa 43, 209 N.W. 406; Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 189 Iowa 678, 179 N.W. 203, 18 A.L.R. 1329; Mochel v. Iowa St. Trav. Men's Assn., 203 Iowa 623, 626, 213 N.W. 259, 260, 51 A.L.R. 1327; Carpenter v. Iowa St. Trav. Men's Assn., 213 Iowa 1001, 240 N.W. 639. In Kascoutas v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 889, 892, 179 N.W. 133, 134, it is stated: "And here comes into action the elementary rule that, in construing such exceptions, the court will deal strictly with the insurer, who drafted the proviso, and will resolve all doubt in favor of payment."
It is a fundamental doctrine that, where a policy is ambiguous in its terms, or susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be placed on it which is most favorable to the insured. Kirkpatrick v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 141 Iowa 74; Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 399; Teeple v. Fraternal Bankers' Reserve Soc., 179 Iowa 65. We have also said that, if an exception of liability in an accident policy is susceptible of two meanings, that one is to be adopted which is most favorable to the insured.
But he suffered hernia — this disability, this sickness — before the coverage of the policy was in effect. Foster v. North American Accident Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 86 S.W.2d 476, by this court, answers every suggestion of "ambiguity" made by appellee. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and judgment here rendered for appellant.