Opinion
January 18, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Washington County (Dier, J.).
Defendants Moses Ludington Hospital and Marguerite Hillgrove served plaintiffs with a demand for a bill of particulars and, after receiving a response thereto, moved for an order of preclusion or, in the alternative, to compel a more particularized statement as to demands numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Supreme Court, finding, inter alia, that the motion was premature in that examinations before trial had not been completed, denied the motion. The hospital and Hillgrove appeal, and we reverse.
Without addressing each individual response to the enumerated demands, suffice it to say that they are as vague and open ended as those found to be insufficient in Morris v Fein ( 177 A.D.2d 915) and, contrary to Supreme Court's assertion, nothing in the CPLR limits the use of a demand for a bill of particulars until after disclosure.
Cardona, P.J., Mikoll, Casey and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and motion granted to the extent that plaintiffs are precluded from presenting proof with respect to the matters referred to in demands numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 unless plaintiffs serve a responsive bill of particulars within 30 days of the date of this decision and order.