The rules above mentioned are those announced by our own decisions. See, as to ambiguous contracts, Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 399, 402, 158 N.W. 401, 402; Crowe v. Merchants Life Casualty Co., 202 Iowa 43, 209 N.W. 406; Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 189 Iowa 678, 179 N.W. 203, 18 A.L.R. 1329; Mochel v. Iowa St. Trav. Men's Assn., 203 Iowa 623, 626, 213 N.W. 259, 260, 51 A.L.R. 1327; Carpenter v. Iowa St. Trav. Men's Assn., 213 Iowa 1001, 240 N.W. 639. In Kascoutas v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 889, 892, 179 N.W. 133, 134, it is stated: "And here comes into action the elementary rule that, in construing such exceptions, the court will deal strictly with the insurer, who drafted the proviso, and will resolve all doubt in favor of payment."
It is a fundamental doctrine that, where a policy is ambiguous in its terms, or susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be placed on it which is most favorable to the insured. Kirkpatrick v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 141 Iowa 74; Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 399; Teeple v. Fraternal Bankers' Reserve Soc., 179 Iowa 65. We have also said that, if an exception of liability in an accident policy is susceptible of two meanings, that one is to be adopted which is most favorable to the insured.
"In the purchase and sale of insurance, as in the barter and sale of goods and wares in the commercial marts, the purchaser can expect to get no more than he pays for." ( Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., (Tex.Civ.App.) 86 S.W.2d 476, 477.) [2] Plaintiff contends that because of its name "Oakland Stadium," the fact of ownership of a race track, and the fact that as between it and the association it would not have permitted the race to be held had it known it was not insured against liability from the ownership of the track, the policy restrictions do not apply to it.
" It cites in support of its answering position these cases and texts: Amicable Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, Tex. Civ. App. 101 S.W.2d 370; City of Providence v. Victor Laurence, 44 R.I. 246, 116 A. 664, 22 A.L.R. 888; Foster v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 86 S.W.2d 476; Hemphill v. Romano, Tex. Civ. App. 233 S.W. 125; Huff v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 95 S.W.2d 498; Indiana Ohio Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Krenek, Tex. Civ. App. 144 S.W. 1181; International Travelers' Ass'n v. Yates, Tex.Com.App., 29 S.W.2d 980; Interstate Casualty Co. v. Martin, Tex. Civ. App. 234 S.W. 710; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, Tex. Civ. App. 102 S.W.2d 454; National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lowery, 136 Tex. 188, 148 S.W.2d 1089; Republic Ins. Co. v. Fulbright Ind. School Dist., Tex. Civ. App. 125 S.W.2d 1052; Salitrero v. Maryland Cas. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 260; Scanlan v. Home Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 79 S.W.2d 186; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Baldwin Motor Co., Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 815; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Rothwell, Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 759; 42 C.J., page 717, Sec. 169; 42 C.J., page 679, Sec. 107, Subsection 3. This court agrees with the trial court and affirms its judgment; indeed, the sole question presented seems t
But he suffered hernia — this disability, this sickness — before the coverage of the policy was in effect. Foster v. North American Accident Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 86 S.W.2d 476, by this court, answers every suggestion of "ambiguity" made by appellee. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and judgment here rendered for appellant.
In view of the undisputed facts, we do not think it can be correctly said that any injury was inflicted on the insured by reason of the automobile being disabled; we fail to find in the facts any causal connection between the injuries to the car and the death, which in our opinion, resulted solely from the insured being struck by the passing interurban car, and independently of any injury to the automobile, the only connection being that the disablement of the automobile and the death of the insured were caused simultaneously by reason of the same force, but otherwise were not related. In the case of Foster v. North American Acc. Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S.W.2d 476, the court had under construction an identical provision of an accident policy. The automobile in which the insured was riding ran into a depression, throwing him against the top of the car and inflicting serious injuries.